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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the following pages, I would like to give an overview of my doctoral thesis, presenting 
briefly the issues treated in each chapter. The first part of the thesis is composed of three 
chapters of theoretical and empirical introduction, with an extended review of the literature 
relevant for my experimental investigation. The second part is composed by seven chapters in 
which is reported the original research that I performed during the past three years. This 
research is aimed at demonstrating the high flexibility and contextuality of embodied and 
situated simulation processes. 
Chapter 1 outlines at a very general level the theoretical context in which my empirical 
work on human cognition has been developed. First of all, I give a brief outline of the 
propositional theory (e.g., Fodor, 1975; Marr, 1982), which has been the dominant view in 
cognitive science in the last decades. Then, the contrasting perspective brought in cognitive 
science by embodied and grounded cognition theories is outlined. In this view, the 
meaningfulness of our psychological representations depends on the ability of the human 
body for sensing the world and acting in it (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; 
Gallese, 2008; Gibbs, 2006; Glenberg, 1997; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Zwaan, 2004). As this 
approach strongly emphasizes the relation between knowledge and action, the reciprocity of 
the subjects and the environment where they are embedded is assumed as the basic structure 
that sustain the very same possibility of any human behavior, including cognition: this mutual 
relation is what embodiment calls situatedness (e.g., Barsalou, 2009). According to the 
embodied view, activations and re-activations by situated simulation in the brain systems are 
considered the basis of any cognitive process (Shapiro, 2010). Mental simulation is always 
characterized by situatedness itself, as it puts again the subject with his/her first-person 
perspective in the same context in which those experience were initially produced.  After 
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discussing in detail the notion of situated simulation, the chapter is concluded with a brief 
theoretical and empirical overview on the process thought to sustain situated simulations at 
the neural level. This brain mechanism is called motor resonance, and it is discussed 
reviewing briefly some relevant findings in behavioural and neuroscientific literature in 
respect to object, action and language processing.  
Chapter 1 sustain that simulation is what underlies cognition and concepts, presenting 
several relevant findings in the literature in support of this assumption. Among this evidence, 
there is the Affordance effect. Chapter 2 provides an extensive theoretical and empirical 
introduction to this issue, as it is the first experimental topic of this thesis. Chapter 2 is opened 
with the discussion on the notion originally proposed by Gibson (1979), which defined 
affordances as properties in the environment relevant for the goals of an organism that acts in 
it. Then, different contemporary theorizations are presented starting from those proposals that, 
explicitly rejecting the notion of mental representation, described affordances as dispositional 
properties of the environment that need to be coupled with some dispositional properties of 
the acting organisms (e.g., Michaels, 1993), or as relations between the features of a situation 
and the capabilities of a subject (e.g., Chemero, 2003). The discussion follows focusing on 
alternative perspectives, that focused on the relations between affordances and conceptual 
knowledge (e.g., Borghi, 2005). In this view, the human ability to interact appropriately with 
external objects is tied to the capacity of categorizing them, storing conceptual information 
about them, and linking their concepts to names (e.g., Borghi, 2005). Also the notion of 
micro-affordances (Ellis & Tucker, 2000) as potential elements of specific actions is 
described. Intended as brain representations of action possibilities, micro-affordances are the 
outcome of the linkage between action-related responses and previously stored sensory-motor 
experiences. Along this line, a last view related to common coding approaches is examined; it 
proposes that an affordance is realized by allowing an automatic translation of perceptual 
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object features to action that occurs in overlap with the prediction of the action effect features 
(Haazebroek et al., 2011). Thus, representational perspectives on affordances describe them as 
relations between situational features, individual abilities and subjective intentions. This 
relational nature is confirmed by a number of empirical findings (obtained with behavioral 
techniques as well as neurophysiological, neuroimaging, etc.) that are then presented along 
the chapter (e.g., Binkofski et al., 1999; Borghi et al., 2007; Chao & Martin, 2000; Craighero 
et al., 1999; Grafton et al., 1997; Grèzes & Decety, 2001, 2002; Rumiati & Humphreys, 1998; 
Pellicano et al., 2010; Phillips & Ward, 2002; Tipper et al., 2006; Tucker and Ellis, 2001). 
This research indicates that at the behavioural level the perception of manipulable objects 
leads to the activation of appropriate representations based on sensory-motor simulations. The 
neuroscientific evidence confirms that objects are represented in the brain as potential action 
patterns by the neural mechanism of motor resonance, indicating canonical neurons as the 
substrate that sustains affordances (e.g., Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2011; Martin, 2007; Rizzolatti 
et al., 1998). Subsequently, as objects, and in particular tools, can be endowed with multiple - 
and sometimes conflicting - affordances, the proposals to distinguish between manipulative 
and functional affordances (e.g., Bub et al., 2008) as well as between stable and variable 
affordances (Borghi & Riggio, 2009) are examined in depth. This discussion shows that the 
simulation elicited by the very same object varies across different contexts or under different 
action intentions (e.g., Borghi et al., 2012; Kalénine et al., 2013; Natraj et al., 2013), even if 
with single objects there seems to be an advantage for manipulative affordances activation in 
perceptual and motor tasks (e.g., Jax & Buxbaum, 2010).  The chapter is closed extending the 
discussion to the motor resonance triggered by the observation of actions performed by other 
agents (e.g., Calvo-Merino et al., 2005, 2006). In this final section several findings are 
presented to suggest that our brain is able to give meaning to others actions by a motor 
simulation modulated by the similarity between the observed actions and the ones we are able 
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to perform, being the resonance tuned to one’s own motor skills and repertoire (e.g., Aglioti et 
al., 2008; Perani et al., 2001; Pezzulo et al., 2010; Tai et al., 2004).  
On the whole, chapter 2 overview shows that the emergence of affordance-based 
compatibility effects is influenced by a number of action-relevant objectual features, as by 
action intentions and tasks goals. Thus, this theoretical and empirical introduction suggest a 
flexible and situational nature of the affordance effects, as the results indicate that sensory-
motor simulations selectively integrate different properties in dependence of the current 
context.  
Chapter 3 provides the theoretical and empirical introduction to the embodied and 
grounded cognition view applied to language. Indeed, verbal language is the second 
experimental topic of this thesis. Embodiment, following the neural exploitation (or reuse) 
principle (e.g., Anderson, 2010; Gallese, 2008), claims that during language processing  is 
triggered a situated simulation that recruits the same sensory-motor areas active during the 
interaction with the objects/entities that language refers to. Thus, in order to comprehend 
words or sentences, an internal re-enactment of the state of the world that is linguistically 
described is activated by mean of multimodal simulations (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Zwaan, 
2004). In the chapter, sensory-motor representations evoked by language are described in 
detail starting from a review of behavioural and kinematics evidence on words and sentences 
processing. The findings in the literature confirm the idea that (perceptual and motor) 
simulation guide comprehension during the exposure to linguistic materials. This simulation 
appears to be rather specific, as it depends on different kinds of modality (e.g., Pecher et al., 
2004) and on the time of the exposition to the linguistic cues (e.g., Boulenger et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, linguistic triggered simulation appear to be sensitive to a number of objectual 
properties presented in the real world by their referents, like shape (e.g., Tucker & Ellis, 
2004), size (e.g., Gentilucci et al., 2000; Glover et al., 2004), orientation (e.g., Stanfield & 
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Zwaan, 2001) and also color (e.g., Connell & Lynott, 2009). The simulation is sensitive to 
different perspectives on the linguistic described scenes (e.g., Borghi et al., 2004), to motor 
characteristics of the described events (e.g., Zwaan et al., 2004), and reproduces the typical 
location in which referents are experienced in every-day life (e.g, Estes et al., 2008; Šetic´ & 
Domijan, 2007). Simulation processes also iconically represent the referents’ affordances 
(e.g., Myung et al., 2006) and the spatial configuration of the referents’ parts (e.g., Zwaan & 
Yaxley, 2003; Borghi et al., 2004). Also eye-tracking data support these findings, showing 
that an oculomotor search of external space accompanies the mental search in internal 
memory of object-related knowledge (Spivey & Geng, 2001). Finally, the sensory-motor 
simulation triggered by linguistic contents re-enacts action-relevant features at different fine-
grained levels, that can include both action goals as well as effector-specificity (e.g., Glenberg 
& Kaschak, 2002; Scorolli & Borghi, 2007; Borghi & Scorolli, 2009). Overall, the 
behavioural evidence reviewed in the first part of chapter 3 clearly indicate that the simulation 
is tied to linguistic content in a very precise manner, showing a high degree of specificity and 
flexibility in dependence of the linguistic content and the described context.  
The neuroscientific literature on both words and sentences is subsequently reviewed, 
to confirm that the simulation occurs in a very precise manner. This evidence shows that a 
resonance mechanism is at work during language processing, and that it is constrained in a 
fine way by language contents. Indeed, as the hypothesis of embodiment is that language 
recruits the same (or contiguous) sensory-motor areas as for real action and interaction with 
objects, it behooves that brain activation should display the same topography for processing 
language as for processing visual objects, affordances, actions, etc. (e.g., Jirak et al., 2010). A 
number of studies on action/object-related words (e.g., action verbs, names of tools) are 
reviewed to confirm this somatotopic organization for the brain’s linguistic system (e.g., 
Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006; Buccino et al., 2005; Hauk et al., 2004; Pulvermüller, 1999, 2005; 
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Simmons et al., 2007; Tettamanti et al., 2005; Willems et al., 2010). Along with somatotopy 
also evidence of the involvement in language processes of the mirror neuron system is 
reviewed (e.g., Gallese, 2008; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004), as in the literature those topics 
are connected because they both rely on the theoretical principle that language is sustained by 
the perception-action neural circuits. On the whole, the evidence reviewed support the idea 
that action/object-related language comprehension elicits a resonance directly connected to 
somatotopy, and possibly to the mirror neuron system. In general it can be affirmed that 
somatotopy of language contents can be consistently identified in premotor regions, 
conclusion that bolsters embodied accounts. The fact that the same cannot be affirmed for 
motor cortices’ involvement is not a problem for embodiment. Indeed, it is possible that this 
indicate a different role played by motor cortices in the direct execution and observation of 
actions, in comparison to actions conceptualization and linguistic description (Jirak et al, 
2010). This is predicted by the neural reuse principle, according to which language flexibly 
recruits some characteristics of the motor system to modify and building on them in function 
of the current context.  
The discussion then focuses on a very important point about the relation of language 
comprehension with sensory-motor processes. Indeed, the largest part of the literature on 
simulation and resonance reviewed so far in the chapter was aimed at demonstrating the 
similarity of the simulation triggered by language in respect to the simulation triggered by 
objects/actions processing. Instead, the idea that I propose is that there might be important 
differences, with the support of recent approaches and evidence, either reviewed in this 
chapter (e.g., Borghi & Riggio, 2009; Costantini et al., 2011). Interestingly, these findings 
indicate that in linguistic tasks functional affordances are more likely to be activated, in 
contrast with the results collected in non-linguistic settings reported in chapter 2 (e.g., Jax & 
Buxbaum, 2010). This suggests that linguistic content simulations put the subject in the most 
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frequently experienced situation, which is the use context, activating a motor prototype of the 
objects/actions linguistically denoted that is mostly based on stable affordances and function-
related features. This points out that the simulation triggered by language comprehension 
differs from the activation during observation and interaction with objects at least in regards 
of the kind of predictions it produces (Borghi, 2012). 
Another fundamental issue afterwards outlined in chapter 3 concerns abstract 
language. Indeed, the literature on simulation and resonance discussed so far built its view of 
language grounding mostly relying on investigations about action/object-related language. 
However, theoretically it should be possible to extend what said so far for concrete 
concepts/words to abstract ones, as embodiment assumes the existence of a single 
representational format for both kinds, either grounded in perception-action and introspection 
systems and characterized by a (multi)modal nature. But, as pointed out by Barsalou (2008, p. 
634), “how can theories that focus on modal simulations explain concepts that do not appear 
modal?”. Thus, the chapter follows with the review of the three principal embodied attempts 
of solving this question, which sums up the symbol grounding problem (Harnad, 1990). The 
first explication is based on conceptual metaphors (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999; 
Santiago et al., 2011). The second, on the re-enactment of action-features (e.g., Glenberg & 
Robertson, 2000; Glenberg et al., 2008). The third - and more promising in my point of view - 
takes into the discussion the possibility that multiple representations underlies concrete and 
abstract concepts. Among the proposal within this third account, the Words As social Tools 
theory (WAT) is detailed in particular. WAT suggests that a different modality of acquisition 
(MoA, i.e., perceptual, linguistic, mixed, see Scorolli et al., 2011) is what lead to the 
contrasting results obtained for each of the two kinds of words/concepts in the literature. 
Several findings that support this idea are reviewed, confirming that concrete words/concepts 
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rely (more) on the sensory-motor system, while abstract words/concepts rely (more) on the 
linguistic system in function of their MoA. 
In the final part of chapter 3 language grounding, which have been considered so far 
exclusively from an ontogenetic point of view, is discussed also at the phylogenetic level. The 
starting point of the discussion is the basic assumption, common to  many embodied 
perspectives on language evolution, of a gestural origin for contemporary verbal languages 
(e.g., Arbib, 2005; Corballis, 2002; Flumini, 2011; Gentilucci & Corballis, 2006; 
Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001). Human language could have existed in an original, entirely 
gestural form analogous to contemporary signed languages, with a gradual, phylogenetic 
blending of vocal components in this kind of linguistic system (Corballis, 2009). As the 
principal grounding property that actually observable gestural languages, signed languages, 
exhibit is iconicity (e.g., Corballis, 2009; Emmorey, 2002; Pietrandea, 2002; Pizzuto & 
Volterra, 2000), intended as the spatiotemporal resemblance in the mapping of signs to 
meanings, the discussion is focused on the analogue of iconicity detected in speech, a process 
called sound-symbolism (e.g., Hinton et al., 1994). Several scholars already suggesting that it 
played an important role in the evolution of vocal languages. Sound-symbolism is indeed 
considered as a sort of phylogenetic grounding for verbal language (e.g. Kita, 2008; Kita, 
Kantartzis, & Imai, 2010; Kovic et al., 2009; Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001). The 
hypothesis discussed is that if visual iconicity is the system for agreeing upon referents in 
gestural languages, sound-symbolism - intended as the natural, non-arbitrary link between the 
sound and the meaning of a word – might have been this system for speech in its initial 
pahses. The evidence reviewed in the final part of the chapter supports this idea, showing a 
reality of sound-symbolism in modern lexicon, at both developmental and cross-linguistic 
level (e.g., Imai et al., 2005; Imai et al., 2008; Iwasaki, Vinson, & Vigliocco, 2007; Kantartzis 
et al., 2011; Maurer et al., 2006; Nielsen & Rendall, 2011; Nygaard et al., 2009). This boosts 
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recent hypotheses (e.g., Perniss et al., 2010) that indicate iconicity as playing a decisive role 
at different levels for both spoken and signed language. Indeed, it is very likely that symbolic 
resemblance relations might be crucial for more than one fundamental aspect of language. For 
example, in phylogenesis iconicity may facilitate displacement, that is the ability to refer 
about things distant in time and space. In ontogenesis, it might provide the mechanism for 
establishing referentiality, linking linguistic form and meaning to facilitate word learning and 
following meaning generalization and lexical access. Finally, in language processing iconicity 
might facilitate grounding of words in sensory-motor and emotional systems, thus 
determining embodiment. This discussion closes the overview on verbal language. On the 
whole, chapter 3 indicates that perceptual and motor simulation guide linguistic content 
comprehension. Simulation processes, that seem to be automatic at the word level, at the 
sentence level occur when all available information is integrated (e.g., Fischer & Zwaan, 
2008). Furthermore, simulation and resonance are associated with linguistic content in a very 
precise manner, and this shows an high degree of specificity and flexibility in dependence of 
the current context (even if only implied by language). 
Chapter 4 opens the second part of the thesis, that is the experimental section. The 
behavioural study reported in this chapter (Borghi, Flumini, Natraj, & Wheaton, 2012) has a 
twofold aim. First, this study is an attempt to extend the evidence on affordance-based 
compatibility effects, mostly based on objects in isolation, to a more ecological situation, 
corresponding to complex visual scene including a tool, another object and a hand interacting 
with them. Second, the effects of different kinds of contexts on the activation of affordances 
are investigated (see par. 2.5). Indeed the presence of a second object along with a tool 
allowed the creation of different visual contexts defined by the tool-object relation, as the two 
items could be either spatially, functionally or not related. Moreover, the active object and the 
second object were presented either alone, with a hand in potential interaction with the tool, 
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or with a hand in effective interaction with the tool, in both a manipulative or functional 
posture. In this setting, the study tried to address the issues pertaining the relationship 
between different affordances (i.e., manipulative/functional) evoked by the same active object 
displayed in different contexts (i.e, move/use). The results of Experiment 1 revealed a clear 
action-context compatibility effect: manipulative postures are favored by move contexts and 
inhibited by use contexts, while the reverse was true for functional postures. This confirms the 
hypothesis that the emergence of object affordances is selectively modulated by the visual and 
social context displayed by the pictures. Additionally, as in the first experiment responses 
were manual key-presses, a second experiment controlled if foot responses could be able to 
replicate the observed effects. The results of Experiment 2 did not show the compatibility of 
hand actions and contexts, suggesting that the findings of Experiment 1 are due to an effector-
specific motor simulation, rather than to simple associations between contexts and hand-
postures. On the whole, this study shows that the emergence of affordance effects is tied to 
the visual scene in which objects are embedded, thus confirming the hypothesis that 
affordance activation is flexible guided by the context. 
The study reported in chapter 5 further investigates the influence of different contexts 
on affordance activation (Kalénine, Shapiro, Flumini, Borghi, & Buxbaum, 2013). In this 
case, the study is focused on a particular class of tools, called conflict objects, that are objects 
endowed with multiple affordances associated to different actions (see par. 2.5.). For 
example, a kitchen timer may be clenched with a power grip to move it, while it requires to be 
pinched with a precision grip on its active part in order to use it. In the present experiment, to 
test the hypothesis that the simulation during conceptual object processing would follow the 
guide of the context displayed in naturalistic situations where the objects are embedded, 
participants were asked to categorize (i.e., natural/artifact) conflict object pictures presented 
in different complex visual scenes that evoked either move- or use-related actions (i.e., 
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move/use context). Categorization judgments were performed on a manipulandum ad-hoc by 
executing a move- or use-related action (i.e., clench/pinch). The results showed shorter 
latencies when the motor response and the visual context were compatible, with the effect 
being particularly marked for pinch responses in the use-context compared to the move-
context. This confirms the action-context compatibility effect observed in chapter 4 with 
conflict objects too. This evidence demonstrate that the emergence of different affordance-
based compatibility effect related to the same object is flexibly biased by properties of the 
current context that are relevant in selecting appropriate actions. 
The study presented in chapter 6 compares the simulation triggered by the processing 
of visual objects with the simulation triggered by language (Flumini, Barca, Borghi, & 
Pezzulo, under review). While the largest part of previous research has been aimed at 
demonstrating their similarity, recent proposals highlighted the possibility of finding also 
important differences in the simulation related to objects and words (e.g., Borghi & Riggio, 
2009; see par 3.4). In order to clarify this issue, a categorization task (i.e. artificial/natural) 
tested the emergence of affordance-based compatibility effects presenting pictures of 
manipulable objects in Experiment 1, and the names of those objects in Experiment 2. 
Participants reported their choice using either a big mouse, requiring a power grip, or a small 
mouse, requiring a precision grip. The results of Experiment 1 showed a compatibility effect 
between the grip required by the mouse and the grip elicited by the pictures in function of the 
depicted objects size. The same effect was not found in Experiment 2 results, however the 
compatibility of hand postures and size  interacted with the category of the target-names (i.e., 
artificial/natural). This finding is predicted by theories of reuse, which suggest that when 
language recruits structures and mechanisms characteristic of the sensory-motor system, the 
simulation triggered modifies and builds on them. On the whole, the hypothesis that visual 
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and linguistic stimuli evoke a simulation that is characterized not only by similarities, but also 
by differences, is confirmed by this study.  
Chapter 7 reports a study aimed at testing the predictions advanced by the Words As 
social Tools theory (WAT) about the grounding of concrete and abstract words (Borghi, 
Flumini, Cimatti, Marocco, & Scorolli, 2011). According to WAT, the differences between 
abstract and concrete words have to be referred to their different modalities of acquisition 
(MoA, e.g., Wauters et al., 2003; see par. 3.5). The hypothesis that abstract words meaning is 
more strongly grounded in socio-linguistic experiences, while concrete words meaning rely 
more on sensory-motor experiences, was tested in four experiments. In order to mimic the 
acquisition of novel concrete and abstract concepts, participants were submitted to a training 
in which they manipulated invented objects (i.e., concrete entity) and observed groups of 
invented objects interacting in novel ways (i.e., abstract relations) on a screen. A subsequent 
recalling task measured participants learning requiring them to judge whether the two 
elements presented on the screen belonged to the same category or not. Then, a second 
training presented each item with a category label, that could be or not accompanied by an 
extended explanation of the category meaning. The recalling task was then repeated and 
followed by a category-label verification task, where participants were presented with the 
previously seen exemplars along with other novel elements and a label and required to decide 
which of the items corresponded to the label. The results showed that, across the experiments, 
it was more difficult to deal with abstract than with concrete categories, even when the labels 
were added. A third task differed across the experiments. In Experiment 1 participants 
performed a feature production task, aimed at controlling if the properties produced with the 
novel categories matched the patterns evoked by real existing concrete and abstract words. 
The result confirmed the typical pattern found in the literature (i.e., concrete words evoked 
more perceptual properties than abstract ones). In Experiments 2, 3 and 4, the third task 
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consisted of a color verification task with manual/verbal responses (i.e., 
keyboard/microphone). The results showed that, in function of the different MoA, novel 
concrete words evoked more manual information, while novel abstract words more verbal 
information. On the whole,  these finding support WAT predictions and confirm the idea of 
multiple representations approaches that indicate the grounding of abstract words relying 
mostly on socio-linguistic interactions (e.g., Vigliocco et al., 2009).  
Chapter 8 reports a further investigation about the grounding of abstract concepts 
(Flumini & Santiago, in preparation). The study in this case is focused on the metaphoric 
mapping of an abstract dimension on a more concrete one (see par. 3.5). In particular the 
TIME IS SPACE metaphor was investigated, with the aim to clarify the issue of automaticity 
in the activation of conceptual mappings. In the literature, compelling evidence showed that 
the TIME IS SPACE metaphor consists in the use of a mental timeline (i.e., a concrete 
schema) to organize and spatially represent the abstract contents of temporal expressions. 
Prior investigations aimed at testing the activation of the mental timeline in time-irrelevant 
task have produced mixed, unclear evidence. In two experiments, we improve the design of 
typical space-time compatibility effect studies, presenting participants with both a time-
relevant and a time-irrelevant task (i.e., temporal reference judgment and lexical decision, 
respectively) on an identical set of tensed Spanish verbs and pseudo-verbs (i.e., both 
categories of stimuli were endowed with past and future tense markers). This allowed to 
perform a trustworthy statistical comparison of the two tasks results. Furthermore, 
Experiment 1 measured reaction times and accuracy as in previous research, while in 
Experiment 2 also the kinematics of the mouse trajectories performed by participants to 
respond were recorded. The principal finding in both experiment indicated that the left-right 
mental timeline was activated only when the task required explicit temporal discriminations. 
On the whole, the results stays in favor of a flexible account for the activation of conceptual 
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mappings, what fit well with the evidence reported for affordance-based compatibility effects 
in the previous chapters. 
Chapter 9 reports the last experimental investigation on verbal language, a study 
focused on sound-symbolism (Flumini, Ranzini, & Borghi, under review). Following the 
assumption that speech evolved from gestures, several scholars have already suggested that 
sound-symbolism could have played an important role in the phylogenetic evolution of 
contemporary vocal languages (e.g., Corballis, 2009). Recent research has also highlighted 
the possible role of iconicity in language as a mean to ground the linguistic-communicative 
medium in the sensory-motor characteristics of words referents (Perniss et al., 2010; see par. 
3.6). These hypotheses are thought to be supported by a number of findings, among them the 
evidence of iconic correspondences between the sound of invented words (i.e., strident, 
sonorant) and information from various modality, especially vision (e.g., Maurer et al., 2006). 
The empirical literature on sound-to-meaning mappings, however, exhibit some 
methodological problems. In particular, it is striking that the research has been limited to ad-
hoc figures, created especially for such experiments. To assume sound-symbolism as playing 
a role in natural language evolution and grounding implies the necessity of observing it in the 
most possible ecological settings. Thus, the hypothesis of the reported study was that sound-
shape correspondences would be observed when participants had to choose, between two 
invented words, the name which better suited an image representing an every-day, common 
entity. As stimuli reproduced every-day entities, a following hypothesis was that this effect 
would be modulated by the entity category (i.e., artificial/natural). The results confirmed the 
“classic” sound-shape correspondence with this more ecological images, showing the effect 
both in Experiment 1, when participants chose a name for figures of natural objects (e.g. leaf) 
and artifacts (e.g. fork), and in Experiment 2, when participants chose a name for figures of 
natural (e.g. animals) and artificial agents (e.g. robots). Furthermore, a modulation of the 
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category emerged when participants had to name agents. On the whole, these results extend 
sound-symbolic correspondences to known entities, demonstrating the reality of sound-
symbolism and validating the idea that sound-to-meaning correspondences could have played 
a crucial role in language evolution. 
Finally, a general discussion of the six studies with their implications is presented. 
This discussion is aimed at summarizing the results observed, and at highlighting their 
original contribution to the hypothesis that embodied simulation processes related to both 
affordances and verbal language are flexibly tied to the context, as it is defined at the 
experimental level by the materials used, the kind of mappings evaluated, the training 
performed, the responses executed and the goals of the task.  
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Notes 
All human studies reported in this thesis have been approved by the appropriate ethics 
committee and have been performed in accordance with the ethical standards of the 
Declaration of Helsinki (1964). 
 
Some references along the thesis may appear to be redundant, but they were repeated in order 
to allow an autonomous reading of each chapter. 
 
The studies presented in chapter 4, 5 and 7 are published in international journals. The studies 
presented in chapter 6 and 9 are actually submitted to the editorial board of two international 
journals for peer reviewing. The study presented in chapter 8 is actually in preparation and 
will be submitted as soon as possible to an international journal. 
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PART I 
Theoretical framework and literature review 
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1. Embodied and grounded view of cognition 
 
In the first chapter I sketch the classic cognitive science view of cognition, then I contrast it 
with the new perspective brought in by embodied and grounded cognition theories. 
Describing the embodiment framework, I refer about the notions of concepts, simulation and 
situatedness, basic elements to understand how cognition works in this account. Finally, I 
briefly refer about the neural mechanism that might sustain embodied simulation. 
 
1.1. Classic cognitive science view of cognition 
For many years, cognitive scientists have described the human brain as an information 
processing device, receiving sensory input, transforming it through some algorithmic process 
(that manipulate that input like a software) and producing a meaningful output. This idea, 
called the Human Information Processing metaphor, is described in many seminal works, for 
instance in Fodor (1983) and Marr (1982). Classic applications of this framework have 
resulted in accounts of cognitive processing that are largely serial and modular, with different 
processes specialized in particular types of information and transformations. 
 The traditional view of concepts was built by many scientists (e.g., in the area of 
Cognitivism) on this idea. The mind was considered no more than a processing software 
endowed with the ability of syntactic manipulation symbols. Concepts would be generated in 
the human cognitive system by a syntactical combination of symbols which are abstract, 
arbitrary and amodal (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975; Fodor, 1983; Pylyshyn, 1973, 1986). 
Following this classical perspective, perception and action are low level, fixed processes 
(Fodor, 1975), peripheral with respect to the higher level processes which are characteristic of 
the human behavior (the “sandwich model”, Hurley, 2002). This independency pertains not 
only low and high level properties, also perception and action were described as totally 
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independent (e.g., Sternberg, 1969). Thus, no penetrability of perception is allowed, neither 
for action nor for cognition (Pylyshyn, 1999): all perceptual process have always to happen in 
the same, constant manner. So, as the most simple or the more complex categorization 
process is fixed and identical for each individual, every human being shares the very same 
world. No situation, no context in which cognition could take place may be influential on its 
processes, properties and products. Life was totally neglected in this account of human 
cognition. 
In the classical framework, sensory-motor processes were strictly separated from 
cognitive processes. Perception and action were no more than an input and an output devices: 
perception, which occurs at each time in the same way, always precedes action. What is 
perceived is independent from both the movements and the knowledge that produce goal-
directed action, as the motor system carries out only executive functions. In this way, 
concepts and meanings were static psychological elements, that must be posited as 
autonomous from both the body of the human subject and his environment. Thus, the 
structure of concepts in the mind would simply consist of lists of properties or statements that 
are represented in a propositional way (Fodor, 1998). In the cognitive science literature many 
authors have proposed accounts of the nature of this propositionality, which was thought not 
only in the form of pure statements, but also as semantic networks (Collins & Quillian, 1969; 
Collins & Loftus, 1975), propositional networks (Anderson, 1983), scripts (Schank & 
Abelson, 1977), frames (Minsky, 1975). A transduction process is always necessary in order 
to transform the information collected by the lower level processes in symbols available and 
usable for the mind. As cognition serves for knowing, not for acting, the transduction final 
products would arise as still representations, with no linkage with the human organism 
properties. 
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It is clear why such a perspective has been named AAA view: concepts and meanings 
are represented in the mind as abstract symbols arbitrarily linked to the world, with no need of 
being distinguishable for any modality property. Neither the influence of the bodily existence, 
nor of the ambient in which such behaviors take place, are considered as aspects that could 
shape our perception of entities and relations in the external world. When the mind is 
conceived as the particular (human) software necessary for the manipulation and combination 
of abstract symbols organized in static linguistic schemes, it has necessarily to be independent 
from the hard-wired structure in which the software itself is implemented (as any software is). 
This is why the hardware – our body and brain, with their natural functioning – fall 
completely out of this description: it is simply an unnecessary part for understanding human 
cognition.  
A consequence of the fact that any knowledge of reality would be organized in a 
linguistic-type form has been that some scientists, to operationalize the classical view, have 
proposed mathematical models for the extraction and evaluation of words’ meanings, 
considering it as the preferential way to understand and study concepts. In fact, assuming that 
knowledge is propositionally organized, the representation of a concept was reduced to the 
lexical co-occurrences presented by its name in the lexicon: it is the semantic relatedness 
between each element and the whole system what can define the meaning of a concept. In the 
last years at least two well-known models have approached the investigation of concepts and 
meanings in this way: they are the Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA, Landauer & Dumais, 
1997) and the Hyperspace Analogue to Language (HAL, Burgess & Lund, 1997). The 
outcomes of the two statistical models are based on mathematical computations performed 
over selected corpus of texts in order to determine word-to-word or global co-occurrence 
values for each of the word/concept examined. In both systems the meaning of a word is a 
vector, hence a point in a virtual space organized in matrices. It is possible to calculate the 
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distance between words, the value of which represents their degree of semantic relatedness. 
The values obtained by these mathematical calculation simply index if the words appear in 
similar or different contexts, but the authors, assuming that each concept/meaning would be 
always the same for every subject, affirm that an appropriate set of these dimensions may be 
considered as a unified representation of human knowledge (Landauer & Dumais, 1997).  
Even if LSA and HAL have received some demonstrations of their predictive validity 
(e.g Deerwester et al., 1990; Landauer et al., 1998), it is doubtful if they really can be 
considered theories of human cognition, as claimed by their authors. Indeed, they propose that 
the meaning of an abstract symbol (i.e., a word) arises from its relations to other undefined 
abstract symbols. Well-known philosophical arguments – of the type of the Chinese Room 
(Searle, 1980) – are enough to reveal that such abstract and arbitrary symbols need to be built 
on something more than relations to other similar symbols, if somewhere they must became 
meaningful for a real subject. With a simple thought experiment (from Harnad, 1990) it is 
possible to show that cognition is not what they assume, introducing at the same time a core 
question in the embodied theoretic framework. Imagine that a man lands at an airport of a 
certain country without speaking the local language. He notices an advise printed in that 
language, which is only a collection of abstract and arbitrary symbols for him. To understand 
it, he can only use a dictionary of that language (i.e., the relations of LSA and HAL), which 
obviously – like the advise – consists for him of nothing more than meaningless symbols. He 
searches for the first word in the dictionary, but he does not understand any of the words in 
the definition or their meaning. So he goes on looking at the first word found in the definition, 
but as before he does not know the meaning of the words of that definition, and so on. At the 
end, for many definition he could have read, he would never figure out the meaning of those 
words: for all the structural relations he could determine among the arbitrary abstract symbols 
cannot help him in catching anything meaningful. The point is that he cannot anchor such 
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relations to anything known and understandable to him. It implies that in order to know the 
meaning of an abstract symbol, as it is each of LSA vectors or any word of a certain language, 
the symbol need to be grounded in something more than other abstract symbols. Only such a 
grounding could make meanings really accessible for a subject. The issue that here emerges 
has been called the Symbol grounding problem (Harnad, 1990), and the questions it sum up 
about how human cognition create meaningful representation are enough to discard the classic 
propositional view of cognition, concepts and meanings. This kind of issues in the last two 
decades made the embodied perspective on cognition gain support from a wide variety of 
disciplines, ranging from neuroscience and psychology to philosophy, cognitive linguistics 
and artificial intelligence (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Berthoz, 1997; Cangelosi et al., 2007; Clark, 
1997, 1999; Prinz, 1997; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; O’Regan & Noe, 2001; Pulvermüller, 
2005; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Talmy, 2000). 
 
1.2. Embodied and grounded view of cognition and concepts 
Embodiment is the theoretical framework ascribable to those perspectives of cognition based 
on the idea that the particular body in which a mind exist shapes its properties, contents and 
possibilities, as already proposed for example by Phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty, 1965; for a 
theoretical discussion see Flumini, 2009) and Gestalt psychology (Kohler, 1947). In this view, 
the meaningfulness of our psychological representations of the world rests on the capabilities 
of the human body for sensing it and acting in it. In this direction, concepts are thought to be 
directly grounded in our bodily experiences (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; 
Gallese, 2008; Gibbs, 2006; Glenberg, 1997; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Zwaan, 2004). In this 
view conceptualization correspond to the storage in long-term memory of those multi-modal 
states that arise across the brain’s systems during perception, action or introspection (intended 
as the internal state which could include affect, intentions, metacognition etc.). Concepts can 
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be considered as simulators capable of the re-enactment of the neural activation patterns that 
were active when we have perceived or interacted with certain entities in the world (Barsalou, 
2008, 2009). External objects/entities are rebuilt in the mind by way of perceptual symbols 
combinations, which are analogically (not arbitrarily) connected to their mundane referents 
(Barsalou, 1999). Indeed, perceptual symbols properties depend on the different type of 
modal information (visual, auditive, tactile, propioceptive, motoric etc.) they convey, which is 
directly related to the particular interactions in/with the environment that the subject has 
performed in everyday experience. In this way, concepts and categories become learning 
products, capable to trace in the mind the real format of their referents. With the partial re-
enactment of the multi-modal states they are grounded in, embodied concepts allow a 
meaningful representational use in the mental workspace which is called embodied simulation 
(see par. 1.3) and can include also prediction about novel situations (Barsalou, 2009).  
The embodied view of concepts shiftes the focus on the contextuality and flexibility of 
cognition, highlighting that concepts are neither fixed nor static. Indeed, the cognitive system 
needs to be able to build on experience to acquire new concepts as they become relevant in 
everyday life, thus a concept can be developed for any salient component of experience which 
attention has repeatedly selected (Barsalou, 1999). For example, when attention focuses 
repeatedly on a certain type of object in experience such as cars, a concept is developed for it. 
Analogously, if attention focuses repeatedly on an action (e.g., driving), a concept is 
developed as well. Because selective attention is flexible and open ended, a concept could 
develop for any element repeatedly experienced over time, but even the grounding of the most 
simple concepts involves a very specific set of experiences depending from the individual 
(physical) skills (Anderson, 2003). It is why a concept as TABLE would not be the same for a 
toddler and an adult. The possibilities conveyed by the object (its affordances, see chapter 2 
for extensive description of this topic) for an adult are of putting things on it, even of sitting 
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on it, while a toddler would probably see other possibilities, as walking or standing on it. 
Thus, the meaning of a situation depends from the bodily experiences collected in the motor 
repertoire (see par. 1.4), and fundamental for embodied concepts is the role of development, 
including the personal history of the subject as whole, for example the social norms present in 
his culture. Furthermore, the resulting set of available responses depends from the individual 
goals and how they can apply to the actual situation (all these aspects are discussed in detail 
in chapter 2). Indeed if our motor representations of external objects takes into account the 
constraints imposed by the body along with the constraints present in the environment, in 
order to render our behavior really adaptive it needs to follow the guide of our current 
purposes too. For example, when is time to paint the walls, in absence of a ladder a table 
could become a good place to stand on for an adult too. 
The characterization of cognition as grounded relies on the assumption that human 
knowledge is the outcome of a close coupling between bodies and environment. For 
understanding cognition (and all mental activity) is foundational the context where it happens, 
not only the (local) context determined by the mind’s dependence from the particular 
properties of the human body, but also to the (global) context of its being always situated (by 
the bodily existence) in the physical and social ambient which constitute the external world. 
In this perspective, action is no more the mere execution of responses that sequentially 
follows perceptual processes (as said in par. 1.1). The subject, with his goals, is no more a 
simple observer detached from the world, but he builds his own world by acting in it and on 
it. It is why both the state of the motor system and the planning of responses can influence the 
perception of the present situation (e.g., Hommel et al., 2001; Prinz, 1997; see par. 2.2). For 
example, preparing to grasp an object results in facilitated processing for similar 
shaped/oriented objects (e.g., Craighero et al., 1999); and also the classic mental rotation task 
(e.g., Shepard & Metzler, 1971) is executed faster and more accurately, if people concurrently 
34 
 
perform a manual rotation in the same direction as the required mental rotation (Wexler, 
Kosslyn & Berthoz, 1998). Thus, as the grounding of conceptual knowledge is the results of 
repeated interaction with objects, entities and events in the external ambient, in the embodied 
view there is permeability and circularity between perception, action and cognition (e.g., 
Glenberg, 1997; Zwaan, 2004). 
  
1.3. Simulation and situatedness: no context, no cognition 
The functions recognized in embodiment to simulation are many, as much evidence indicates 
it as a basic neural computational mechanism (e.g., Barsalou, 2008, 2009; Gallese, 2008; 
Gibbs, 2006; Jeannerod, 2001; Martin, 2007; Pecher & Zwaan, 2005; Pulvermüller, 2005; 
Semin & Smith, 2008). What here is intended for simulation is that when a concept is stored, 
and represents all the instances of a certain category, aspects and properties of its content can 
be re-enacted by an emdodied simulation. It does not mean that simulation is a 
representational process that necessarily reaches consciousness. If it does, and some simulated 
aspects become conscious, they emerge as elements of aware mental imagery (Barsalou, 
2009). The whole content of a concept could not become simulated simultaneously, only 
small subsets can be activated at a time to represent particular instances of the concept in 
particular scenes and occasions. When a car is simulated, for example, it might be a big suv, a 
two seater sport car or an electric car, as all the experienced contents for CAR reside 
implicitly in the car concept/simulator: any subsets can be re-enacted on different occasions, 
tailored to the specific context which elicited it. As concepts can be developed in semantic 
memory for objects, events, relations, actions etc., an important issue of embodiment 
concerns in which way simulations of abstract concepts (those concepts which do not have a 
direct perceptual referent, e.g., DEMOCRACY) are grounded (see par. 3.5 and chapter 7 and 
8). Here it would be enough noticing that it has been proposed that simulators for abstract 
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concepts generally capture complex multi-modal simulations of temporally extended events, 
with simulation of introspections being central in this process (Barsalou, 1999, 2009). 
According to this, simulators develop to represent categories of internal experience just as 
they develop to represent categories of external experience. In support of this account stay 
empirical studies which confirmed that both concrete and abstract concepts contain extensive 
amounts of situational information, but that abstract concepts tend to contain a greater amount 
of information on introspections, individual states and events (e.g., Barsalou & Wiemer-
Hastings, 2005; Borghi, 2004; Borghi et al., 2011; Wiemer-Hastings et al., 2001; Wu & 
Barsalou, 2009). 
Simulation is what sustains the representation in the mind of any categories’ instance 
not only in its actual perception, but also in its absence, for example during memory or 
thought (e.g., Gallese, 2008; Barsalou, 2008). It is also what represent all linguistic contents, 
from single word to complex propositional structures (e.g., Barsalou, 2009; Glenberg & 
Gallese, 2012). It can produce inferences or predictions based on the previous experience 
about a category instance or a specific situation (Barsalou, 2008; Pezzulo & Castelfranchi, 
2009). It is also what fulfills and give meaning to abstract concepts (further discussion of this 
point in par. 3.5). Thus, in the embodied framework simulation is able to implement all the 
functions of the classic AAA symbolic systems, but its functionality emerges implicitly from 
modal and associative brain systems, rather than being directly represented in the symbolic 
structures (Barsalou, 2009).  
One of the fundamental aspect of embodied simulation, important to highlight for the 
aims of this thesis, is its situatedness (Barsalou, 2008; 2009). Indeed, concepts are processed 
out of the typical isolation indicated by AAA theories, as they are always situated in 
background settings like scenes, or events. When representing a car, for example, people do 
not represent it in isolation, but in relevant situations. Subjects situate concepts at least 
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because when the brain simulates a perceptual experience while representing a concept 
instance, it should simulate it in a certain situation because situations are intrinsic in real-
world perceptions (Yeh & Barsalou, 2006; Barsalou, 2009). Indeed, perceptual activity 
depends from the embeddedness of the subject in a physical (and social) context: a human 
being always perceives the space around the body, which includes objects, events, agents etc.; 
in everyday life, if we focus the attention only on a particular entity/event in the perceived 
scene, the background situation does not disappear, but continues to be perceived, because 
total isolation in the real world is impossible. Thus, as the situation never disappears, when 
we built a simulation to represent a category instance we tend to simulate it in a relevant 
perceptual scene: the simulation is always situated because in real life cognition is always 
situated, as a direct consequence of its correlation to a living body.  
In different occasions, the simulation process would give place to different situated 
representations; conceptualizations that are more specialized are constructed in place of single 
general representations, as the latter would be indefinite, thus not able to support the relevant 
inferences which are necessary for adaptive behavior in specific situations. This aspect is also 
compatible with well-known principles of cognitive load economy (e.g., Zipf, 1949). If we 
consider for example the representation of a chair, according to the traditional view it would 
be represented as a generic list of amodal propositions which become simultaneously active 
every time an instance of the category is processed. According to the embodied view, the 
cognitive system would produce many different situated representations of the concept 
CHAIR, each of them based on individual previous experiences, but also anchored to the 
present context. It means that the grounded concept works in a way that would help the 
human agent in the interaction with the peculiar chair present in that specific situation. Thus, 
one situated simulation for chair could support the goal of sitting on it, while others could 
support moving it, or repairing a broken leg etc. In the embodied and grounded cognition 
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view, a concept is not the single, general and propositional representation of the category, but 
rather the concept is a subject skill, that is the ability to produce a wide variety of situated 
representation in order to allow the achievement of the goals in the specific contexts in which 
the simulation was triggered. To notice here that a multi-modal simulation is something built 
out of many different concepts activation. For example, the situated simulation of driving a 
car would include the necessary different sub-simulations for any involved object, action, 
agent, setting and also internal state (e.g., being afraid of a weat road). Actions, entities and 
introspections are re-enacted from the conceptualizer particular perspective, so during 
simulation the subject is put in that situation with the first-person experience of being there 
(Barsalou, 2009). This means that the situation is no more represented in separation from the 
knowing subject, because cognition is not possible out of any context. 
To summarize what said about simulation so far, our cognitive processes are 
constrained by the body and the modal sensory systems. Activations and re-activations in 
these systems by simulation are the basis of cognition (Shapiro, 2010). Simulation identifies 
objects and agents, sustains thinking about events or places, predicts behavioral 
consequences, makes situated plans for action, and so on. Thus, according to this view, to 
know what entity is in front of a subject, he must simulate the previous experiences (visual, 
auditory, sensory-motor etc.) with it. Additionally, when reasoning about or imagining that 
entity, similar simulations serve as the cognitive operations’ basis: all thoughts on that entity 
rely in some ways on these modality-specific simulations, because even abstract thoughts rest 
on the possibility offered by embodied simulation. Finally, as it relies on reactivation of real-
life experiences, simulation is always situated, as it puts again the subject with his/her first-
person perspective in the same context in which those experience were initially produced. 
 
1.4. Neural substrate of embodied simulation 
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In this paragraph I briefly describe the neural substrate where situated simulation processes 
rest. As it is fundamental for some of the results of my investigations on the two empirical 
topics of this thesis, that are affordances (see chapter 2) and verbal language (see chapter 3), it 
will be discussed further in the next introductory chapters.  
The neural substrate for simulation is offered by the mechanism of motor resonance 
(review in Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). It was revealed by well-known neurophysiological 
studies on the macaque brain, which confirmed the idea that concepts are structures which can 
reactivate past interactional experiences in the mind. These studies found in the monkey’s 
premotor cortex, especially in the area F5, two kinds of visuomotor neurons, named canonical 
and mirror neurons (e.g., Di Pellegrino et al., 1992). What was observed during the imaging 
of this brain areas is that the canonical neurons system is active in the direct execution of 
actions (e.g., the action of grasping a banana), with that same set of neurons being active 
during the merely observation of objects (e.g., a banana). The mirror system instead is active 
during goal-directed action execution (e.g., the action of grasping a banana) and during the 
observation of actions performed by other agents (e.g., other monkeys or experimenters 
grasping a banana), while it seems that no neural activity is detected in this system during the 
observation of objects presented alone (see par. 2.4). 
In the last years, much research has been aimed at extending the evidence collected on 
animal populations to human subjects, and the results suggesting that in the human brain there 
are cortical circuits endowed with functions similar to monkey’s F5 area. Indeed, as predicted 
by the supposed existence of a canonical neuron system, much evidence showed that our 
brain is able to resonate to the action afforded by external objects. For example, in an 
experiment in which participants were asked to mentally manipulate the objects they were 
presented with, brain activity was shown in the prefrontal, parietal and motor cortex (Grèzes 
& Decety, 2001). Similar circuits were active during execution of the hand grips evoked by 
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manipulable objects (Grèzes et al., 2003). At the same time, a great number of results 
collected with fMRI during passive viewing of objects showed an analogous fronto-parietal 
activity (e.g., Binkofski et al., 1999; Chao & Martin, 2000), which was also found in PET 
studies (e.g., Grafton et al., 1997). 
The motor resonance to others’ actions, supposed to be mediated by a human mirror 
neurons system, has been intensively studied too. For example, a fMRI study (Buccino et al., 
2004) investigated functional activations in human subjects during the observation of videos 
of biting and communicative gestures, performed not only by humans, but also by monkeys 
and dogs. Independently from the species, viewing biting actions activated in the participants 
regions (thought to be part) of the human mirror system, while viewing communicative 
gestures elicited activation of the human mirror systems only for actions performed by 
humans (lip-reading) and monkeys (lip smacking), not by dogs (barking). In the same 
direction, reduced mirror activity was found as the consequence of observation of actions 
performed by a robotic hand, compared to human hand actions (e.g., Perani et al., 2001). 
These results implies for the activation of the mirror system, and so for the emerging of a 
motor resonance, a fine-graded structure, which is modulated (at least) by similarities in the 
body structure of the observer and the agent observed (I further discuss this point in par. 2.6).  
Furthermore, another fMRI study (Buccino et al., 2001) found that when a subject 
observes different type of actions, involving respectively as effector the mouth, the hand or 
the foot, selected neural areas – the same that map the first-person execution of those actions - 
are actived in dependence of the effector used for the action. This selective activation of 
different cortical areas in dependence of the observation of different kinds of action observed 
revealed a somatotopic organization for the human brain. In the literature, this was confirmed 
also in empirical studies on verbal language (e.g., Pulvermüller, 2005; Hauk et al., 2004). For 
example, Tettamanti et al. (2005) found differences in the brain activity that were triggered by 
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the exposition to sentences referring to actions performed with different effectors: the mouth, 
the hand or the leg. The three categories activated selectively the brain regions involved in the 
real performance of the action they referred to; additionally, activity in Broca's area was 
detected independently from any effector-specificity, implying a special role in language 
processing. Similar evidence was observed also with TMS (Buccino et al., 2005) in a study 
where the recording of motor evoked potentials from hand and foot muscles found a 
decreasing amplitude during the exposition to sentences respectively describing hand and foot 
actions. The authors performed a behavioral study too, which extended the TMS results 
showing that participants responded faster to hand action sentences with a pedal and to foot 
action sentences with a keyboard. The inhibition effect observed in both neurophysiological 
and behavioral measures by Buccino et al. (2005) showed a modulation of the motor system 
activity during the comprehension of action language which is symmetrical to the effect 
emerged with the observation of actions in video of Buccino et al. (2001). Similar behavioral 
findings were also observed in a lexical decision task performed on words that referred to 
mouth and hand actions (Scorolli & Borghi, 2007, I further discuss this topic in par. 3.2 and 
3.3). 
Thus, the reviewed results on motor resonance support of the simulation hypothesis, as 
the simple exposition to visual and linguistic stimuli referring to objects/actions implies the 
activation of the same neural patterns that sustain the real, first-person interaction with objects 
and performance of that actions. Furthermore, the behavioural evidence clearly indicates the 
bidirectional link between perception, action (low level process) and language (high level 
process) which is predicted - as described in par 1.2 and 1.3 - by the embodied and grounded 
view of cognition. 
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2. The Affordance Effect 
 
The first topic of my thesis concerns the experimental investigation of the affordance effect in 
different context. In this chapter I discuss the literature on affordances both at a theoretical 
and empirical level, discussing first the original notion of affordance by J.J. Gibson, then the 
differentiation of this notion in contemporary literature. I review important empirical evidence 
on affordances based on research at both the behavioral and the neural level, describing the 
functioning of the compatibility paradigm, the same used in my experiments to investigate the 
affordance effect in different (visual and social) contexts. Finally, I refer about the distinction 
between manipulative and functional affordances (my empirical investigation on these topics 
is reported in chapter 4 and 5), which reveals the high contextuality and flexibility of 
affordances, and about the mechanism of motor resonance, thought to be the substrate which 
sustains their emergence at a neural level. 
 
2.1. The origins of the notion of affordance 
J.J. Gibson was the first psychologist to use, in his works on visual perception, the notion of 
affordance. His theory, condensed after three decades of research on vision in the well-known 
volume The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Gibson, 1979), defined affordances 
as something that the environment offers to living organisms for tuning their actions to the 
surrounding physical reality: “The affordances of the environment are what it offers the 
animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill” (Gibson, 1979, p. 127). Thus, an 
affordance can be defined as an invitation to act, which presuppose both an action context as 
an agent. Gibson wrote that “an affordance cuts across the dichotomy of subjective-objective 
and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is equally a fact of the environment and a fact of 
behavior. It is both physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to the 
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environment and to the observer” (Gibson, 1979, p. 128). The concept of affordance has its 
origins within the Gestalt psychology research. The Gestaltists argued that we perceive the 
function of a thing as quickly as the color. Gibson, quoting Koffka (1935), said that “each 
thing says what it is […] a fruit says eat me, water says drink me” (Gibson, 1979, p. 137). It 
means that we are able to see directly what these objects/entities are for, and how to use them 
too.  
Affordances were described as phenomenal in their nature, and not as physical 
properties of objects. Indeed an affordance is, rather than an object or a part of it, the outcome 
of a dialectic process which involves both acting organisms and external ambient. Such an 
idea reveals that the ecological approach to cognition is a view that strongly emphasizes the 
relation between knowledge and action, assuming the reciprocity of the 
perceiving/acting/knowing organism and the surrounding environment as its basic structure. 
We already indicated in the precedent chapter (par 1.3) that a similar mutual relation, which 
can be identified as situatedness, is a basic idea also for embodied and grounded views of 
cognition. 
The ecological approach was entirely constructed by Gibson on his research on visual 
perception, which marked an important innovation with respect to the traditional approach 
reserved to perception by Cognitivism. Here it can be useful to identify the differences 
between the two theorizations, as the cognitivist theory of perception was based on the 
traditional perspective on cognition (whose theoretic view was discussed in par 1.1). 
Cognitivism considered the perceiving subject as an entity detached from the surrounding 
environment, a pure observer. Visual perception was reduced to the mechanical impression of 
images in the eye produced by the stimulation of the retinal receptors by light (Merleau-
Ponty, 2003). In the ecological perspective of Gibson, this situation simply does not exist, 
because in real visual perception the external world is not composed of geometrical solids on 
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a plane, as in a painting. Gibson rejected the retinal image principle, and claimed that on the 
contrary, what sustains our possibility to see is the existence of an ambient optic array: what 
we perceive is the whole array of the refrained light rays that reach us. The idea is that 
structure existing in the surface of the environment structures in turn the light, and the angles 
created in the refrained light directly provide the observer with visual information on objects, 
entities, textures, substances, events in the environment. Thus, it is the structure of light, 
rather than the stimulation of light, that furnishes information in visual perception: stimulation 
per se does not lead to visual perception (Bruce, 2003), as revealed by the perceptual 
experiences experimentally induced in a Ganzfeld (e.g., Avant, 1965; Gibson & Dibble, 1952; 
Gibson & Waddell, 1952). It is why the ambient optic array has been shortly defined as “how 
things look from here in these conditions” (Noë, 2004). As a consequence of the ecological 
approach starting point, in this view perception can be defined as the bottom-up process of 
direct registration of the invariants present in the ambient optic array. The optical flow 
invariants are obviously what Gibson identified with the term affordance, and this is why he 
claimed that the right level for understanding visual perception is the one set by ecology: as 
these invariants are relative to animals, they cannot be understood in the terms of optic or 
physics, nor reduced to a geometrical description, like the traditional theory of perception 
tried to do.  
Another fundamental point of difference from Cognitivism concerned its assumption 
that perception is a mediated process. Indeed, ignoring the perceiver natural surroundings, the 
traditional theory considered the structure of light as not adequate for specifying the 
properties of the environment, so it invoked the supplement of inference processes, or stored 
representation etc., in order to explain perception. In the ecological view, perception is a 
direct process not in the need to be sustained by memory, conceptual inferences or any other 
high level process: “You do not have to classify and label things in order to perceive what 
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they afford” (Gibson, 1979, p. 134). As said above, an organism can directly perceive objects 
in the world just picking up the invariants in the optic array, this is enough to specify all the 
entities and events present in the environment, and no identification is needed to benefit of 
their invitation to act. The ecological psychology assumed with the direct perception of 
affordances an ability of the individual to resonate to the ambient like a tuning fork, which 
responds to sound frequencies without doing any sort of information processing. Gibson 
stated overtly that organisms have evolved to develop the possibility of accessing relevant 
information about the environment directly from the invariant structures in the array, without 
any mediation of higher level processes.  
A fundamental aspect, that is connected to the latter and was originally highlighted by 
the ecological theory and later recognized also in embodied theory, is the assumption that 
perception is an active process. Indeed “invariants of structure do not exist except in relation 
to variants” (Gibson, 1979, p. 87). The variants are identified both with the movement of the 
observer and entities in the ambient, where the possibility for the perceiver to actively explore 
the world is considered a very powerful way for collecting information. When an organism 
moves the entire optic array is transformed: the transformation contains information about the 
layout and shape of objects and surfaces, and about the perceiver’s same movements in the 
ambient too. It is evident that here perception itself is a form of action. If traditional cognitive 
theories described visual perception as the passive detection of retinal sensations, Gibson 
always underlined the mutuality of perception and action. 
A final point important to notice here, as it follows from the active view of perception 
and it is also fundamental for the embodiment view, is the complementarity of the perceiving 
organism and the environment. In the traditional theory visual perception was the processing 
of the retinal reflections of light stimulation without any context. It implied a fixed pathway, 
that goes from the outside to the inside of the observer. Against the theory of visual 
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impressions, the ecological approach stated that perception of the environment is 
simultaneously perception of the self: “Perception of the world and of the self go together and 
only occur over time” (Gibson, 1979, p. 87). As affordances are neither objective properties 
nor subjective ones, and at the same time they are both, they can cut across the classic 
dichotomy of subjective-objective. They are the conjoining of subjective and objective, which 
fulfilling the netherland between the perceiver and the world creates the contact point 
necessary for adaptive behavior. It is why, as said, invariants make sense only for variants: 
affordances only take meaning from a specific system’s point of view as anchored to the 
environmental context. This makes organisms and environment linked and mutually 
interdependent: not only an organism needs an environment, but also the environment implies 
organisms acting in it. 
To briefly summarize, affordances are invariants in the ambient (optic array) that can 
be registered directly by our perceptual system, with no more effort that just picking them up. 
Affordances are holistic in nature, as when we look at the external objects/entities we do not 
perceive geometric perimeters, dimensions, physical properties etc.: we perceive their 
affordances. Affordances cannot be considered as something exclusively objective or 
subjective; reciprocally, they cannot be considered as something purely physical or psychical. 
Indeed they are equally “a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. […] An affordance 
points in both ways, to the environment and to the observer” (Gibson, 1979, p. 129). So 
affordances are structures whose nature depends both from the specific bodily properties of 
the acting organism and from its being in a certain specific context (the surrounding 
environment): affordances are intrinsically relational properties, which exist and operate only 
in a perception-action loop (Turner, 2005). If the conditions sustaining the emergence of 
affordances pertain to both the agent and the ambient, or - as better said above - to their 
complementarity, this assumption is fundamental for the perspective on the contextuality of 
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cognition that guides this thesis. Indeed since affordances depend from both bodies and 
ambient, as from both perception and action, they could be intended not only as relational, but 
also as situated and contextual structures, even if it could mark a discontinuity with their 
original notion.  
 
2.2. Contemporary perspectives on affordances  
The notion of affordances have been employed so far in many areas of cognitive science in 
the last decades. In ergonomy, for example, the notion has been extensively used in well-
known exploration of the properties of cognitive artifacts; for example Norman (1988) 
discussed the roles of affordances and natural mappings for usability; Gaver (1991) applied 
and extended the notion investigating the design of computer displays; Robertson (1997) used 
it for studying the situational features that support remote cooperation. Other examples of the 
use of the concept can be commonly found in the literature on anthropology (e.g., Cole, 1996; 
Wenger, 1998; Holland et al., 2001), and also in the literature on education (e.g., Hammond, 
2010; Roth et al., 1996). In cognitive psychology, the contribution given by Gibson 
challenged as said many long-accepted ideas, thus at the beginning many authors (e.g., 
Neisser, 1977) have refused his proposal. However, then started an attempt (e.g., Neisser, 
1994, 1995; Shepard, 1984) to bring together the classic approach, which highlights high level 
functions and top-down processes, with the gibsonian ecological approach, in which central is 
the information present in the ambient collected in a bottom-up way. Gibson's notion of 
affordance converged with cognitive representationalism in a view which affirmed that not 
only perception, but also imagination, thought and even dream are similarly guided by 
internalizations of long-enduring constraints in the external world (Shepard, 1984). This is a 
foundational step in the development of a useful notion of affordance for describing the 
relations between perception, action and cognition in simple and complex behaviours. The 
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contemporary views of affordances that I discuss below can be differentiated exactly for their 
resort (or not) to conceptual representations. 
Nowadays the value of the ecological approach for cognitive psychology has been 
widely recognized, even if the term affordance is sometimes used in slightly different ways 
with respect to Gibson notion, in function of specific attempts to unfold what an affordance 
really is. The largest part of the post-gibsonian attempts have described affordances as 
dispositional properties in the environment that are in the need to be supplemented by certain 
dispositional properties pertaining to the individual organism. These approaches explicitly 
reject the notion of mental representation (e.g., Michaels, 1988, 1993; Michaels et al., 2001; 
Shaw et al., 1982; Turvey, 1992). A recent, radical perspective has even refused the definition 
of affordances as dispositional environmental properties, because although they are 
considered as relative to an agent, they cannot be identified with properties. In this view, they 
are better described as the relations existing between the features of a situation and the 
abilities of an individual (Chemero, 2003, 2009). Far from being a minor point, there is an 
important epistemological reason to mark the difference between properties and features 
(Costantini & Sinigaglia, 2012). Indeed, in order to perceive a certain property of an object a 
subject needs first of all to identify the object itself, and then to recognize that such an object 
really has the aforementioned property. But in the original gibsonian view, as said above, to 
perceive an affordance a subject does not have to identify the particular entity in question 
(Gibson, 1979): what is needed is simply the ability to resonate with the ambient and perceive 
immediately that the specific situation as a whole supports - in a certain measure imposes - a 
certain kind of action. Thus, only the situation as a whole is what can exhibit that certain 
feature (Chemero, 2009). In the same vein, neither the notion of individual abilities are 
explained in terms of dispositional properties, as the concept of ability would show a certain 
degree of normativity: individuals endowed with particular abilities are supposed to have the 
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possibilities of behave in certain specific manners, but without having any guarantee of doing 
it successfully. On the other hand dispositions are not something that can succeed, nor fail: 
simply, they are or not in the adequate situation to make their emergence and manifestation 
possible. Furthermore, individual abilities are not just reciprocally interconnected, but 
hierarchically organized: all higher abilities are grounded on the more basic ones, which are 
obviously the primary motor abilities. It implies that if in a certain context the basic motor 
abilities cannot be exercised, no one of the higher could be (Chemero, 2003). And according 
to the motor possibilities defined by having a certain body, basic affordances could be 
distinguished in two main categories: micro-affordances and macro-affordances (Costantini & 
Sinigaglia, 2012). The notion of micro-affordances (which I discuss further in the following 
part of this paragraph, to show that actually they have a different connotation in the work in 
which they were originally proposed) pertains transitive, object-centered interactions: micro-
affordances are active if the situation suggest behaviors like grasping, pulling, biting, kicking 
etc.. Macro-affordances (or walking like affordances) instead indicate motor abilities as 
locomotion or navigation, thus are elicited when the situation suggests behaviors like walking, 
jumping, climbing etc. 
From the aforementioned perspectives, which explicitly reject the notion of mental 
representation, seems that if affordances directly support us in interacting with objects, 
concepts are not in the need to come into play for behaving successfully. Indeed, the possible 
behaviors are entirely specified by the pattern induced by the environment in the perceiver, or 
by the features of the situation as imposed by the perception-action loop. It is very likely that 
such views, even if they are more in line with the original proposal of the ecological 
approach, could may be applied to simple affordances (i.e., the ones related only to very basic 
motor skills), not to those affordances that elsewhere have been defined as complex (e.g., 
Turner, 2005). Indeed, scholars that have focused the discussion on the possible relations 
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between affordances and conceptual knowledge (e.g., Borghi, 2005) have already noticed that 
there are some problems within the above described views, especially when it is taken in 
consideration more than simple actions in a merely physical world. In this alternative 
perspective on affordances, our ability to interact appropriately with objects depends also on 
the capacity of categorizing objects storing conceptual information about them, and on the 
capacity, fundamental for homo sapiens, to link concepts with names (Borghi, 2005). 
Concepts, intended as the cognitive and internal aspects of categories (Barsalou et al., 2003; 
Borghi, 2005), are the mental glue (Murphy, 2002) necessary to connect our previous 
experiences to the actual interactions with the world. Indeed, if we consider the affordances 
derived from a slope blocking our way, it is possible to quickly pickup from the situation the 
affordance of going back, or climbing the obstacle. But if we consider the affordances derived 
for example from a bicycle, many behaviors are simultaneously afforded: the handles may 
afford grasping, the seat sitting, etc.; to coordinate action successfully, catching the global and 
conventionalized affordance of the bike, that is to ride it, we need to access some form of 
previous knowledge related to experiences with bikes. We need this conceptual information in 
order to know how to react properly to each affordance. Thus, it is in particular the ability to 
use tools appropriately what reveals as fundamental the possibility of combining actual 
affordances with the previous experience of that object (or a similar one) and with any 
previous experience of its conventional function (Borghi, 2005), even if this experience is not 
direct: the information regarding object affordances can be acquired socially, as human are 
able from very early stages of development to extract the meaning of a situation simply 
observing others, by mean of imitation (e.g., Marschall & Johnson, 2003). In this view, 
another fundamental element to take in account is the goal that subject has in interacting with 
the external objects/ambient: the intentions of the actor are in the need to have an effect on 
action (as said in the previous chapter, see par 1.2 and 1.3) if human behavior would exhibit 
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fitness in adapting to the real demands of the physical and social world. Indeed, if for example 
the action of grasp and move a blender might be elicited automatically by perceiving it 
visually, the act of using the blender for beating eggs is something more, resulting not only 
from the basic motor abilities of the subject, but also from stored knowledge and goal-
directed intentions, and the act to wash it after cooking implies further representations and 
capabilities, the selection of which is again driven by the agent’s specific goals. Thus, the link 
between the perceived properties of the object and the subject possible actions might be based 
on a stored representation of the particular object (Humphreys, 2001) and, furthermore, to the 
mediation of conceptual knowledge and conventionality it is to add also the one of action 
intentions (Borghi, 2005). This perspective highlights not only the relational character of 
affordances, but also the high grade of flexibility in their emergence, their being driven by the 
context and the situation as a whole. 
 In a similar direction, an influential views of affordances indicated them as “states of 
the observer” (Ellis & Tucker, 2000, p. 453). In contrast to the notion of dispositional 
properties of objects and events, or features of a situation, as discussed above, the definition 
of micro-affordances originally proposed by Ellis & Tucker (2000) look at them as 
dispositional properties of a viewer’s brain, arising as the result of adaptations of the nervous 
system not only during phylogenetic evolution, but also in the life span of an individual1. This 
                                                 
1
 To support this description, Ellis & Tucker (2000) indicated the kind of neural architecture which can 
explain both the developmental nature and the biological sense of micro-affordances. It is the one 
defined in the theory of Neural Darwinism (Edelman, 1978, 1987). According to the theory, an 
individual brain is scaffold by a pressure similar to natural selection, called somatic selection. 
Adaptive behaviour development requires an integration of sensory and motor processes, and learning 
coordinated actions (e.g., grasping) is the direct outcome of the gradual adaptation of neuronal groups, 
which are the morphological unit somatic selection operates on: those groups involved step by step in 
a successful action (such as in grasping one leading to contact with an object) become the preferential 
neural mapping for that purpose. The mappings resulting from this process not only sustain adaptive 
behaviour, they are also seen as the basis for categorizing external objects. Micro-affordances are 
intended to be in these mappings motor components, which have come to represent visual objects 
during development. 
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definition implies that, even if the term micro-affordances was chosen to underline the 
similarities with the gibsonian tradition, as micro-affordances are brain structures capable of 
representing possibilities of action they have to be the outcome of previously stored 
perception-action experiences. Furthermore, as the notion of micro-affordance directly refers 
to potential elements of an action, it means that, if for example we refer to the case of a 
manipulable object affording hand grasping actions (e.g., a wine-glass), what is elicited is not 
grasping “in general”: only specific components of grasping, which are the more appropriate 
to suite the action on that particular object, are selected. It implies that the activation of micro-
affordances is mediated by a visual identification of the external objects, thus their emergence 
depends from selective attention (Vaino et al., 2007). However, in line with the gibsonian 
view, micro-affordances facilitate simple and specific kinds of interaction with objects and 
they do not pertain to complex actions, which in order to be successfully executed would need 
- as said before - the mediation also of a particular intention to act, a certain agent’s specific 
goal to be reached by the use of the object (e.g., drinking). In this direction, as they come into 
play independently of the goal of the agent, micro-affordances have been explicitly defined as 
structures which are automatically activated (see par 2.5 and my empirical study presented in 
chapter 4 for further discussions on this topic). This idea seems to be confirmed by 
compatibility studies as the one by Tucker & Ellis (1998) in which participant judged with 
bimanual lateralized key-presses if handled objects in figures were lying on their habitual 
plane or not (upright oriented/inverted). The position of the handle of the object, totally 
irrelevant for the task, could match or not the side of the manual response (left/right). Results 
showed that the left-right orientation of the handle played instead a role, facilitating 
compatible responses (those that were carried out by the congruent hand, e.g., handle on the 
right and response given with the right hand) and interfering with those same responses if 
incompatible (those carried out by the incongruent hand, e.g., handle on the right and 
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response given with the left hand). This kind of evidence is considered as a support for the 
existence in the brain of a direct, non-semantic route from perception to action (e.g., Milner & 
Goodale, 1995; I discuss further this topic in paragraph 2.4 and 2.5) and also for the idea that 
the psychological effect between perception and action is unidirectional, that is only from 
perception to action (see Girardi et al., 2010). This position in anyway problematic (see par. 
4.4 for a detailed discussion). 
 It is worth to notice, before closing this theoretical paragraph on the contemporary 
notions of affordance, that in the literature there is another very influential approach to the 
coupling of perception and action, provided by theories of common coding, which assume that 
representations of perception and action are based on the same cognitive codes (e.g., Hommel 
et al., 2001; Prinz, 1990, 1997), and operate in the same representational space. With respect 
to the relation of perception and action, this account assumes an ideomotor link (Greenwald, 
1970) that would predict a bidirectionality and reciprocity between their effects. The central 
assumption here is that motor actions and perceptual effects are highly interrelated and 
mutually dependent: movements are exhaustively coded in terms of their perceptual effects 
(Girardi et al., 2010). Evidence for this idea has been provided by studies showing effects of 
motor-visual priming, for example that the perception of a manual movement facilitates the 
following execution of congruent motor actions (e.g., Brass et al. 2000; 2001). Sturmer et al. 
(2000) required participants to open or close their hand in response to the color of a picture of 
an opening or closing hand: the results showed faster responses in case of a match of the 
action depicted in the picture and the actual action that was executed. Moving from such a 
theoretical framework a recent paper (Haazebroek et al., 2011), that proposes a computational 
model of cognition as grounded in perception and action processes, offered a very 
comprehensive definition of affordance (applicable also to complex ones), in which the action 
planning can modulate the perception of objects (see par. 2.3). Indeed, the authors affirm that 
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an affordance is effectively realized by allowing an automatic translation of perceptual object 
features (e.g., object shape) to action, but that this happens in overlap with the prediction of 
the action effect features (e.g., hand shape). In this way, by focusing the attention on certain 
features in the action planning, these dimensions become enhanced in object perception, and 
as a consequence these sensory features are processed more strongly than the others. 
Therefore, “affordances can be defined in terms of the intrinsic overlap between stimuli 
features and action effects as encountered in sensorimotor experience […] By having 
common codes, perceiving objects fundamentally implies anticipating intrinsically related 
action plan features” (Haazebroek et al., 2011). Because of the ideomotor link they show, the 
activation of those features shared by both objects and actions easily biases the cognitive 
system in programming and executing the appropriate motor responses. Crucially for the aims 
of our research, the final element that plays a role in complex behavior is the task: the task 
with is goal fully determines the context, driving the monitoring of selected effect features in 
the situation. It gives the hint that indicates among the object and the action features, the ones 
which are really relevant for the agent’s goals, specifying which of the available affordances 
apply in the situation.  
To close this discussion about the contemporary theoretical views on affordances, I 
want to underline that all the approaches sketched in this paragraph have in common the 
following assumption: that at least some compatibility effects should arise and be observed in 
dependence of the relations between external (visual) objects and the possible real-world 
actions that can be performed on them (by a human agent). Furthermore, the most interesting 
accounts of how it can happen diverge from the ecological view of affordance, as in order to 
explain adaptive behavior they explicitly recover the notion of conceptual representation to 
the discussion of the relation between perception and action. Finally, the role of concepts for 
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action results to be strictly connected with the current context, intended as the whole situation 
which is determined by taking in account the acting subject goals too. 
 
2.3. Behavioural evidence on affordances  
In the literature, evidence on the existence of an affordance effect comes from behavioural 
research as well as from a variety of neural techniques - neuroimaging, neuropsychological, 
neurophysiological, single cell recording studies. These investigations are aimed at addressing 
the question of how perceptual and action representations are related in embodied 
representations of affordances. 
Much behavioural evidence has been provided in support of the idea that visual 
representation of objects includes the partial activation and potentiation of the motor patterns 
associated with the actions they afford. It is now well established that the visual presentation 
of an object can affect subsequent action. For example, in a semantic categorization task 
(artificial/natural) in which participants responded by grasping a manipulandum ad-hoc, 
Tucker and Ellis (2001) reported that responses given by mean of precision grip (or pinch, 
that is grasping with the index finger opposed to the thumb) were executed faster when small 
objects were presented, and power grips (or clench, that is grasping opposing the fingers to 
the palm) were executed faster when big objects were presented. This evidence suggests that 
the visual presentation of an object can automatically activate the specific action it affords. In 
the same direction, Rumiati & Humphreys (1998) asked participants to pantomime the correct 
action for an object presented in figure, showing that there was a greater amount of errors of 
visual nature (e.g., mimicking the use of a hammer for a visually-related razor) than errors of 
semantic nature (e.g., mimicking the use of a hammer for a semantically-related saw): the 
authors – that in a second experiment observed on the contrary more semantic errors when 
participants mimicked to words - suggested a direct link between visual object representations 
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and action. There are also a number of behavioral results on the affordance effect which 
confirm that a motor simulation is activated, but that it is not necessarily so specific. In the 
literature, stimulus-response compatibility effects, that show facilitated responses to visual 
elements appearing in the left/right space with the left/right hand - often considered as simple 
Simon effects (e.g., Proctor & Cho, 2006) - have been reported using, rather than limb 
movements, lateralized key-press responses. As seen above, Tucker & Ellis (1998) showed 
that judging if an object was upright or not was faster when the handle of the object (e.g., a 
coffee pot) was spatially congruent in respect to the side of the manual response. 
Analogously, Tipper et al. (2006) presented door handles in passive or active states to 
participants which have to discriminate their shape or color. They showed that simple button-
press responses in making these decisions were faster when the handle was aligned with the 
responding hand, but only in the shape judgments, with the effect being greater for the active 
state (for similar findings, i.e., absence of an affordance effect in color judgments, see 
Pellicano et al., 2010). These findings are very interesting also because they seem to suggest 
that judgments which are usually considered to be “implicit” in respect to object action-
features (e.g., upright/inverted, artificial/natural) probably need to successfully perform the 
task at least an access to object shape features, that is an access to previous action-related 
knowledge about the object (for further discussion, see par. 4.4). Also Phillips & Ward (2002) 
reported related evidence priming participants with handled objects in figure, such as a picture 
of a frying pan. The handle could be on the left, right or middle, and be placed near or far 
from the participant. The prime was followed after a varying stimulus onset asynchrony 
(SOA) by a target-stimulus which required a single button press by left/right hand or foot. The 
data showed a correspondence effect between handle orientation and side of response which 
increased with SOA regardless of the response modality (which could be hands, hands 
crossed, or feet). These results supports the idea that participants form a simulation of their 
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interaction with the objects, being sensitive to the relationship between the (irrelevant) object 
property, the handle location, the current position of their limbs in space and the force of the 
effectors (Borghi, 2005). They may also indicate that the affordances of an object do not 
always potentiate a specific response for the effector more suited to respond, but that are 
activated more global, abstract spatial codes, which may potentiate a wide variety of 
responses in the congruent side of space. Indeed, additional evidence indicated that visual 
object processing is able to activate action representations even when the task does not 
involve an overt motor response (e.g., Kalénine et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2013; Myung et al., 
2010).  
On the whole, the reviewed behavioral results confirm that the activation of 
affordances corresponds to a (more or less specific) motor potentiation depending on visual 
objects presentation. A greater number of behavioral experiments than the few reviewed, 
which mainly employed compatibility paradigms (e.g., Bub et al., 2003; Creem & Proffitt, 
2001; Edwards et al., 2003; Fischer et al., 2008; Girardi et al., 2010; Tuker & Ellis, 2004), 
supported the idea that the simple observation of objects can activate an embodied simulation 
of appropriate actions – it was confirmed also in modeling works (e.g., Caligiore et al., 2010). 
However, the visual presentation of an object is not the only factor able to potentiate the 
associated affordances, as also the intention to perform an action can modulates visual 
processing by favoring those perceptual features which are action related and eliciting overt 
limb movements. In Craighero et al. (1999) the preparation to grasp an object facilitated the 
detection and discrimination of visual shapes congruent with it. Participants were trained to 
prepare a grasping movement towards a bar oriented clockwise/counterclockwise; in the 
experimental block, they had to really execute that movement after the presentation of a go-
signal which was the picture of a bar oriented clockwise/counterclockwise (or of a circle, in 
catch trials). Grasping latencies were shorter when the orientation of the go-signal and of the 
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bar to grasp were congruent. The compatibility effect was present with different effectors and 
even when the response was not of the type affected by kinematic relations with the grasping 
movement (i.e., eye blinking), but extinguished if the visual properties of the presented target 
were others than those for which the grasping movement was trained. Thus, as noticed by 
Borghi (2005, p. 17), “the effect was not due to orientation effects per se, but to the matching 
of the motor affordances of the visual object with those of the real object”. In the same 
direction Bekkering & Neggers (2002) found that the first eye movement performed to select 
an oriented target-object situated among distractors was more accurate when the object was 
individuated to be then grasped than to be pointed. As orientation is a relevant feature for 
grasping only, not for pointing, these results suggest again that action planning can influence 
visual processing. Further evidence of motor-visual attentional effects is offered by a number 
of hand-primes studies (a review in Borghi & Cimatti, 2010). For example, Borghi et al. 
(2007) in a categorization task asked participants to classify (with bimanual lateralized key-
presses) as artificial or natural big/small manipulable objects, that afford a power/precision 
grip, while the objects were preceded by hand-primes pictures depicting power/precision 
grips. The results showed a compatibility between the posture depicted in the prime 
(power/precision) and the grip required by the target-objects (power/precision), even if the 
effect was present only in the case in which the experimental block was preceded by a motor 
training, in which participants reproduced with their hands the prime postures in order to 
strengthen the potentiation of the action elements associated with the real interaction with the 
showed objects. To further investigate the nature of this motor priming effect, Vainio et al. 
(2008) replicated the study using video-clips in place of still-hand pictures. The results 
showed a compatibility effect even if in this experiment participants did not perform any 
preceding motor training.  
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Overall, the reviewed body of behavioural research shows tight (bidirectional) 
relationships for the visual presentation of an object and the execution of the actions that 
object affords (which can also be very specific). As the behavioural effects occur in the 
context of cognitive tasks (e.g., deciding whether an object is upright/inverted, 
artificial/natural etc.), this evidence implies a fundamental role for motor simulation in 
cognitive processing, which - as seen before - is predicted by embodied accounts of cognition. 
Finally, as the reviewed behavioral studies showed compatibility effects in dependence of 
different object properties (orientation, size etc.), it is worth mentioning here the proposal by 
Borghi & Riggio (2009) to distinguish between stable affordances (e.g., shape), based on 
information stored in memory, and temporary affordances (e.g., orientation), variable across 
situation because based on actual object properties (further discussed in par. 2.5). This is a 
proposal that clearly underlines a high contextuality in the emergence of the affordance effect. 
 
2.4. Neuroscientific evidence on affordances 
Neuroscientific evidence has shown that the visual presentation of manipulable objects 
activates regions known to be associated with motor activity both in monkeys and humans. 
The discovery of mirror neurons in the area F5 of the monkey frontal lobe (i.e., those neurons 
firing both during the execution of a certain action and the observation of that same action), 
individuated directly by mean of single cell recording, has prompted much speculation about 
the brain’s capability to simulate other people’s actions, and it is often argued that mirror 
neurons are the basis of action understanding (e.g., Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Indeed, the 
response properties of such neurons appear to validate many assumptions made by embodied 
theorists and serve as a solid basis of simulation accounts of cognition (e.g., Gallese & 
Sinigaglia, 2011), even if the role of mirror neurons in representing concepts remains debated. 
In macaque area F5 there is a small subclass of visuo-motor neurons called canonical neurons, 
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that – unlike “pure” mirror neurons - selectively respond both to the presentation of an object 
as to the performance of an action on that object (e.g., Murata et al., 1997; Jeannerod et al., 
1995; Raos et al., 2006). For example, for some of these neurons the size of an object affects 
their firing such that those cells firing during precision grips execution favour objects that 
afford precision grips actions; similarly, those that fire during types of grasps such as power 
grips and full hand grips favour larger objects (Sakata et al., 1995). This suggests that these 
neurons are coding complex sequences of movements that pertain to interaction with specific 
objects (Rizzolatti et al., 1988), thus that they are resonating to their features. This type of 
neuronal response, called motor resonance, has been taken as evidence of the automatic 
activation of motor-representations by the visual presentation of an object that may constitute 
the neural basis for object affordances (e.g., Garbarini & Adenzato, 2004). Indeed, the 
identification of affordances implies that the same neurons are active to encode the motor acts 
they control and to respond to the visual situation that elicit these motor acts. Recently, 
Ferrari et al. (2005) discovered a unique class of mirror neurons that selectively respond to the 
observation of actions performed with tools, called tool-responding mirror neurons. These 
neurons are triggered by actions that are made with a tool, compared to similar goal-directed 
actions without tools. They do not respond to the visual presentation of a tool alone, so this 
suggest that such neurons might be representing the global action-vision relationship for tools. 
On the whole, the discovery of these different types of neurons in monkeys’ brain support the 
idea of the occurrence of a simulation of motor actions that is triggered by the visual 
perception of objects.  
Interesting evidence of the occurrence of motor resonance mechanisms are present 
also in the findings of the neural literature on humans. For example, a number of fMRI results 
have revealed fronto-parietal activity during passive viewing of manipulable objects (e.g., 
Binkofski et al., 1999; Chao & Martin, 2000). Also in PET studies an activation in the 
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premotor cortex in response to tools have been observed during passive viewing (without any 
requested response), and also during naming and description of their use (Grafton et al., 
1997), with the results interpreted as evidence that the premotor cortex is involved in 
representing object semantics. In an experiment in which participants were asked to imagine 
themselves manipulating objects they were visually presented with, brain activity was shown 
in the prefrontal, parietal and motor cortex, as in supplementary motor area (Grèzes & Decety, 
2001). Similar findings have been reported also in an orientation judgment task 
(upright/inverted) performed on pictures of manipulable objects (Grèzes & Decety, 2002). A 
similar fronto-parietal circuit was active also during execution of the specific hand grips 
afforded by visually presented objects (Grèzes et al., 2003). Additional evidence also 
suggested that this motor activation evoked by visual objects might be context-dependent. For 
example, Gerlach et al. (2002) showed premotor cortex involvement in a semantic 
categorization task (natural/manmade), but not in object decisions (real/non-real), thus the 
emergence of the resonance was mediated by the different goal of the tasks. This is a very 
interesting result for the hypotheses that guide the research of this thesis, as it highlights a 
certain flexibility in the occurrence of the motor resonance, in direct analogy to what observed 
above for the embodied simulation processes (which are thought to be based on that neural 
mechanism).  
Additionally, a number of brain imaging studies have shown that the human brain is 
differently activated by tools in respect to objects which do not afford action (a review in 
Martin, 2007). A PET study showed that, although naming images of animals and tools 
activated overlapping visual cortical structures, there were also different category-specific 
brain activations: in the occipital lobe in response to animals, in motor cortical areas in 
response to tools (Martin et al., 1996). Furthermore, in a TMS study the observation of tools 
(e.g., a cup) that could be or not broken showed significantly larger MEPs in cortical motor 
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areas for entire items, indicating that these regions sustain a graded identification of 
affordances in dependence of the perceived visual context (Buccino et al., 2009). 
Additionally, a meta-analysis over several PET studies (Devlin et al., 2002) that examined 
specific activation patterns for man-made objects/tools with respect to other object categories 
(e.g., fruits, vegetables) found evidence of activations elicited by tools in the left posterior 
temporal regions especially when subjects were engaged in semantic tasks (e.g., naming), not 
during simple passive viewing. This result implies an influential role for the subjects’ 
orientation to visual objects in function of the task on the kind of motor representations 
evoked. 
The embodied account of object representation is consistent with the reviewed brain 
imaging patterns. They have often been interpreted in light of a very influential architectural 
and functional model, proposed by Milner & Goodale (1995). In this model, there are two 
streams where visual information is processed. Information about object shape is processed in 
the ventral stream, extending from V1 into the inferior temporal lobes, while information 
about movement, location and correct metrics to grasp it are processed dorsally, in the 
posterior middle temporal gyrus and regions of the anterior inferior parietal lobe. The two 
routes have been respectively identified as a “what” (or “how”) pathway, which contains 
stored representation that mediate object recognition, and a “where” pathway, which contains 
on-line information that sustain actual interaction with the objects. Affordances were thought 
to be processed only by the dorsal stream (e.g., Tucker & Ellis, 2004). However, recent 
proposals seem to be able to re-interpret this (strong) distinction of a semantic and a 
perceptual route. A discussion about this topic, which is fundamental for the empirical 
research presented in chapter 4 and 5 is sketched in the following paragraph.  
Overall, this body of neural research supports the idea of a motor resonance as the 
base of embodied simulation and object representation. As the behavioral findings discussed 
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in the previous paragraph are consistent with the patterns of brain activity reviewed here, the 
presence of resonance mechanisms in the brain seem to be the neural counterpart able to 
sustain the (reciprocal) effects of object perception and action preparation/execution indicated 
previously.  
 
2.5. Manipulative and functional affordances 
With respect of the two-routes model of visual processing (Milner & Goodale, 1995) we 
referred to in the previous paragraph, affordances were initially seen to be allied exclusively 
to a dorsal stream processing (see Borghi, 2005; Young, 2006). However recently some 
researchers, starting from both neurological and behavioural findings, have proposed an 
important distinction between affordance classes that may help clarify the possible 
contributions of the dorsal and ventral regions. For example, Creem-Regehr & Lee (2005) 
proposed to distinguish between actions associated with the structure of the object and actions 
associated with the function of the object, moving from the data they collected in an imaging 
study. In the experiment, they presented participants with 3-D images of graspable objects in 
two tasks: passive viewing and imagined grasping. Half of the presented items were everyday 
tools (e.g., hair brush), the other half were objects not associated with a conventional use 
(e.g., elongated block). In the passive viewing task, only known tools activated posterior 
parietal and premotor regions along with the middle temporal gyrus. In the imagined 
condition, a similar result was observed with both kind of items, but there was anyway 
evidence that frontal regions were active more for familiar tools (e.g., hair brush). The results 
indicated that the previous experience with a tool function constrains the way in which 
functional knowledge is represented in comparison to structural knowledge. This suggests that 
the dorsal areas might be more important in controlling structural grasping (e.g., processing 
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both natural kinds and tools), while the ventral areas might be more related to functional 
aspects (e.g., processing objects affording functional use).  
The specificity of affordances activation has also been investigated in the study by 
Bub et al. (2008). The authors trained participants to produce a particular hand action (e.g., 
poke) in response to the colour of a visually presented object (e.g., red); any item in the set of 
objects used afforded a structurally and/or a functionally action, that was 
compatible/incompatible in respect to the manual action response previously trained to its 
colour. The results shown that responses which were congruent with moving/using the objects 
(e.g., poking-calculator; clenching-spray bottle) were executed faster than incongruent 
actions, suggesting that object processing may recruit both of the action types. Furthermore, 
Masson et al. (2011) showed that manual movements in response to objects are facilitated 
with those objects whose handle is congruent with the response action to execute (e.g., a 
power grip executed after the prime of a beer mug), and suggested that the presentation of 
objects automatically specifies the action the object affords. But the issue of automaticity is 
controversial (as discussed in chapter 4 and 5). For example, Bub & Masson (2010) trained 
participants to respond to colour cues by grasping a manipulable apparatus with their left/right 
hand, or by pressing a button with their left/right hand; in both cases participants were primed 
by pictures depicting either an object congruent (e.g., a beer mug with the handle facing the 
cued hand) or incongruent (e.g., a beer mug with the handle facing away from the cued hand) 
in respect of the response performed. They found that when participants responded by a 
grasping movement, showing a compatible object shortened response latencies, while no 
effect was not present for press responses. The authors concluded that affordances are elicited 
by objects under the guidance of the specific motor intentions that characterized the action 
executed, and not by simple ballistic movements. This goes in support of the possibility that 
objects do not (always) automatically elicit (general) motor simulations, but that motor 
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simulations critically follow the guide of the action intention of the subject, having the 
affordance effect an highly contextual characterization.  
In this vein, Jax and Buxbaum (2010) investigated the distinction between 
structural/volumetric grasping (i.e., grasp-to-move) and functional grasping (i.e., grasp-to-
use) presenting participants with (real) objects that afforded the same grasping to be moved 
and to be used (e.g., drinking glass) and with objects that afforded different structural and 
functional grasps (e.g., a calculator, affording clench for moving it and poke for using it). 
They showed that initiation movement for use actions was slower for objects associated with 
distinct move-related actions (that they called conflict objects, discussed further in chapter 5) 
as compared to objects for which use- and move-related actions are similar (non-conflict 
objects), while initiation for move-related actions was not different in both conflict and non-
conflict objects. These results suggests that move-related activations may be relatively rapid, 
and so produce an interference with the planning of use-related actions, which is longer 
because characterized by retrieval of motor information.  
 If only functional responses require activation of long-term conceptual 
representations, whereas structural responses can be activated more quickly than functional 
responses, the existence of two classes of actions associated with a given object raises 
questions about the factors that may influence the strength and time course of their activation. 
One possibility is that both types of action are invariably activated during object recognition, 
but it is more likely that affordances activation may be mediated by task goals and context. It 
is why Jax & Buxbaum (2010) proposed that the intention to act on an object triggers a race-
like competition between structural/volumetric and functional responses during action 
planning (see also Cisek, 2007). In support of this idea, there is already evidence in the 
literature, at both the behavioural and neural level, that the visual context in which objects are 
embedded exert an influence on their processing (e.g., Bar, 2004; Borghi et al., 2012; Gronau 
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et al., 2008; Kalénine et al., 2013; Mudrik et al., 2010; Natraj et al., 2013), and it is very likely 
that for the objects associated with more than one action (such as the conflict objects of the 
latter study) is the visual context what selectively amplifies one of the actions associated with 
it (e.g., Wurm et al., 2011). In an iterative manner, this bottom-up facilitation of an object-
related action by the context may resonate with the intention-driven facilitation of action by 
the action planning (for similar proposal see Chambon et al., 2011; Shen & Paré, 2011).  
Finally, Buxbaum & Kalenine (2010) have explicitly proposed that different brain 
circuits might sustain the two kind of affordances: one dorso-dorsal stream (a “pure” dorsal 
pathway) is mostly involved in the processing of object structure, whereas a dorso-ventral 
stream is more related to the processing of object function. The overlap point they propose in 
the activation of the two streams (at least in the condition of functional activations) smoothens 
the original, very dichotomist distinction of the ventral and dorsal streams. An analogous 
proposal has been presented by Borghi & Riggio (2009), that focused on the distinction of 
stable and variable affordances. Stable affordances would emerge primarily from properties 
which are rather constant across contexts like shape, while variable affordances would emerge 
from incidental properties such as orientation. A special case is represented by canonical 
affordance. Considering, for example, a cup, it is obvious that even if we interact with cups in 
many different orientations depending on specific situations and goals (e.g., move, wash, 
drink, fill etc.) there is a tendency to find this object in a typical orientation that is upright 
(especially in contexts of use). Due to its higher frequency, it might be useful to store 
additional information on this canonical orientation. At a neural level, stable affordances are 
thought to be represented more ventrally, whereas variable affordances more dorsally. Thus, 
the indication of the authors is also in this case for a partial overlap of the two kinds of 
affordances, as the first would activate a dorso-dorsal stream, the second a dorso-ventral 
pathway (see also Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003). 
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Overall, the results discussed here are in line with the embodied literature on object-
related action representation, reviewed in par. 2.3 and 2.4. Indeed, they confirm again the 
evidence that the perception of manipulable objects lead to the activation of appropriate motor 
representations. Furthermore, these results extend the reviewed evidence on affordances 
indicating that the motor simulation can be (selectively) triggered in respect of structural and 
functional properties of the presented objects. The elicited simulation, in line with the 
description made in par. 1.3, can vary even for the very same object if it is found across 
different contexts, or perceived under different action intentions.  
 
2.6. Mirror mechanism in motor resonance  
On the whole, the evidence reviewed so far clearly suggest that when a subject is exposed to 
manipulable objects, its affordances elicit the activation of appropriate motor programs. The 
effects have clearly confirmed that the possibility of evoking motor behaviours rests “on the 
possibility of a sensory-motor coupling allowing any onlooker to map such a feature onto the 
motor possibilities belonging to his or her motor repertoire” (Costantini & Sinigaglia, 2012, 
p.436). The reviewed findings have been interpreted as evidence of a motor simulation, idea 
that holds at both the neural and the behavioral level. This last introductory paragraph is 
dedicated to a brief overview of the findings on the motor resonance which triggered by the 
observation of action execution, as it is one of the basis for the hypotheses of the experiments 
described in chapter 4 and 5.  
In par. 2.3 results of behavioural hand-primes studies were reviewed as evidence for 
the existence of a motor-visual attentional effect. In light of the description in par 2.4 of the 
motor resonance, it is possible to argue that at a neural level the effect of the hand-prime was 
based on this same mechanism, and that its architectural basis might be the mirror neuron 
system. Indeed, it was observed in primates that - differently from the canonical neuron 
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system - mirror system is activated during the performance of an action (e.g., grasping, 
moving an object) and the observation of other actors performing the same action (e.g., Di 
Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al., 1996). Mirror neurons in humans have not been 
ultimately identified, as it is very hard to observe directly the activity from single neurons as 
done many and many times in monkeys. It happens that, for a number of (valid) reasons, 
single cells recording in humans is almost impossible, except in rare occasions (e.g., 
Mukamel et al., 2010). However, even if single neurons have not been directly identified, in 
the literature of neural research several results stay in support of the existence of a human 
mirror system (review in Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Gallese, 2011).  
Much evidence shows that a resonance phenomenon is triggered when we observe 
others acting, interacting with objects, and even performing complex movements such as 
playing basketball or dancing (e.g., Cross et al., 2006). The neural data indicate that the 
mirror system activation is higher and the resonance is stronger if actors and observer share a 
similar motor repertoire. For example, in an fMRI study by Calvo-Merino et al. (2005), when 
capoeira dancers saw other people dancing capoeira, their mirror neuron areas were more 
activated than when they observed classical ballet dancers. In the same vein, Aglioti et al. 
(2008) demonstrated that, while observing free throws videos, elite basketball players (from 
the Italian first basketball league) predicted the outcome of the shot earlier and better than 
both novice players and expert observers (e.g., coaches). The authors related this advantage in 
predicting the outcome to the elite players’ higher capability in reading the actor’s body 
kinematics in the early phases of the movement. The results reveal a more detailed motor 
resonance in function of motor practices and experiences: motor expertise specifically 
contributes to anticipating and predicting the ongoing of other people’s actions. Furthermore a 
study of Calvo-Merino et al. (2006), aimed at controlling if these kind of effects could be 
simply due to the higher familiarity of the observers with certain types of movement, showed 
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a larger motor resonance effect when classical ballet dancers observed movements performed 
by other classical ballet dancers of the same gender. As the sequences of movements 
performed by the two genders were equally familiar to the observers, this evidence supports 
the explanation based on the occurrence of a motor simulation. In the same direction, 
evidence of higher mirror system activity was found during the observation of actions 
performed by a human hand in comparison to hand actions performed by an artificial agent 
(Perani et al., 2001; Tai et al., 2004), whereas observing actions impossible to execute with 
respect of the observer’s body structure does not elicit a motor resonance (Stevens et al., 
2000). An fMRI study by Buccino et al. (2004) presented human participants with videos of 
biting and communicative gestures performed by a human, a monkey or a dog. Independently 
from the species, viewing biting actions activated in the participants (among other areas) 
regions thought to be part of the mirror system, while viewing communicative gestures 
elicited activation of the human mirror systems only for actions performed by humans (lip-
reading) and monkeys (lip smacking), not by dogs (barking). Thus, only the actions belonging 
to the observer’s motor repertoire were mapped by the motor system. But motor resonance is 
not only modulated in function of body similarity and shared motor experience: other inter-
individual differences, such as cultural factors, can affect this mechanism, as it was suggested 
by the TMS study by Molnar-Szakacs et al. (2007). In order to investigate the neural bases of 
cross-cultural social communication, the authors measured participants’ corticospinal 
excitability during observation of culture-specific emblems (i.e., autonomous communicative 
gestures). Foreign Nicaraguan and familiar American emblems (as well as meaningless 
control gestures) were performed by Euro-American and Nicaraguan actors, and the data 
indicated that in Euro-American participants were found a higher corticospinal activity during 
the observation of the Euro-American actor. On the whole, these neural results clearly suggest 
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that the resonance emergence is very flexible, as it is sensitive to a multiplicity of factors that 
can vary across different contexts. 
Among the contextual factors that modulate motor simulation in function of action 
observation, behavioral evidence indicates also perspective. For example, Vogt et al. (2003) 
demonstrated it with a simple response procedure. Participants, given the instruction 
“clockwise” or “counterclockwise” and a prime, were asked to grasp a bar in the indicated 
orientation. By manipulating the perspective of the hand presented as a prime, which could 
either be congruent with the hand posture of the participant’s own hand (egocentric 
perspective) or the hand posture of a person in front of the observer (allocentric perspective), 
they found a compatibility effect when a hand-stimulus was given as a prime for the 
egocentric perspective. Similarly, Bruzzo et al. (2008) presented hand-primes and target-
objects in egocentric or allocentric perspective asking participants to decide whether the 
action displayed by the hand was suitable (or not) for interacting with the object depicted. The 
data revealed an advantage of the egocentric over non-egocentric targets, and moreover an 
interaction that indicated that the fastest responses were performed when egocentric primes 
were followed by egocentric targets. These results show that it is easier to put ourselves in 
others’ shoes and to resonate to their actions when we share with the actor action-relevant 
characteristics, as the point of view is. Additional behavioural evidence on the graded nature 
of motor resonance and the role of individual expertise is provided by the study of Pezzulo et 
al. (2010) on climbers. They divided for expertise participants in two groups (novice/expert), 
and presented them with three routes distinguished in function of their difficulty 
(easy/difficult/impossible). A following recalling test showed no differences between 
participants for easy or impossible routes, but for the difficult route the performance were 
significantly better in experts than novices.  
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To close, much evidence clearly demonstrated that our brain is able to resonate, as to 
the affordances of external objects, with the actions performed by other agents. This 
resonance mechanism is not fixed and serial, but has a graded structure: its emergence is the 
result of the mediation (at least) of body structures similarity, shared motor skills, cultural 
factors and perceptual features of the current situation. Thus, the findings reviewed confirm 
the context-dependence of the motor simulation, as they demonstrate a high flexibility in the 
activation of the neural circuits that sustain conceptual representations of action possibilities 
and action meaning. 
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3. Language and embodiment 
 
The second topic of my thesis concerns the experimental investigation of verbal language. In 
this chapter, I sketch a discussion at both a theoretical and empirical level on the embodied 
view of language, and describe results in the literature that indicate the occurrence of 
simulation processes triggered by language. Subsequently, as much research has the aim of 
showing the similarity of the simulation evoked by language and by objects/actions 
processing, the possible differences in these processes are discussed, introducing an issue that 
is experimentally investigated in my study reported in chapter 6. Then, as the embodied 
literature is prevalently focused on concrete language, while the grounding of abstract 
concepts is a test bed for any theory of cognition, I will describe theoretical proposals inside 
the embodiment framework for explaining abstract words meanings, that I also investigated 
empirically in two of my following reported studies (chapters 7 and 8). Finally, following this 
description of language grounding at the ontogenetic level, I refer also about iconicity and 
sound-symbolism (my investigation on this topic is reported in chapter 9) as the possible 
phylogenetic grounding that supported the emergence of contemporary human languages.   
 
3.1. Embodied and grounded view of language 
Many widely accepted theories in cognitive science have been assuming for decades that 
cognition is divided in lower and higher level processes (e.g., action and language, 
respectively), and that any mental process would be handled in separate systems. Following 
the assumption of a modular and encapsuled organization, each system can work 
independently from the others, according only to its own principles (e.g., Fodor, 1975, 1983; 
Marr, 1982; Pylyshyn, 1986). Under this traditional view the mind is considered no more than 
a symbols processing unit (see par. 1.1). These symbols are posited as amodal, abstract and 
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arbitrary, because their content is totally detached from perception and action processes, so 
they do not exhibit any systematic relation to the original sensory patterns they emerged from 
(Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Anderson & Spivey, 2009). These kind of theories have dominated 
cognitive science for decades because of their power to account the relations of types and 
tokens, to combine symbols productively, as well as to represent abstract concepts’ content 
(Fodor, 1975; Pylyshyn, 1986). But much evidence against such a modular view has been 
accumulated in more recent years, and a new understanding of the mind emerged by relating 
cognition directly to the mechanisms which govern the perceptual processes feeding into 
cognition, as well as the actions selected by and guided through cognition. The physical 
instantiation of the cognitive system as a brain inside a body which exist in the world provides 
all its principles, and this is the core idea that defines embodiment (see par. 1.2). Thus, what 
embodiment proposes in deep contrast with the traditional view is that perception and action 
are not peripheral with respect to cognition, and that our cognitive activity is embodied, 
environmentally embedded and perceptually grounded (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Glenberg, 1997). 
Far from the idea of the subject as an isolated observer, cognition is a matter of situatedness 
(see par. 1.2 and 1.3). 
According to embodied theories, from the continuity of perception, action and 
cognition (Berthoz, 1997; Gibson, 1979; Hommel et al., 2001; Prinz, 1990, 1997) follows that 
also language is grounded in sensory-motor activity. While in the traditional view words 
would be ungrounded, thus understood only in terms of other words associated to them (e.g., 
Landauer & Dumais, 1997, see par. 1.1), the embodied view of language comprehension 
proposes that the understanding of a word/sentence occurs by mean of mental simulation (see 
par. 1.3 and 1.4) of the entities, events and situations that are linguistically described. This 
implies that the neural areas recruited by language are the same involved during perception 
and action (e.g., Anderson, 2010; Barsalou, 1999; Barsalou et al., 2003; Borghi, 2012; 
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Gallese, 2008; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Gibbs, 2006; Glenberg, 1997; Glenberg & Gallese, 
2012; Glenberg & Robertson, 2000; Jirak et al., 2010; Pecher & Zwaan, 2005; Pulvermüller, 
2005; Zwaan, 2004). The idea proposed by embodiment is that words are something able to 
sustain and guide action in the world, as language activates online simulations that help us to 
interact appropriately with objects, entities, agents and events in the environment (Barsalou, 
2009; Borghi & Cimatti, 2010; Gallese, 2008; Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Glenberg & 
Robertson, 2000; Zwaan, 2004). Therefore, this (re)activation of modal contents associated 
with particular described scenes is what serves as the “engine of meaning” (Bergen et al., 
2007, p. 76). 
A growing body of research has revealed that words, far from being linked in an 
arbitrary way to their referents, are grounded in perception, action and bodily processes. 
Much evidence has been obtained recently on action-related linguistic stimuli by studies 
performed with several techniques (e.g., behavioural, kinematic, eye tracking, brain imaging). 
This research has demonstrated that continuous visual availability is not necessary to create a 
bias in the sensorial and motor system: concept activations seem to be sufficient to do so. 
Indeed, the emergence of affordance effects (see chapter 2) have been observed also when 
participants were only briefly exposed to a perceptually degraded  object as when they simply 
see (e.g., Tucker &  Ellis, 2004) or hear (e.g., Myung et al., 2006) a word denoting the object. 
Thus, analogously to visual stimuli (as described in chapter 2), objects names would evoke 
the affordances of their real-world referents; similarly, motion verbs would evoke the action 
they refer to, eliciting the corresponding motor programs, and so on.  
As object information is stored in the brain in terms of affordances (e.g., Ellis & 
Tucker, 2000; Glenberg & Robertson, 2000), it is plausible that a word which refers to a 
certain object would activate the same affordances as the object itself (this assumption is 
directly investigated in a study I performed on affordances using both visual and verbal 
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stimuli referring to the same objects, reported in chapter 6). However, as the same object 
could possess simultaneously concurrent affordances (e.g., tools, see par. 2.4 and 2.5), or be 
linked to more than one action across contexts, one issue in the literature concerns how the 
simulation activated during language comprehension is built up and detailed (Bergen et al., 
2007). If simulation processes should sustain comprehension as well as prediction and 
inference (Barsalou, 2008, 2009; Pezzulo & Castelfranchi, 2009), it is very likely that what 
would emerge during language-triggered simulation are only those elements relevant for the 
current goals and situations, or the more canonical in respect to the state of things 
linguistically described (Borghi, 2012). The evidence reviewed in the next paragraphs about 
both single words and sentences points exactly in this direction, revealing first a certain 
degree of sensitivity to a number of real-world properties in the simulations of linguistic 
contents, and second highlighting their flexibility in dependence on the available context-
related information.  
 
3.2. Behavioural evidence of embodied simulation during word and sentence comprehension 
The embodied cognition view applied to language claims that when we understand words, 
following the neural exploitation (or reuse) principle (e.g., Anderson, 2010; Gallese, 2008), 
the same sensory-motor areas are recruited as when interacting with the objects/entities the 
words refer to. Similarly, when we comprehend sentences we internally re-enact, by mean of 
multimodal simulations, the state of the world those sentences describe. In this paragraph, the 
sensory-motor representations evoked by language are examined reviewing the results of 
behavioural and kinematics research. 
In the literature, semantic effects on grip aperture by the exposition to single words 
have been observed. Indeed, the meaning of words that prime objects of fixed size can affect 
the movement directed towards those objects. For example, Glover et al. (2004) investigated 
77 
 
the influence of object names on the grasping actions kinematics, asking participant to reach 
and grasp wooden blocks of different sizes after having silently read a word that could refer to 
small (e.g., GRAPE) or large objects (e.g., APPLE). The results observed larger maximum 
grip apertures after reading words referring to larger objects (e.g., APPLE) than after reading 
words referring to smaller objects (e.g., GRAPE). This suggest that the names - and obviously 
in a broader sense any element of grammar – are able to trigger a mental simulation of the 
referent real-world properties which overlapped with the planning of the action for 
responding, thus influenced online motor control of the required movement (see also Glover, 
2004). This interpretation is confirmed by the early presence of the effect in the grasping 
kinematics (i.e., it was observed in the reach phase). Also in the study of Gentilucci et al. 
(2000) an analogous affordance-based effect on grasping kinematics by word reading has 
been observed. In order to investigate the influence of automatic word reading on visuo-motor 
transformations, the authors asked participants to reach and grasp big and small objects 
printed on with the adjectives SMALL or LARGE (in their Italian versions, see Experiment 
4). The results showed again that the kinematics of the movement initial phase were affected 
by the meaning of the read words, as the word LARGE evoked grips with a larger maximum 
aperture, while the contrary was true with SMALL. Thus, subjects simulated the meaning of 
the word (activating the corresponding real-world property) and associated it to the response 
motor program, which was built up under the influence of the linguistic stimulus. The results 
of this study showed that also this class of words (i.e., adjectives) is able to influence motor 
control. This was further confirmed by a very similar study by Glover & Dixon (2002), which 
reported that maximum grip aperture was enlarged when subjects grasped an object with the 
word LARGE printed on top, as compared to the grasping of an object labeled with the word 
SMALL. This implies that word reading is able to activate automatically motor 
representations that constrain subsequent or simultaneous action. This finding is obviously 
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consistent with the embodied account of object/action representations (see chapter 2). Other 
scholars have examined if qualitatively different types of hand postures corresponding to the 
real interaction with objects - rather than simple grip aperture - are activated in dependence of 
a simulation triggered by the exposure to their name. For example, Tucker & Ellis (2004) 
asked participants to use a manipulandum ad-hoc, that required either a power or a precision 
grip, to judge whether names of manipulable objects referred to natural or man-made kinds 
(see Experiment 3). The results showed  faster power grip responses to words denoting 
objects requiring a power grip than to words denoting objects requiring a precision grip, 
whereas the reverse was true for precision grip responses. Taken together, these findings 
provided conclusive evidence that on-line visual processing of an object is not necessary to 
generate an affordance- based compatibility effect for properties like shape and size. 
The simulation has been shown to be also sensitive to the spatial configuration and the 
order that parts of objects present in the real world. For example, Zwaan & Yaxley (2003) 
asked participants to judge whether the members of a word pair were semantically related or 
not. The names, which in the critical trials denoted parts of objects (e.g., ATTIC - 
BASEMENT), were presented vertically (one above the other), and could bear with their 
referents either an iconic relation (e.g., ATTIC presented above BASEMENT) or a reversed 
one (BASEMENT above ATTIC). The results showed that the iconic condition yielded 
significantly faster semantic-relatedness judgments than the reversed condition. The authors 
ruled out the explication of the effect as due to the order in which the words are usually 
coupled in every-day language with further experiments with horizontal presentation, where 
no effects were observed. Furthermore, and importantly for the embodied hypotheses, each 
participant saw a list that included along with the critical word pairs (that matched or not the 
vertical orientation of their referents) also semantically related/unrelated filler pairs that were 
not constrained with respect to vertical orientation. All the pairs were controlled for semantic-
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relatedness in Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA, Landauer & Dumais, 1997, see par. 1.1), and 
no differences were found between critical and filler pairs. Thus, the factor responsible for 
these findings - consistent with the notion of iconicity (extensively discussed in par. 3.6) - 
was the similarity between the word pairs’ spatial arrangement on the screen with the spatial 
arrangement of their referents. In a similar direction, other studies reported compatibility 
effects between the word meaning and the location where the word were presented (i.e., 
spatial position on a screen). For example, Šetic´ & Domijan (2007) presented words referring 
to flying or non-flying animals at the top/bottom of a screen, asking participants to decide 
with bimanual key-presses whether the word referred to flying/non-flying animals. The results 
showed faster and more accurate decisions for words presented in a congruent than 
incongruent position (e.g., shorter latencies and less errors for STORK at the top than at the 
bottom of the screen). This may be due to a congruency between word meaning and stimulus 
position: as readers understand the meaning of a category by mean of situated simulations 
(Barsalou, 2008, 2009, see par. 1.3), the representation of the meaning of words referring to 
flying animal involves simulating the first-person experience of looking up at the sky to see 
the animal fly (see par. 1.3).  
It is worth to notice here that in the literature is present an alternative explanation for 
this kind of results, which argues against the simulation account (not only of language 
comprehension) that these compatibility effects are simply due to markedness (e.g., 
Greenberg, 1963; Clark, 1969). Some authors pointed out that in many binary decision tasks 
the speed of response selection might be affected by a polarity correspondence (e.g., Proctor 
& Cho, 2006; Lakens, 2012), that would occur when a stimulus dimension with binary values 
is encoded as having a plus or minus polarity (e.g., flying/non-flying animal) and 
simultaneously the response alternatives are also encoded as plus or minus (e.g., yes/no), with 
response selection being faster when stimulus and response polarities correspond than when 
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they do not (i.e., yes/flying). The basic idea is that the polarity coding of dimensions and 
responses is not entirely random, as some dimensions are always coded in the same way: a 
yes-response is always plus while a no-response is always minus, and in the same way up and 
right are always represented as plus while down and left are always represented as minus; so, 
accordingly, right key-presses are coded as plus and left key-presses are coded as minus. 
Furthermore, the opposite ends of these dimensions are thought to consist of a positive, 
unmarked member (e.g., more, big, tall), the name of which is extended to the dimension in 
its entirety, and a negative, marked member (e.g., less, small, short). Polarity correspondence 
has been thought to explain results on verticality similar to the ones reviewed, among a 
number of other effects of spatial congruency observed with many concepts - also more 
abstract, such as valence or number magnitude (e.g., Fischer et al., 2004; Meier & Robinson, 
2004; Santens & Gevers, 2008). For example in Šetic´ & Domijan (2007) the flying animals 
always required a yes-response and the non-flying animals always required a no-response. 
Therefore, the polarities of position and response (up/yes and down/no) matched. To rule out 
the markedness-based account, Pecher et al. (2010) used two semantic judgment tasks for 
which the same linguistic stimuli required reversed responses. One task was an ocean 
judgment (i.e., Is it usually found in the ocean?) and the other task was a sky judgment (i.e., Is 
it usually found in the sky?). These tasks were chosen as sky and ocean have clear spatial 
positions, but are not the linguistically marked/unmarked end of a conceptual dimension. The 
authors used in both tasks the same set of names referring to objects typically found in one of 
the two locations (e.g., WHALE, EAGLE), and presented the target-word at the top/bottom of 
the screen. Subjects responded with lateralized bimanual key-presses counterbalanced across 
participants, with the same name in two different tasks required both yes and no-responses. 
The markedness account would predict that yes-response, higher location of the target word 
and right-hand response would be aligned (i.e., all coded as plus), but the results showed only 
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that in the sky decision task responses were faster to words at the top than at the bottom of the 
screen, while the reverse was found in the ocean decision. Thus, this finding support the 
simulation account: spatial attention was directed by the situated simulation of the task-
relevant conceptual dimension up or down. The asymmetry found in this study, as in many 
others (e.g., Casasanto, 2009; Meier & Robinson, 2004; Van Dantzig, 2009; Boot & Pecher, 
2010), is very problematic for maintaining a polarity principle, which - as noted elsewhere - is 
a of generality that should be observed consistently (Landy et al., 2008).  
A further confirmation of the simulation account derives from the literature that show, 
in place of facilitations, interference effects. Indeed, if during linguistic materials processing 
occurs a re-enactment of (multi)modal information,  this process has to occupy sensory-motor 
systems (Barsalou, 1999, 2008). Following this principle, it is equally possible to find 
facilitation as interference effects, and it has been already pointed out that both effects fit well 
in the simulation account because different findings are probably due to differences in timing 
(e.g., Bergen et al., 2007; Borregine & Kaschak, 2006; De Vega et al., 2004; for modeling 
work in this direction, see Chersi et al., 2010). Much evidence in the literature confirms this 
idea. For example, it has been clearly confirmed by the kinematic study of Boulenger et al. 
(2006) that the timing between the planning of a movement and word processing is able to 
modulate the direction of a motor simulation effect. Participants were asked to perform a 
reaching movement in two experiments. In the first, the reaching movement was performed 
concurrently to a visual lexical decision task on action verbs, action nouns or pseudo-words, 
as the target-letter string appeared when the hand released a touch-pad where was placed 
before each trial. In the second experiment, the lexical decision was made prior to movement 
onset, as the letter string represented in this case the go-signal to start the execution of the 
movement. The results showed that processing of action verbs, compared to nouns, interfered 
with the simultaneous execution of the reaching movement. By contrast, processing action 
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verbs prior to movement onset favored the subsequent reaching movement execution. The 
interference result could be explained also referring to common coding theories (e.g., TEC, 
Hommel  et al., 2001, see par. 2.2): comprehending an action verb (e.g., PAINT), the features 
that code the execution and outcome of the action are activated, so they cannot be used in the 
planning of the motor response, and this results in an interference effect. 
In the literature, evidence of perceptual interferences has been found as well. For 
example, in an early study (Craver Lemley & Reeves, 1992) interference was found when 
people simultaneously performed mental visual imagery and a visual perception task, with 
similar effects being observed also without explicit imagery instructions. Interference effects 
were found also in the study by Estes et al. (2008), where the authors presented in the center 
of the screen adjective-name pairs that referred to an object with a typical vertical location 
(e.g., COWBOY HAT/COWBOY BOOT). After  the presentation of this prime, a target-letter 
appeared at the top or the bottom of the screen, and participants were asked to identify the 
letter as quickly as possible. The results showed that the identification of the letter was slower 
when the position of the letter matched the typical location of the prime’s referent.  
In the literature, findings supporting the idea of a simulation during word processing 
has been collected, as well as by visual presentation, with auditory stimuli. For example, a 
priming effect between names of objects which afford similar motor programs to be used has 
been observed by Myung et al. (2006). Participants were acoustically presented with a series 
of prime-target pairs, with the task of making a lexical decision on the target-word pressing 
two buttons (correct/incorrect) on a response box. The results showed significantly faster 
decisions if the target-word (e.g., TYPEWRITER) followed a prime related with the target in 
terms of the manner of manipulation (e.g., PIANO) than an unrelated one (e.g., BLANKET). 
As objects affording similar actions tend to be similar in shape such that priming might be 
explained on the base of visual similarity, to rule out this possible account the authors selected 
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words denoting objects that were rated as having high similarity in terms of manipulation, but 
low visual similarity. Thus, they assumed that the words automatically evoked object 
knowledge, as it is represented in pattern of potentials action (Glenberg & Robertson, 2000), 
which mediated the effect from the prime to the target. This finding clearly indicates that 
sensory-based functional knowledge is an intrinsic part of the semantic and lexical 
representation of objects, and that this action knowledge can be activated by simulating 
manipulation features also in implicit task (e.g., Tucker & Ellis, 1998, see par. 2.3). 
To close with the behavioural evidence on simulation during language processing, it is 
worth reporting that Pecher et al. (2004) have demonstrated that verbal language is able to 
select different modal information related to the same concept. Indeed, according to the 
perceptual symbols theory (Barsalou, 1999), the sensory-motor simulations which underlie 
the representation of concepts are componential, so they have to vary with the context in 
which the concept is presented. In this study, concept names (e.g., APPLE) were presented in 
a property verification task with two different property in different trials. The two properties 
were either from a same perceptual modality (e.g., GREEN - SHINY) or from different ones 
(e.g., TART - SHINY). The results showed that response times and error rates for the second 
presentation of the name were higher if the properties were from different modalities than if 
they were from the same modality (even if there was a gap of several trials between the first 
and second presentation). This finding demonstrates that a simulation of the word’s referent is 
elicited automatically and that this mental representation is affected by recent experiences 
with the concept. Indeed, in direct dependence of the context imposed by the priming 
adjective, an activation of a neural pattern corresponding to the modality specific domain 
occurred. This earlier activation could be compatible with the following, so the same circuits 
were used, but in the case of incompatibility the switching from a brain system to another 
explains the modality switching cost in terms of response latencies. 
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On the whole, the reviewed evidence confirms the idea that (perceptual and motor) 
simulation occurs automatically to guide comprehension during the exposure to words. The 
simulation appears to be rather specific: it depends from different kinds of modality as on the 
time of the exposition to the linguistic cue; it is sensitive to a number of objectual properties 
presented in the real world by their referents and to their affordances; it represents spatial 
configuration of the referent’s parts; it reproduces the typical location in which referents are 
experienced in everyday life.  
In the literature similar behavioural findings have been reported also for sentence 
comprehension. For example, it has already been addressed that the simulation during 
sentence comprehension occurs in a figurative way which is highly sensitive to subtle 
modulations of objectual properties, like shape or orientation. According to the assumption 
that a symbol is analogically, not arbitrary, linked to its referent (see par. 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3), 
perceptual symbol theories (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 2008) predict that “the complete 
representation of an object, called a simulation, should reflect physical characteristics of the 
object” (Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001, p. 153). In order to test this hypothesis, Zwaan et al. 
(2002) presented participants with a prime-sentence describing a same object/animal (e.g., 
EAGLE) in two different locations that implied a change of shape state that was only implied 
by the sentence (e.g., THE RANGER SAW THE EAGLE IN THE NEST vs. IN THE SKY). 
The sentence was followed by a target-picture (i.e., a line drawing) that participants had to 
judge as displaying or not the item mentioned in the sentence. The results of the recognition 
task showed that response latencies were shorter in the case in which the item shape in the 
picture was compatible with the state of the shape implied by the sentence (i.e., EAGLE IN 
THE SKY / eagle drawn with open wings). To notice that an amodal account of cognition 
could not explain why recognition latencies were different between the conditions. In order to 
control for the task-dependency of the effect, in a following experiment the authors simply 
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required participants to name the item in the target-picture. Indeed, the naming task arguably 
provides a stronger test of the perceptual simulation hypothesis because, unlike a recognition 
task, it does not require an explicit comparison between the sentence and the picture. The 
results showed the same advantage in term of mean latencies for the congruent condition, 
confirming that during the comprehension of a sentence a perceptual representation of its 
meaning is automatically activated, even when the task demands does not request it. The 
results also suggested that the context imposed to the simulation by the situation described in 
the sentence has a guiding role in building these representations. Thus, as the linguistic 
simulation is context-driven it is characterized by a certain flexibility. It’s worth noting here 
that Spivey & Geng (2001), using the eye-tracking technique, have probably unfolded 
oculomotor patterns subtended to this kind of results. The eye movements of participants were 
recorded while they were instructed to simply listen to visual descriptions of objects, or when 
they had to retrieve properties of objects previously shown to them. The data showed that 
during both tasks participants spontaneously looked at particular regions (in a blank space) in 
a systematic iconic fashion in relation to the object’s spatial configuration that was implied in 
the description/explicitly retrieved. The authors explained the results pointing out that “a 
mental search of internal memory is accompanied by an oculomotor search of external space” 
(Spivey & Geng, 2001, p. 235). Moreover, the results were obtained in the first task using 
only auditory linguistic stimuli with no execution of a response, what seems to reproduce an 
everyday situation of language comprehension more ecologically than other experimental 
settings and paradigms. 
The dynamicity and flexibility of language-triggered simulations has been highlighted 
also in a study of Stanfield & Zwaan (2001) testing the hypothesis that, while simulating, 
people do not only mentally represent shape and object spatial configuration, but also the 
orientation of an object as it is implied in verbal descriptions. In this case, participants read a 
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prime-sentence which implicitly suggested a horizontal/vertical orientation for an object (e.g., 
HE HAMMERED THE NAIL INTO THE WALL vs. INTO THE FLOOR), followed by 
target-pictures of the mentioned object that could be in both horizontal or vertical orientation. 
Similarly to the previous experiment, recognition times to pictures matching the orientation of 
the object implied by the sentence (i.e., HE HAMMERED THE NAIL INTO THE WALL / 
horizontal nail) were shorter than in the orientation mismatch condition (i.e., HE 
HAMMERED THE NAIL INTO THE WALL / vertical nail). In a similar setting, Connell & 
Lynott (2009) examined how people represents implied perceptual information about color 
during language comprehension, performing a semantic Stroop task that tested both object-
typical and context-implied color information activation during sentence reading. Participants 
were presented with a color-associated target-word (such as TOMATO in typical red, atypical 
green, or unrelated brown ink) after having read a prime-sentence implying either typical or 
atypical color for the object (e.g., JANE TASTED THE TOMATO WHEN IT WAS READY 
TO EAT or BEFORE IT WAS READY TO EAT). Results observed an advantage in naming 
the target-word color both when its ink color was typical for that object (e.g., TOMATO in 
red ink) and when it matched the color implied by the previous sentence (e.g., TOMATO in 
green ink following JANE TASTED THE TOMATO BEFORE IT WAS READY TO EAT). 
These findings suggest that the simulation tends to follow the default configuration of a 
certain scenario (e.g., seeing red tomatoes) if it is the most usual in everyday experience. 
However, when subject are pushed in unusual contexts (in this case by the prime-sentence 
description) it can be elicited the representation of scenario-specific perceptual information 
that is compatible with the current situation.  
Other scholar demonstrated that also the representation of motor events is affected by 
language comprehension. For example, Zwaan et al. (2004) presented acoustically to 
participants sentences suggesting a movement close to or away from the body (e.g., THE 
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SHORTSTOP HURLED THE SOFTBALL TO YOU). Then two pictures of a ball differing 
in size were presented on the screen, such as they suggested a movement in direction from the 
observer (smaller ball before bigger ball) or not (bigger ball before smaller ball). The task was 
deciding with bimanual responses if the two pictures displayed the same object or not. The 
results showed that when the movement implied by the sentence and the movement suggested 
by the picture of the ball were compatible response latencies were shorter. This indicated that 
participants activated a motor simulation of the sentence contents that influenced the visual 
representation of the motor event. Moreover, these results were obtained in a task were the 
meaning of the sentences was totally irrelevant.  
In the same direction, the results of Borghi et al. (2004) demonstrated the sensitiveness 
of the linguistic content simulation to different perspectives on related scenes. Participants 
read a prime-sentence describing a location/object from inside (e.g., YOU ARE EATING IN 
A RESTAURANT), outside (e.g., YOU ARE WAITING OUTSIDE A RESTAURANT) or 
mixed (e.g., YOU ARE WALKING TOWARD AND ENTERING A RESTAURANT) point 
of views. The prime-sentence was followed by a word (e.g., TABLE, usually found inside a 
restaurant, or SIGN, usually found outside a restaurant) that participants had to judge as 
referring or not to a part of the location/object. Response latencies were faster when the word 
referred to element more typically available in the perspective implied by the sentence (e.g., 
YOU ARE EATING IN A RESTAURANT / TABLE). The results of the part verification 
task also showed an effect of location: participants were faster if the target-word referred to a 
part that was near than far within the perspective (e.g., YOU ARE EATING IN A 
RESTAURANT / TABLE faster than KITCHEN). Importantly, the authors controlled the 
semantic-relatedness of primes and targets in Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA, Landauer & 
Dumais, 1997, see par. 1.1), ruling out a propositional account for their data. Thus, the results 
are consistent with the previously reviewed findings, suggesting that the perspectives implied 
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by the sentences guided the organization of the information feeding in a mental simulation. It 
is again the context what selected the necessary conceptual knowledge to build an appropriate 
representation of the linguistic meaning. In a further experiment, the authors presented prime-
sentences describing an orientated object (e.g., THERE IS A DOLL UPRIGHT IN FRONT 
OF YOU). Participants was asked to judge if the target-word presented after the sentence 
referred or not to part of the object mentioned by the sentence, giving their response manually 
on a vertical response box. The results showed shorter latencies in case of a compatibility 
between the response movement (yes-up/down) and the part location (upper/lower), extending 
to action the findings about the iconicity effect found by Zwaan & Yaxley (2003) on 
perception.  
In the literature, many scholars have reported similar results also for sentences 
explicitly describing actions. For example, Glenberg & Kaschak (2002) asked participants to 
judge the sensibility of imperative sentences (e.g., OPEN/CLOSE THE DRAWER) moving 
their hand from a starting button to response buttons that could be either close or far away in 
respect to their body. So, in the case of a sentence as OPEN THE DRAWER, the movement 
performed by the subject to respond would be compatible with the described action if the 
hand goes close to the body, while responding away from the body would serve as 
incompatible condition. The finding showed the predicted action-sentence compatibility effect 
(ACE): action-compatible responses were faster than action-incompatible ones. The effect 
was observed not only for imperative sentences, but also for descriptive sentences (e.g., 
MIKE HANDED YOU THE PIZZA) and, moreover, for abstract transfer sentences (e.g., LIZ 
TOLD YOU THE STORY, see par. 3.5 for further discussion). In the same direction, Scorolli 
& Borghi (2007) confirmed the effector-specificity of the motor simulation. They presented 
sentences that referred to actions performed using hands (e.g., UNWRAP THE CANDY), 
mouth (e.g., SUCK THE SWEET) or feet (e.g., KICK THE BALL) in a lexical decision task 
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where participants were instructed to respond vocally/pressing a pedal in case of correct 
responses. Response latencies were shorter for mouth-sentences than for hand-sentences with 
vocal responses, while an advantage of foot sentences over hand-sentences was found in pedal 
responses. Thus, the results suggested again that the simulation of the sentence meaning is 
quite detailed, as it is sensible to the effector implied by the action.  
On the whole, the results on sentences provide evidence of the generality of the 
simulation triggered by action/object-related language comprehension, showing simulations 
as arising during the whole sentence comprehension, rather than merely during lexical access. 
Thus, following the evidence reviewed so far, it is plausible that there is an action (or object) 
specific sensory-motor simulation elicited by individual words (or by words combinations), as 
well as a more general simulation evoked by the whole linguistic construction. Presumably, 
the ACE reported in Glenberg & Kaschak (2002) reflects a combination of both these aspects 
- at least in the concrete sentences, there is probably only the latter in the more abstract 
sentences (see also Glenberg et al., 2008, reviewed in par. 3.5). Indeed, if we take for example 
a word such as the verb “open”, by itself it does not necessarily imply moving a hand 
horizontally toward the body: “one can open one’s eyes, open a sunroof, open a bank account, 
or open a lead in a race” (Fischer & Zwaan, 2008, p. 842), none of which necessarily involves 
such a movement. In the same direction, a name as “drawer” does not necessary imply such 
action without further context, and may imply many other actions across different situations 
(as in for example in “put the shirts in the drawer”). In other words, these findings suggest 
that perceptual and motor simulation might occur when all available information is integrated 
(Fischer & Zwaan, 2008). Furthermore, they show that simulation (and so the resonance by 
which simulation is carried on at the neural level, see par. 2.4 and par. 2.6) is associated with 
linguistic content in a very precise manner, showing its high degree of specificity and 
flexibility in dependence of the current context (even if only implied).  
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3.3. Neuroscientific evidence of motor resonance during word and sentence comprehension 
In the previous paragraph, the evidence reviewed suggested that the simulation processes are 
tied to language in a very precise manner. The literature of neuroscientific research on both 
words and sentences showed that a resonance mechanism (see par. 1.4., 2.4 and 2.6) is at 
work during language processing supporting this conclusion as well. In the last years 
compelling evidence has been produced on the role of motor resonance in language 
comprehension, for example during the exposure to action verbs and names of tools. It has 
been demonstrated that naming/describing tools in comparison to animals selectively activates 
the left middle temporal gyrus and the left premotor cortex (regions associated to action), 
which are active also during imagery of interaction with the same items (e.g., Martin et al., 
1996). In the same direction, exposition to tool words and action verbs elicits a fronto-central 
cortical activation that is not found during exposition to words not associated with action 
(Preissl, Pulvermüller, Lutzenberger & Birbaumer, 1995; Pulvermüller, Lutzenberger & 
Preissl, 1999). However, considering that the hypothesis held as true here is that language 
recruits the same sensory-motor areas as for interaction with objects and real action, it 
behooves that brain activation should display the very same topography for processing 
language as for processing objects, affordances, actions etc. (Jirak et al., 2010). To give an 
example, neuro-imaging research indicated that regions of the fusiform gyrus are active 
during color perception, and that in the retrieval of color knowledge this same color 
perception system is involved in the posterior temporal cortex. Thus, it is expected that an 
analogous neural circuit would be activated by color knowledge retrieval triggered 
exclusively by linguistic stimuli. And it is exactly what has been observed in the literature. 
For example, Simmons et al. (2007) asked participants to perform two tasks while undergoing 
fMRI. First, participants performed a property verification task in which they had to judge 
91 
 
whether a named color/motor property was true for a named object (e.g., TAXI-yellow, 
HAIR-combed). Then, they performed a color perception task, and a region of the left 
fusiform gyrus - found as said as highly responsive during color perception - showed a greater 
activity during color retrieving than motor property knowledge retrieving. These results 
confirmed that conceptual knowledge is grounded in modality-specific systems (e.g., 
Barsalou, 1999, see par. 1.3 and 3.2), and provided direct evidence for an overlap in the 
neural bases of color perception and stored information about object-associated color (similar 
results in Hsu et al., 2011; Yee et al., 2012). 
In the same direction, a selective activation of different cortical areas in dependence of 
the observation to different kinds of actions has been observed, revealing a somatotopic 
organization for the human brain. For example, an fMRI study by Buccino et al. (2001) found 
that during exposition to videos of actions involving as effector the mouth, the hand or the 
foot, the same neural areas that map the first-person execution of those actions were activated. 
Under the embodiment view, it is expected to observe similar brain patterns also in the 
resonance mechanism triggered by action-language exposition, and this is exactly what has 
been found recently by studies on action words and verbs. Indeed, much evidence of a 
somatotopic activation of the premotor cortices has been collected, and with different 
techniques (e.g., TMS, fMRI, MEG, EEG). For example, Pulvermüller (2005) recorded  with 
TMS neurophysiological (and  behavioural) responses in a lexical decision task to three kinds 
of verbs, referring respectively to actions performed with the face (e.g., LICK), arms (e.g., 
PICK) or legs (e.g., KICK). The results showed the predicted somatotopic organization in the 
corticospinal activity patterns: different neural sites in topographical patterns were observed 
during the exposition to the different kinds of verb (starting at 250 ms after stimulus onset). In 
addition, EEG-recordings confirmed activations of the effector-specific motor resonance as 
occurring quite early, that is before than 200 ms from word onset (Pulvermüller, 1999). 
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Similar findings on the somatotopic organization of the motor cortex were observed by Hauk 
et al. (2004) using action words in a magnetic resonance setting. Again, processing language 
semantically related to hand and foot actions produced different brain patterns, specifically 
the middle frontal and precentral gyrus for words referring to hand actions, and areas in the 
dorsal premotor cortex for words referring to foot actions. Several other studies have 
identified body-part specificity in the topography of premotor cortices (but not in other motor 
areas). For example, Willems et al. (2010) using fMRI found in a lexical decision task a 
selective activation of the left premotor cortex for right-handers and of the right premotor 
cortex for left-handers during the processing of verbs denoting manual actions. This result 
suggests that the simulation evoked during language processing is not only sensitive to 
somatotopy, but also to inter-individual body differences. However, if language 
comprehension seemed to be able to activate only the premotor cortex, while the authors 
investigated the neural substrate of the same manual verbs during mental  imagery, the 
activation of both the motor and the premotor cortex were observed. 
Further evidence on the activation of the premotor areas during the exposure to action 
verbs have been collected using high-density MEG. For example, Pulvermüller et al. (2005) 
presented acoustically words referring to actions involving the face or the leg to participants 
engaged in a distractor task. Different neural patterns in the premotor cortex were observed in 
relation to the different kinds of stimuli: listening to face-related verbs resulted in stronger 
activation of inferior fronto-central areas in respect to leg-related verbs,  whereas listening to 
leg-related verbs resulted in stronger activation of superior central areas in respect to face-
related verbs. Furthermore, these activations occurred  within 170 ms after stimulus onset, so 
it is difficult that other strategic factors could contribute to the results. As noted elsewhere, 
the results of this study clearly showed that “meaning access in action word  recognition is an 
early automatic process reflected by spatiotemporal signatures of word-evoked activity” 
93 
 
(Fischer & Zwaan, 2008, p. 839). A related study from the same lab (Pulvermüller, Hauk et 
al., 2005) provided support for the idea that as motor resonance is automatically evoked by 
words, also the reverse process should run as well. The guiding hypothesis was that the 
identification of these action words might be favored when the neural regions subtended to 
the actions they denote are directly stimulated. TMS was applied over left hemisphere motor 
areas while right-handed subjects performed a lexical decision on action-related words, hence 
mean latencies to leg-action words (e.g., KICK) were compared to hand-action words (e.g., 
PICK). Participants responded to meaningful word with an energetic lip movement, chosen to 
minimize interference between semantic and motor planning processes. The results showed 
the expected interaction between stimulation sites and word type. Indeed, TMS of hand/leg 
areas modulated the processing of hand/leg related words selectively: stimulation on hand 
areas led to faster hand than leg-word responses, whereas when leg areas were stimulated a 
reverse effect showed shorter lexical decisions latencies for leg than hand-words. Such effects 
related to word types disappeared during sham or right hemisphere TMS stimulation. Thus, 
the influence of activations in motor and premotor areas over the processing of different kinds 
of words semantically related to hand or leg actions confirmed a somatotopic mapping for 
linguistic stimuli, providing clear evidence that language and motor functions interact in the 
processing of meaningful information about language and action. As the effects emerged only 
for left hemisphere stimulations, these results fitted well in the typical language dominance 
observed in the literature for this hemisphere. Furthermore, they demonstrated that if 
accessing action-related words evokes motor resonance, this process is also bidirectional: 
lexical access of this kind of words is  favored by motor resonance. This bidirectionality is a 
fundamental assumption for several theories inside the embodied framework (e.g., TEC, 
Hommel et al., 2001, discussed in par. 2.2). 
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The neuroscientific literature reports also several findings on sentence processing 
which confirmed that a resonance mechanism is at play during language exposition, and that 
the resonance connects simulations and linguistic contents in a very fine way. For example, 
topographic differences in the brain activity patterns have been observed by Tettamanti et al. 
(2005) during the exposition to sentences denoting mouth, hand or leg actions. Abstract 
sentences with analogous syntactic structure were used as control stimuli. The action 
sentences, confirming the somatotopic organization observed in the previously reviewed 
studies on words, activated selectively the same regions involved in the real performance of 
the action they referred to. Specifically, hand action activated the left precentral gyrus, the 
posterior intraparietal sulcus and the left posterior inferior temporal area, while leg activity 
was identified in the left dorsal premotor and left intraparietal sulcus. The detection of a 
bilateral pattern in the posterior cingulate showed a clearly different activation when 
processing abstract sentences. Thus, the results displayed activity in a fronto-parietal circuit 
with a temporal participation in the left hemisphere. In addition, activity in Broca's area was 
detected independently from any effector-specificity, implying a special role in language 
processing that seemed to go beyond the one usually attributed to it. Similar findings were 
observed by Buccino et al. (2005) using TMS and a behavioural paradigm. By means of 
single-pulse TMS, either the hand or the foot/leg motor area in the left hemisphere were 
stimulated in distinct sessions, while participants were acoustically presented with sentences 
describing hand or foot actions (abstract content sentences were used as control stimuli). 
Motor evoked potentials were recorded from both hand and foot muscles. The results 
indicated that MEPs from the hand muscles were selectively modulated by hand-action 
sentences, while MEPs from foot muscles by foot-action sentences. This modulation took the 
form of a decreasing amplitude in the recorded MEPs. In the behavioural task, participants 
responded with the hand or the foot while listening the same pool of sentences on hand/foot 
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actions and abstract situations. In line with the psychophysical results, manual responses were 
inibhited by hand-related sentences and foot responses were slower for foot-related sentences, 
in comparison to abstract sentences processing. This evidence is in line with a number of 
results obtained with behavioural tasks (Scorolli & Borghi, 2007; Borghi & Scorolli, 2009) 
that showed the simulation activated during combinations of nouns and verbs as sensitive to 
the compatibility of the effector implied by the sentence and the one used to execute the 
response (see par. 3.2).  
In a similar direction, another fMRI study observed that the same brain areas that were 
activated by action observation also mapped sentence comprehension in an effector-specific 
way (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006). Indeed, regions in the premotor areas that were active during 
the observation of hand actions were also active during the comprehension of sentences 
denoting actions performed with the hands. In the literature there is also clear evidence that 
the referents’ affordances have a direct influence on the comprehension of sentences 
describing object in space. For example, in a visual-world paradigm study (Chambers et al., 
2004) participants were presented acoustically with sentences describing spatial scenes during 
the observation of a display composed by elements connected to the sentences, while holding 
or not a tool in their hand. The fixations on the visual scene were monitored, and the results 
showed it was modulated by the linguistic input in interaction with the holding of the tool. 
Indeed, holding the tool affected the syntactic parsing in a way that changed the amount of 
time spent looking at (possible) goal locations that is likely/unlikely under that specific parse 
in respect to an alternative one. This research showed that motor resonance occurs very 
rapidly during comprehension, substantially before the associated linguistic constituent has 
been fully processed, even if it did not allow us/researchers to affirm directly that motor 
resonance occurs during every-day language comprehension. 
96 
 
There are also studies, however, the conclusions of which seem to be at odd with those 
of the behavioural and neural studies discussed so far. For example Postle et al. (2008) used 
fMRI on primary and premotor cortices while presenting verbs denoting hand, foot or mouth 
actions, concrete nouns not related to action/body parts, non-words, and characters strings 
(with verbs and nouns matched for imageability). In the data there was no evidence of a 
somatotopic organization for action words, but the pre-supplementary motor area presented a 
different pattern for foot verbs in respect to nouns, so it is possible that this region had both a 
cognitive and motor role. As the main novelty of this study, in comparison to the literature 
reviewed above, was the use of cytoarchitectonical probability maps, these results suggested 
that “studies on somatotopy connected to word meaning extraction should be also related to 
cytoarchitectural information and functional criteria, in order to correctly interpret activation 
distibution as somatotopy” (Jirak et al., 2010, p. 713). 
In the neuroscientific literature, somatotopy has been connected also to the 
involvement in language processes of the mirror neuron system, as they both rely on the 
theoretical principle that assumes language as sustained by the same neural circuits of 
perception and action. Indeed, canonical and mirror neurons (see par. 1.4, 2.4 and 2.6) are 
thought to be the neural basis of the simulation activated during language referring to objects 
and actions (e.g., Gallese, 2008; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Originally identified in 
macaque’s area F5 (ventral premotor cortex), mirror cells are a class of visuo-motor neurons 
that map first-person execution of action, as well as the observation of others performing 
actions. In almost a total absence of investigations on humans at the single-neuron level, the 
area which is regarded as a homolog of monkeys’ F5 is the Broca’s region (inferior frontal 
region of the human cortex). The Broca’s area, originally thought to be a pure speech 
processing area, is now recognized by many scholars as containing mirror neurons, and 
regarded to as the action-language linking area (e.g., Binkofski & Buccino, 2004; 
97 
 
Pulvermüller, 2005) at the core of the human mirror neurons system. As it suggest additional 
circuits linking motor and speech processing, the whole mirror neurons system possibly has 
an impact on language comprehension. Supporting this idea, for example Glenberg et al. 
(2008) using TMS found comparable mirror activation patterns by either presenting the 
typical sound of actions or their verbal description. But, as noticed by Jirak et al. (2010), the 
activation of the Broca’s area seems to differ in typically mirror-activating tasks, like action 
observation compared to language processing. For example, a series of fMRI  studies (Aziz-
Zadeh et al., 2006; Aziz-Zadeh, Wilson et al., 2006; Aziz-Zadeh & Damasio, 2008) revealed 
that the pattern of activation found for actions observation and action-sentences reading did 
not result in a total overlap. The authors suggested that mirror neurons, as also pointed out 
elsewhere (e.g., Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998), are probably not directly involved in the process 
of language understanding, but have possibly played a fundamental role in the phylogenetic 
development of language (see also par. 3.6). However, this is not in contradiction with the  
integrating role attributed to Broca’s region in sounds and actions processing. For example, 
D’Ausilio et al. (2009) reported facilitated perception of a given speech sound when the 
motor articulator mapping that sound was stimulated with TMS. Thus, it is possible that 
mirror neurons integrate sounds and actions or even sustain simulation in order to understand 
linguistic stimuli. However, the conclusion that motor regions closely linked to regions of the 
mirror neuron system are indispensable in language processing will need further evidence. 
The suggestion of being careful in discussing the relation of action, perception and 
language can also be drawn from of a lesion study which tested  both visual and linguistic 
action understanding of both aphasic patients and control subjects (Saygin et al., 2004). 
Participants in the experiment would see, for example, a line drawing of a boy licking an ice 
cream but with no an ice-cream cone depicted in the picture, or sentences fragment like HE 
LICKED THE with no object as patient (i.e., followed by a blank space). Then, they were 
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presented with pictures that could display the missing target object, or an affordance-related 
object which invite to the same manual interactions (i.e., bouquet of flowers), or a 
semantically related distractor (i.e., cake), or a semantically unrelated distractor (i.e., rooster). 
Participants decided which among these pictures fitted the visual scene/sentence fragment by 
pressing the button corresponding to the chosen picture, while response latencies and 
accuracy were measured. The results showed no overall correlation between patients’ deficits 
in visual and linguistic comprehension, suggesting that different brain regions were associated 
(at least in this task) with the deficits in visual representation than the deficits in linguistic 
representation. However, correlations inside specific subsets of participants were observed, 
suggesting that action and language understanding share overlapping neural substrates. Thus, 
this evidence implies here the emergence of a critical question about the real extent of 
similarity ascribable to action observation and language comprehension (see the following 
paragraph). Indeed, it seems that these two processes are not identical, at least with respect to 
the timing and the manner involved: action observation is much closer to the execution of 
action than how could be linguistic action description (Fischer & Zwaan, 2008).  
To summarize what have been seen so far, several studies showed a great amount of 
evidence confirming that - although critical views have also been proposed (e.g., Postle et al., 
2008) - action/object-related language comprehension elicits a resonance directly connected 
to somatotopy, and possibly to the mirror neuron system. In general (but also considering the 
critical views), it can be affirmed that somatotopy of language contents can be consistently 
identified in premotor regions, conclusion that bolsters embodied accounts even if it cannot be 
affirmed the same for motor cortices’ involvement. Indeed, this might be simply due to the 
tasks used (very little results have been collected in really ecological settings), or it is possible 
that the evidence highlights a different role played by motor cortices in the direct execution 
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and observation of actions, in comparison to actions conceptualization and linguistic 
description (Jirak et al, 2010).  
 
3.4. Objects/actions processing and language comprehension: are there identical simulations?  
The largest part of the literature on simulation and resonance reviewed so far has investigated 
embodied language mostly in order to demonstrate the similarity of the simulation triggered 
by language in respect to the simulation triggered by objects/actions observation, action 
preparation or action execution. The evidence is compelling, and has been very valuable for 
the spreading of embodied and grounded views of cognition and language. However, as it has 
been highlighted in the last part of the previous paragraph, there might be important 
differences in the cognitive processes (e.g., understanding the meaning of a certain action) 
elicited during execution of action, observation of objects/actions, preparation to action, than 
during language exposition. And it is probably time to better investigate and understand these 
possible differences. From an epistemological point of view, it is obvious that language 
cannot be considered identical to execution or observation, at least because “observation and 
real interaction with objects is always situated in a specific context, whereas during language 
comprehension we typically have to mentally construct a situation” (Borghi, 2012, p. 127). 
Thus, assessing to what extent the simulation during language comprehension resembles or 
differs from the one during action/object observation results to be an important test bed for 
the explicative power of embodied cognition accounts (my empirical investigation on the 
differences of affordance and language, the results of which confirmed the supposed 
differences, is reported in chapter 6).  
In order to better understand the differences of linguistic triggered simulation in 
comparison to simulation during action execution or observation, it is useful to refer to the 
literature on affordances and language (Borghi, 2012). A starting point to try a clarification of 
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what happens during real interaction with objects and what happens during language 
comprehension could be the recent proposal of Borghi & Riggio (2009) to make a distinction 
about specific affordances kinds (see par. 2.3 and 2.5). In their view, stable affordances are 
affordances related to properties rather constant across contexts, like size, while variable 
affordances are affordances related to mutable properties, like orientation. A special case are 
represented by canonical affordances: a canonical affordance is the more frequent 
configuration of a variable affordance usually depending on object use, such as typical object 
orientation (e.g., for a right-hander a beer mug upright with the handle on the right, ready to 
be filled and grabbed), the information of which might be useful to store along with stable 
affordances. Given this situation, there are several possibilities about language. 
The first possibility is that words are not grounded, not linked to objects’ perceptual 
and motor characteristics; in this case the existence of different kind of affordances related to 
the same object/action would be not problematic. Indeed words would be simply understood 
in terms of semantic relatedness to other words (e.g., Landauer & Dumais, 1997, see par. 1.1). 
I hope I have given enough examples of the fallacy of this position in the course of this 
dissertation, at least enough to avoid discussing it again now (see chapter 1 and par. 3.2). A 
second possibility is about an identical activation of sensory-motor systems in the situation in 
which we are interacting with a beer mug, as in the situation in which the words “beer mug” 
are read on a menu, listened from the radio or said to a friend. In this view, words and 
sentences are directly linked to their referents (as in the Indexical hypothesis, see Glenberg & 
Robertson, 2000) or to their analogical representations (as in Perceptual symbols theory, see 
Barsalou, 1999, 2008, 2009). In this view, words denoting objects would evoke perceptual 
and motor information relative to such objects. Much evidence supporting this idea has been 
reviewed in this thesis (see par 3.2 and 3.3), confirming that the way we understand language 
is constrained by the affordances elicited by the objects/actions denoted by word and 
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sentences. However, as recently advanced elsewhere (Borghi, 2012), there is a third possible 
view about what happens during language processing. Indeed, if it is held as true that 
language is tied to affordances and simulation is constrained by them, assuming that language 
comprehension is under the influence of object affordances implies here to be able to indicate 
what specific affordances are referred to. For example, it is obvious that interacting 
successfully in the real world with beer mugs imply the capability to use previous knowledge 
about object-based interaction, especially experiences with beer mugs. In the case of linguistic 
information, to understand what it is meant by the words “beer mug”, in absence of a general 
and still representation of the concept, we might at least retrieve perceptual information about 
the typical shape of beer mugs and the related information about the grip that is usually 
necessary to interact with an object of that shape and parts configuration. Indeed, a rather 
canonical property of our interaction with beer mugs is to use a power grip on the handle to 
manipulate it and to start any kind of interaction with it.  
In the direction to clarify which affordances are activated during the exposition to 
action sentences, Borghi & Riggio (2009) used the recognition task described above for 
Stanfield & Zwaan (2001). In their setting, participants were visually presented with prime-
sentences denoting observation of an object or action on the same object (e.g., LOOK AT vs. 
GRASP THE BRUSH). After the cut off at 400 ms, the sentence was replaced by a picture of 
an object that participants were required to judge as named or not in the prime-sentence; 
responses were produced by manual key-presses. The target-objects elicited power/precision 
grips (e.g., brush vs. pencil) and could be represented, in respect of the participants’ 
perspective, in their canonical orientation or not (i.e., the affording part in the lower vs. the 
higher part of the screen). The results showed that action verbs (in imperative forms) were 
processed faster than observation verbs even if the verb frequency was controlled, indicating 
that action sentences induced a motor preparation. Additionally, the objects in canonical 
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orientation produced shorter response latencies in respect of the reversed presentation, 
underlying - rather than a visual - a motor nature for the effect, relative to objects’ orientation 
for use (upright vs. reversed) and not to object visual orientation (vertical vs. horizontal). 
However, the most important results concerned mismatching trials, when the object in the 
prime-sentence and the target-picture did not correspond; in this case, when the grip of the 
sentence’s referent and the grip elicited by the picture were compatible (e.g., GRASP THE 
BRUSH followed by a picture of a pencil), mean latencies were longer for action than 
observation verbs. This interference was probably due to the unavailability of the motor 
system, still occupied in the production of the linguistically elicited (mismatching) simulation. 
The inhibitory effect observed can be explained in terms of common coding (e.g., Hommel et 
al., 2001): if an event code is activated from two different sources (i.e., the linguistic task and 
the motor response), an inhibitory process may have place. Thus, Borghi & Riggio’s results 
suggested first, that when we read an action sentence a motor preparation of proper actions 
with the described object take place, and second, that object-names favor the appropriate 
grasping of the referent. This means that the representation of the concept of an object follows 
the guide of its referent size and shape, along with the grip they evoke. 
On the whole, these findings permit a better characterization of the simulation 
occurring during language understanding, indicating which kinds of affordances are evoked 
by action-related sentences reading. Indeed, analogously to the simulation during object 
observation, linguistic triggered simulation re-enacts previous experiences preparing us to 
future action, thus sustaining prediction. Specifically, linguistic simulation of action language 
seems to build a motor prototype based primarily on stable affordances along with 
affordances related to objects’ grip and canonical use orientation. This confirms that language 
understanding is directly tied to object affordances, rather than being merely implemented by 
associative relations between words. However, the simulation during sentence reading seemed 
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to be slightly different in comparison to the simulation triggered by objects observation. 
Indeed, linguistic simulation seems to consider only stable and canonical affordances, 
favoring the most frequently experienced object properties, which have the higher probability 
to be encountered. Thus, language evokes a rather detailed simulation, but for this simulation 
is not possible to contain variable properties of objects. On the contrary, variable properties 
are taken into account online in object observation (e.g., Tucker & Ellis, 1998), similarly to 
what happens during real interaction with objects.  
Other scholars have pointed out that, as we can interact with objects in specific ways 
in order to reach for distinct goals, different affordances might be also related to objects 
manipulation and objects use (see par. 2.5). Tools are the object kind with perfectly represent 
this situation, as they usually can evoke distinct skilled actions that are consistent to their use 
as well as grasping actions that are adapted to their structure (e.g., Bub et al., 2008; Creem & 
Lee, 2005; Jax & Buxbaum, 2010; Natraj et al., 2013; see also chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis). 
For example, the appropriate way to move a knife is to grasp it with a precision grip, whereas 
to cut something with a knife a power grip is required. At the neural level, it has been 
proposed that affordances related to object use are represented more ventrally, with those 
related to manipulation represented dorsally (e.g., Young, 2006; Buxbaum & Kalénine, 2010). 
Interestingly, Jax & Buxbaum (2010) showed a behavioural difference for conflict objects 
(i.e., require different grips for manipulation and use) and not-conflict objects (i.e., 
manipulated and used with the same grip), and proposed that the intention to act on an object 
triggers a race-like affordances competition. Considering that functional behaviours require 
activation of previously stored information, the activation of manipulation responses is faster. 
Moreover, when a manipulative grasping is performed before using the object there is an 
interference effect which is not present when use is performed before manipulation. In light of 
this further evidence, and of the distinction between functional and volumetric affordances, an 
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interesting proposal has been very recently advanced by Borghi (2012) about affordance 
simulation in language comprehension. Borghi hypothesized that when a word/sentence 
denoting a manipulable object as a tool is processed, functional information is more likely to 
be activated than volumetric information. This is what might be observed because “functional 
actions are more frequently associated with tools than other kinds of actions” (Borghi, 2012, 
p. 131). Evidence supporting this idea have been already collected. For example, Costantini et 
al. (2011) presented participants with 3D-pictures of a room which displayed an everyday tool 
(e.g., bottle) that was located in peripersonal/extrapersonal space. Then, participants were 
presented with a function/manipulation/observation verb (e.g., DRINK, GRASP, LOOK AT), 
being instructed to judge if the verb was congruent with the previously presented object in the 
3D-scene. Faster responses were observed for verbs denoting function and manipulation than 
observation, with latencies to manipulation and function verbs being shorter if objects were in 
the peripersonal than extrapersonal space. Further, in the peripersonal space the fastest 
responses were observed for function verbs. Thus, these results confirmed that objects are 
represented in terms of affordances and that the linguistic context flexibly modulates the 
simulation. Additionally, they show that in the situation in which first-person action usually 
happens (i.e., peripersonal space), function is the content more likely to be activated. Thus, 
the activation of affordances might differ for linguistic and non linguistic task, as in the latter 
online information (e.g., variable affordances), along with manipulation to access the object, 
is activated firstly, as it has been shown that in real interactions information related to 
structural characteristics is activated earlier than functional information (e.g., Jax & 
Buxbaum, 2010). Instead, during action-sentence reading a motor prototype based on function 
was activated because, especially with tools, functional actions are the more frequently 
performed (e.g., Borghi & Riggio, 2009; Costantini et al., 2011). Thus, in the case of 
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linguistic tasks the competition of manipulation and use had a different winner, as language 
processing would activate primarily function information.  
On the whole, the findings reviewed in this paragraph indicated that the simulation of 
linguistic contents re-enacts previous experiences to produce comprehension in light of 
specific predictions aimed at action planning and execution. Indeed, the simulation put the 
subject in the most frequently experienced situation, activating a motor prototype of the 
objects/actions linguistically described. This prototype contains stable and canonical 
affordances, along with the sensory-motor representation of the object function. This suggest 
that there is a difference in the activation triggered by language comprehension from both 
observation and interaction with objects, and that this difference regards in particular the kind 
of predictions implicitly produced (Borghi, 2012).  
 
3.5. Abstract concepts in embodied language 
The literature on simulation and resonance reviewed so far has built an idea of language 
embodiment and grounding which is mostly based on investigation about words and sentences 
denoting concrete concepts. The primary reason of this is that distinguishing between abstract 
and concrete concepts/words is not an easy work. The standard assumption that concrete 
words index perceivable entities, whereas abstract words refer to entities more detached from 
sensible experience (e.g., Paivio, 1991; Barsalou et al., 2003), does not solve the problem. For 
example, if it is agreeable that TO GRASP is a concrete verb, judging noun-verb combination 
as for example GRASP THE MEANING seem to be not so easy (Aziz-Zadeh, Wilson et al., 
2006). Similarly, words denoting social roles as TEACHER might be considered more 
abstract than words referring to single objects as GLASS, but anyway less abstract than a 
purely definitional word as NUMBER (Keil, 1989); similarly, basic or subordinate words, 
like DOG or COCKER, may be considered more concrete than a superordinate word like 
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ANIMAL (e.g., Borghi et al., 2005). Moreover, words and sentences meaning is determined 
by the context they are embedded in, which comprehend at its most general level the 
language/culture in which they are produced, with evidence in the literature suggesting that 
abstract concepts/words are strongly influenced by sociolinguistic and cultural factors (e.g., 
Boroditsky, 2000, 2001). These reasons are starting to led scholars to look at the abstract-
concrete dimension as a continuum, rather than a clear-cut dichotomy (e.g., Wiemer-Hastings 
et al., 2001).  
If we consider the general explanation proposed by the propositional account and 
embodiment, it is evident that they either suppose the existence of a single representational 
format for both concrete and abstract concepts. Indeed, according to propositional theories 
(see chapter 1) the representation of both concrete and abstract concepts/words is symbolic 
and amodal (e.g., Fodor, 1975, 1998). On the contrary, according to embodied accounts of 
cognition (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Gallese, 2008; Glenberg, 1997; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), 
both concrete and abstract concepts/words are grounded in perception, action and 
introspection systems, being characterized by a (multi)modal nature. However, given this 
starting point for embodiment the grounding of abstract language remains something unclear, 
as the consequent question about abstractness that follows from it is: “how can theories that 
focus on modal simulations explain concepts that do not appear modal?” (Barsalou, 2008, p. 
634). Thus, abstract concepts constitute a very problematic issue for the embodied view of 
cognition, if not the most problematic one. 
As embodied theories propose, at a very general theoretic level, that abstract 
concepts/words are grounded in sensory-motor systems in the same way that concrete ones 
are, starting from this all-embracing assumption at least three more specific explanations have 
been advanced (Glenberg et al., 2008; see also Flumini, 2011). The first embodied account of 
abstract concepts, and probably the most well-known and influential, explains them referring 
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to metaphors. Indeed, Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT, Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999) 
has pointed out that our vocabulary about time has metaphoric, spatial roots, with this idea 
being supported from several investigations in linguistics and psychology (e.g., Boroditsky, 
2000; Clark, 1973; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999; Núñez & Sweetser, 2006; Talmy, 2000). 
For example, Lakoff & Johnson (1980, 1999) showed the presence of dickers of metaphorical 
mapping schemata in every-day English language (e.g., DEATH FINALLY CAUGHT HIM 
could be an example from the personification schema). The authors suggested that these 
metaphoric linguistic mappings directly observable in speech are something that renders 
explicit the (pre-linguistic) conceptual mappings subtended to them. Thus, metaphors would 
be at work at a deep cognitive level, and in the case in which abstract concepts would be 
referred to, the elicited embodied simulation should follow the guide of stored mappings 
between abstract and concrete concepts. This basic principle of CMT is supported especially 
by those empirical findings on conceptual metaphors that discovered the existence of 
metaphoric mappings which are not explicitly attested in language (for further discussion see 
Flumini & Santiago, 2013; Santiago et al., 2011). In the last years, one of the most studied 
example of this kind of mapping has been the TIME IS SPACE metaphor which maps 
temporal reference onto a horizontal spatial axis (e.g., left-to-right in Western cultures), in 
place of the explicitly attested in many languages front-back axis (e.g., Sell & Kaschak, 2011; 
Torralbo et al., 2006; Ulrich et al., 2012). Indeed, in his review of cross-linguistic space-time 
metaphors, Radden (2004) observed for all the languages considered a total lack of linguistic 
conventions in speech that referred to time as organized in an horizontal space. However, in 
every-day experience we are all used to conventional associations of time as flowing from left 
to right in a horizontal axis, i.e., in written language as in many types of sequences and 
graphic devices (e.g., comic strips, calendars, etc.); thus, the establishment of a left-right 
mapping has been referred to the cultural exposure to an habitual reading-writing direction 
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(review in Bonato et al., 2012). Along with this observational evidence, a wide set of response 
time studies reported interactions between the processing of the temporal reference of 
words/sentences (and/or the spatial presentation of the stimuli) and a variety of response 
mappings: lateralized key presses, forward-backward manual movements, vocal responses 
(e.g., Boroditsky, 2000, 2001; Flumini & Santiago, 2013; Ouellet et al., 2010b; Sell & 
Kaschack, 2011; Torralbo et al., 2006; Ulrich & Maienborn, 2010;  Ulrich et al., 2012). 
Space-time congruency effects are part of a wider family of compatibility studies which 
manipulate concrete and abstract dimensions in tasks that require responding only to aspects 
of the abstract one. In this setting, modulations due to (task-irrelevant) concrete dimensions 
are often observed on the processing of the (task-relevant) abstract dimension. The resulting 
metaphoric congruency effect is interpreted as the index of the use of underlying concrete 
representations to organize the abstract dimension, with many examples of this being 
furnished in the literature on the so-called SNARC effect (Dehaene et al., 1993) literature. As 
the experimental results showed an unexpected degree of flexibility in conceptual mappings, 
nowadays there seems to be a well-motivated support to the idea that conceptual congruency 
effects could have contextual nature (e.g., Flumini & Santiago, 2013; Torralbo et al., 2006; 
Santiago et al., 2008; Santiago et al., 2011, 2012). This cognitive flexibility clearly 
contradicts the classic interpretation of the effects as indexes of stable, automatic long-term 
memory mappings, opening a question about how and why specific mappings are selected 
from the semantic memory to be used in the working memory mental space (my empirical 
investigation on this topic is reported in chapter 8). In the literature there is evidence of 
different degrees of flexibility depending on the abstract dimension studied, the task and 
materials used, the kind of mappings which are evaluated. A case considered as the example 
of strong automatic activation (usually related to its salience for basic human beahviours) 
concerns the mapping of valence evaluation to approach-avoidance manual responses. Indeed, 
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several results showed faster responses to positive and negative items respectively by pulling 
and pushing a lever (e.g., Chen & Bargh, 1999). It happened not only when the decision was 
based on the valence of the stimuli: also when performing a lexical decision task (Wentura et 
al., 2000) and even a stimulus detection task (Chen & Bargh, 1999), which really minimized 
the task-relevance of the evaluative dimension. Given this evidence, Freina et al. (2009) 
investigated if the content of the simulation triggered in such settings would be automatically 
determined or not. Participants judged words as positive/negative by pressing two buttons, 
one close to and one far away from their body. Results showed that in the case they had to 
press the buttons with the open palm of their hands, shorter latencies were found when 
responding to positive words with the button away from their body, like if they were 
simulating the reaching of something positive, while the reverse was true for negative words, 
like if they avoided something negative. The opposite pattern was instead found in the case in 
which participants responded holding a tennis ball in their hand. The authors suggested that in 
this case participants simulated keeping the “good” for themselves and throwing the “bad” 
away from them. This study, in line with the literature, confirmed that processing words with 
different valence evokes oriented arm/hand movements based on previous approach-
avoidance experiences, but it revealed also that an identical flexion/extension movement 
could be dynamically associated to positive or negative valence in dependence of the overall 
situation (i.e., hand-posture, action goal). This evidence, describing the simulation as sensitive 
both to the overall action goal and to fine-grained kinematics aspects (see also Hommel et al., 
2001), showed for the metaphoric relation between valence language (abstract dimension) and  
motor schemata (concrete dimension) a higher flexibility to the one usually attributed to it, 
indicating that also in this case the context, able to elicit the assignment of different meanings 
to the very same action, guided the emergence of the effects.  
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On the whole, flexibility seems to be the commanding rule in abstract metaphors. 
Furthermore, this view of metaphoric mappings as contributing to the access to abstract 
meaning by appealing to a conceptualization depending from real (action) experiences have 
given in the last decades an important boost to the spreading of the embodiment’s perspective 
about language comprehension.   
The second explanation of abstract concepts/words grounding follows a strongest 
version of embodiment, suggesting that both abstract and concrete language would be 
represented by overlapping activations in the same sensory-motor neural units. The idea is 
that the same representation of the verb GRASP is activated for YOU GRASP THE 
HAMMER and for YOU GRASP THE IDEA (e.g., Aziz-Zadeh & Damasio, 2008): literal 
and abstract meanings would elicit activations of the same neural patterns. This notion that a 
same action schema is subtended to the understanding of both concrete and abstract contents 
is widely accepted among linguists that work on signed languages. For example, signs 
analysis of Al-Sayyid Bedouin Language (ABSL, Sandler et al., 2005) has showed evidence 
that a hand movement, starting near the body to finish far from it, is used either in the 
mapping of concrete (e.g., GIVE) and abstract (e.g., INFORM) transfer verbs. In the 
psychological literature, there is both behavioural and neuroscientific evidence supporting this 
idea. For example, Glenberg & Kaschak (2002) instructed participants to judge the lexicality 
of imperative sentences (e.g., OPEN/CLOSE THE DRAWER) moving their hand from a 
central starting button to response buttons located close to or far away from their body, and 
reported an action-sentence compatibility effect (ACE, see par. 3.2). The effect was found for 
concrete sentences as well as for descriptive sentences (e.g., MIKE HANDED YOU THE 
PIZZA) and abstract transfer sentences (e.g., LIZ TOLD YOU THE STORY). Glenberg et al. 
(2008) have confirmed this behavioural evidence in a following study which also extended it 
to the neural level in a TMS setting. The neuropshysiological results confirmed that, relative 
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to no-transfer sentences reading, there was greater modulation of the hand muscles during the 
reading of abstract (e.g., ARTHUR PRESENTS THE ARGUMENT TO YOU) and concrete 
transfer sentences (e.g., ANDREA CARRIES THE PIZZA TO YOU). The processing of 
abstract and concrete words has been detailed at a finer level in the fMRI study of 
Rüschemeyer et al. (2007). The authors performed a go-no go lexical decision task requiring 
participants to respond with a key-press to pseudo-words whereas no response was required 
for the correct items, which were verbs with a motor meaning (e.g., BEAT) or abstract verbs 
(e.g., GUESS). The authors found first a greater activation (bilateral but higher in the left  
hemisphere) in areas associated to action as the motor cortices and the somatosensory cortex 
for simple motor verbs compared to abstract verbs; no difference during  processing of motor 
verbs in respect to abstract verbs was instead observed in the activation of frontal mirror 
neurons areas, ventral premotor cortex and inferior parietal lobule. Second, while the authors 
investigated the neural correlates of processing morphologically complex verbs with abstract 
meanings built on stems with motor meaning (e.g., BEGREIFEN/COMPREHEND) or with 
abstract meaning (e.g., BEDENKEN/CONSIDER), no evidence for the hypothesized residual 
effects of the motor stem meaning in the activation pattern was found, whereas complex verbs 
built on motor stems resulted in increased activation patterns of the right posterior temporal 
cortex compared with complex verbs built on abstract stems. However, in the fMRI study by 
Tettamanti et al. (2005, see par. 3.3 above) premotor cortex activations were reported during 
the exposition to action-related sentences, with the data indicating activations in the motor 
regions only for concrete sentences denoting action on manipulable objects in comparison to 
sentences denoting abstract objects. Thus, from this results the representation of verbs seems 
to be highly dependent on the interactions with the semantic context, if it is present. In this 
direction, a more recent fMRI study (Raposo et al., 2009) investigated this supposed 
flexibility in a set of fMRI studies in which participants passively listened to arm/leg-related 
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action verbs that were presented in isolation (e.g., KICK), in literal sentences (e.g KICK THE 
BALL) and idiomatic sentences (e.g., KICK THE BUCKET). The results showed significant 
activations in motor regions when action verbs were presented in isolation and, to a smaller 
extent, in sentences describing literal contexts. In the case in which the very same verbs were 
presented in idiomatic contexts activation was observed in fronto-temporal regions, associated 
with language processing, but not in motor and premotor cortices. Thus, these findings clarify 
the previously reviewed by showing that the nature of the semantic context determines the 
degree to which alternative senses and particularly relevant features are processed when a 
word is heard. This suggests that motor representations are context-dependent, rather than 
automatic and invariable. 
On the whole, from this evidence clearly follows that a sensory-motor grounding for 
abstract concepts/words has been confirmed only in rather specific domains, while much and 
more extensive evidence is still needed before considering its demonstration conclusive. 
The third account of the grounding of abstract concepts/words has been advanced by 
recent proposals which suggest that multiple kinds of representations underlie abstract and 
concrete concepts (review in Borghi & Pecher, 2011). In this view, abstract language is 
characterized  by specific type of properties, as it re-enacts first-person and introspective 
situations (or qualia, e.g., Edelman & Tononi, 2000), at least more frequently than what 
happens with concrete language (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 
2005; Pecher et al., 2011). For example, Wiemer-Hastings & Xu (2005) used a feature 
generation task to systematically compare the content of abstract and concrete concepts. 
Participants were required to list characteristics of the indicated concepts (i.e., item 
properties) or of their usual context (i.e., context properties). Abstract concepts elicited a 
greater number of properties expressing subjective experiences than concrete concepts, which 
mostly evoked intrinsic item properties. Similarly, the situation components generated for 
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abstract and concrete concepts differed not in number, but in kind, as abstract concepts were 
mainly related to social aspects of situations. In general, the properties produced were less 
specific for abstract concepts in respect to concrete ones. Hence, in this study abstractness 
seems to emerge as a function of multiple factors, both qualitative and quantitative. This 
pattern of results might fit in the Language and Situated Simulation theory (LASS, Barsalou 
et al., 2008). According to LASS, linguistic material interact continuously and in many 
different ways with situated simulation processes, so that mixed contributions of the two 
systems are selectively subtended to a wide variety of mappings and tasks. The theory 
suggests that left-hemisphere language areas by which the brain’s linguistic system is 
composed, in particular the inferior frontal gyrus (or Broca’s area), are mostly involved 
during superficial linguistic processing, whereas during deeper conceptual processing also the 
simulation system is engaged, especially the bilateral posterior areas that are associated to 
episodic memory and mental imagery (Scorolli et al., 2011). In contrast to the LASS theory, 
the very recent Words As social Tools proposal (WAT, e.g., Borghi & Cimatti, 2010) 
suggests that the linguistic system does not merely sustains a superficial processing. Indeed, 
words cannot be described as simple indexes of something else, but - in line with well-known 
philosophical views of language  (e.g., Austin, 1962; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Wittgenstein, 
1953) - they are better conceived as tools that allow us specific behaviours and operations in 
the world. In addition, the WAT theory formulates predictions about the grounding of 
concrete and abstract concepts/words that are more detailed than the ones advanced by LASS. 
According to WAT, abstract words’ meaning is more strongly related to the every-day 
experience of being exposed to language and immersed in socio-cultural contexts than 
concrete words’ meaning. Thus, the difference between abstract and concrete words is 
referred  to different modalities of acquisition (MoA, Wauters et al., 2003): perceptual, 
linguistic and mixed. The basic idea of WAT is that MoA rates, in correlation to age of 
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acquisition, concreteness and imageability, gradually change during ontogenetic development. 
In the first steps of acquisition the grounding is mostly perceptual, whereas going on with the 
development become more and more linguistic, until learning presents mainly linguistic 
characteristics. This is why abstract words are typically learnt after the first steps of 
development: the acquisition of abstract words, due to their complexity, require elaborate 
linguistic explanations in enduring and repeated social interactions. In contrast, the 
acquisition of concrete words in young children seems to be effortless, often requiring only a 
single episode of exposition to the word in the context of simultaneously pointing to its 
referent (e.g., Pulvermüller, 2012). WAT does not neglect that for the acquisition and 
representation of both concrete and abstract words meanings either sensory-motor and 
linguistic experience are crucial. The theory simply points out that people rely more on 
language to understand and build abstract words’ meaning, as they do not have a specific 
entity as referent, while sensory-motor experience is usually enough to fulfill and give sense 
to concrete words. This is true also for the different degree of complexity of abstract and 
concrete words’ meaning (as confirmed by the results of my empirical investigation on WAT 
predictions, reported in chapter 7). This was confirmed in the study on WAT by Scorolli et al. 
(2011) in which, starting from the assumption that the concrete-abstract dimension represents 
a continuum, a concrete/abstract verb was combined with both a concrete and an abstract 
noun (e.g., GRASP THE FLOWER vs. THE CONCEPT; DESCRIBE THE FLOWER  vs. 
THE CONCEPT). In order to disentangle semantic meaning from the words’ grammatical 
class, the authors  focused on two syntactically different languages, German and Italian. 
Results showed that compatible noun-verb combinations (i.e., concrete verb and noun, 
abstract verb and noun) were processed faster than mixed noun-verb combinations. 
Additionally, if in the mixed combination a concrete word preceded an abstract one, 
participants were faster regardless of the grammatical class and the spoken language. This is 
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probably due to the peculiar MoA of abstract words, as they  are acquired more in a linguistic 
than perceptual manner. Overall, these findings support the idea that abstract and concrete 
words are processed selectively in parallel systems, that is abstract words (more) in the 
linguistic system and concrete ones (more) in the sensory-motor system, as indicated by the 
lower processing costs when the combination was confined within one system. Thus, results 
confirmed WAT predictions: if for abstract words is crucial the role of both sensory-motor 
and linguistic experience, in respect to concrete ones there is a more marked contribution of 
language. Scorolli et al. (2012) confirmed this behavioural evidence and extended it to the 
psychophysical level using TMS. The role of the motor cortex was investigated in  a 
sensibility task on sentences again constructed by coupling concrete (i.e., action-related) and 
abstract verbs with nouns of manipulable/non-manipulable objects. Single-TMS pulses were 
applied to the left primary motor cortex 250 ms after verb or noun presentation in each of the 
four possible verb-noun, with registration of the cortico-spinal excitability of the right first 
dorsal inter-osseous muscle. The MEPs pattern observed after TMS pulse during noun 
presentation revealed greater peak-to-peak amplitude in phrases containing abstract rather 
than concrete verbs. The response times analysis confirmed that compatible verb-noun 
combinations (i.e., concrete verb and noun, abstract verb and noun) were processed faster than 
mixed combinations. In addition, combinations containing concrete verbs were responded 
faster when the pulse was delivered on the first word (i.e., verb) than on the second one (i.e., 
noun). Thus, the results were in line with findings of early activation of hand-related areas 
after concrete verbs processing, with a prolonged or delayed activation of these same areas by 
abstract verbs explained by referring to the different MoA of concrete and abstract words. 
Finally, also a very recent study by Sakreida et al. (2013) confirmed this evidence using a 
similar paradigm in a fMRI setting. Participants were required to read sentences composed by 
the same concrete noun coupled with concrete and abstract verbs, as well as an abstract noun 
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with either kind of verbs previously used. As expected, the results showed that 
comprehension of concrete and abstract content activated the core areas of the sensory-motor 
neural network, precisely the left lateral and medial premotor cortex (i.e., supplementary 
motor areas). Additionally, pure concrete sentences elicited activations within the left inferior 
frontal gyrus and two foci within the left inferior parietal cortex, whereas pure abstract 
sentences were represented in the language processing system, namely the anterior left middle 
temporal gyrus. Although the sensory-motor neural network was engaged in both concrete 
and abstract language contents, the present findings on functional activity confirmed that 
concrete sentences relied more on the sensory-motor system, while abstract sentences reading 
relied more on the linguistic system. 
The results reviewed are perfectly in line with WAT theory predictions, that explicitly 
suggest MoA as determining the representation of language at the neural level. Indeed, a word 
referring to a sensory-motor experience-based concept, like GLASS, might present a more 
extended grounding in perception-action systems than words learned through linguistic 
mediation, like FREEDOM. This idea is confirmed by data showing precocious activation of 
motor areas in a somatotopic fashion for concrete words (e.g., Pulvermüller, 1999, 2005; see 
the evidence reviewed in par. 3.3), whereas abstract words might elicit more linguistic 
information. However, WAT does not imply that abstract language rely simply on phono-
articulatory experiences: if language representation was based only on speaking and listening 
experiences, it would not be enough to consider it as embodied. In contrast, opposing to 
disembodied approaches to language abstract concepts/words (e.g., DEMOCRACY) would 
activate as well sensory-motor information in WAT perspective. WAT is not a dual code 
theory (e.g., Paivio, 1991), according to which abstract words would rely only on the verbal 
linguistic system. WAT is instead a multiple representations approach, according to which 
both concrete and abstract words are grounded in perception, action and emotion systems, and 
117 
 
even if the linguistic system plays a major role for abstract words representation they rely for 
a larger extent on the re-enactment of subjective and introspective experiences (see also 
Scorolli et al., 2011). It is worth noticing here that an embodied proposal which, in a way 
similar to WAT, may offer the possibility of accounting for both abstract and concrete words 
has been put forward by Vigliocco et al. (2009). The principal hypothesis of the authors is that 
two source of information underlie the representation of all concepts. The first source is 
experiential (e.g., sensory, motor, and also affective) and the second is linguistic (e.g., verbal 
associations determined by co-occurrence and syntactical patterns), with differences between 
concrete and abstract word meanings resulting from the relative proportions of experiential 
and linguistic information they rely on. Thus, analogously to what proposed by WAT, 
Vigliocco et al. (2009) affirmed that the supposed dichotomy of concrete and abstract 
words/concepts arises in function of the statistical preponderance of sensory-motor 
information that underlie concrete word meanings and the reciprocal statistical preponderance 
of affective and linguistic information to underlie abstract word meanings. This approach 
strongly underlies that emotion has to be considered as another kind of experiential 
information, that play a crucial role in acquisition and representation of abstract words 
especially.  
To close, even if conclusive evidence on the topic is still far from being produced, 
proposals such as the WAT theory, that refers to both developmental phenomena and multiple 
kinds of experiences and mental representations to explain the grounding of language, seem to 
be really comprehending approaches  very promising in the direction of solving the problem 
that abstractness posit to embodied theories.  
 
3.6. Embodiment and the evolution of language  
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A discussion of the embodied views on language cannot be concluded without referring to its 
possible phylogenetic evolution. Indeed, one of the classic question in philosophy and 
psychology is about how language evolved. Especially following the discovery of a human 
mirror neurons system (e.g., Rizzolatti et al., 1998) a number of scholars have approached this 
topic inside the embodiment framework, producing interesting proposals (e.g., Arbib, 2005; 
Corballis, 2002; Gallese, 2008; Gentilucci & Corballis, 2006; Gentilucci & Dalla Volta, 2008; 
Hurford, 2011; Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001; Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998; Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004). 
The basic idea that links embodied perspectives on language evolution is the 
possibility of a gestural, iconic origin for contemporary conventionalized languages (e.g., 
Arbib, 2005; Corballis, 2002, 2009, 2010; Flumini, 2011; Gentilucci & Corballis, 2006; 
Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001). The  proposal  that  language  may have originated from 
manual gestures is long-standing, dating at least the XVIII century. For example, the 
philosophers Vico (1744), Condillac (1746) and Rousseau (1782) referred to a gestural theory 
more or less openly in their essays, while in the following century Darwin (1871) explicitly 
described the role of gestures for human language: “I cannot doubt that language owes its 
origins to the imitation and modification of various natural  sounds, and man’s own 
distinctive cries, aided by signs and gestures” (1871/2004, p. 76). However, the gestural 
theory languished in modern psychology until the late XX century, as it was freshened by the 
influential work of Pinker & Bloom (1990). A first source for the renewed interest was the 
growing evidence on signed languages that suggested they present similar grammatical and 
semantic sophistication, when compared to spoken languages (e.g., Emmorey, 2002). At least 
in principle, human language could have existed in an original form that, analogously to 
contemporary signed languages, was entirely gestural, with a gradual, phylogenetic blending 
of vocal components in this kind of linguistic system (Corballis, 2009). Supporting evidence 
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also came from the study on the communication systems of non-human primates, which 
highlighted their ability in progressing toward the learning of a form of manual sign language 
(Gardner & Gardner, 1969), or to the pointing to visual symbols on a keyboard (Savage-
Rumbaugh et al., 1998), while the attempt to teach them to speak have been always a failure. 
Finally, as said before, the gestural theory was pushed also by the discovery of mirror neurons 
in the primate brain. Indeed, as described in par. 2.4 and par. 3.3, the human homologue of 
area F5 in monkey’s ventral premotor cortex is Broca’s area (e.g., Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998), 
traditionally associated with speech production. Nowadays there is well-supported evidence 
that this neural region is involved not only in speech, but also in motor functions including 
complex hand movements and sensory-motor learning (e.g., Binkofski & Buccino 2004). 
Moreover, the extended mirror system in monkeys has been shown to overlap with the 
homologue cortical circuits in humans that sustain language, leading some scholars to assume 
that language is originally a part of the mirror system itself (e.g., Fogassi & Ferrari, 2007). 
Indeed, the primate mirror system has to do mainly with manual gestures, although facial 
movements also play a role, and even if it does not seem to incorporate vocalization, it is 
receptive to acoustic as well as visual input (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2008). This is supported 
by results on single neurons recorded in monkey area F5 that showed responses to the sounds 
of manual actions, like breaking peanuts, in absence of visual presentation, while no response 
to monkey calls was detected (Kohler et al., 2002). Also other properties of the primate mirror 
system suppose a close connection between hand and mouth. For example, area F5 neurons 
responded when the monkey grasped an object with both the hand and the mouth (Rizzolatti 
et al., 1988). As suggested elsewhere, “the close neural associations between hand and mouth 
may be related to eating rather than communication, but later exapted for gestural and finally 
vocal language” (Corballis, 2009, p.25). A linkage between hand and mouth was also 
indicated in humans by behavioral results. For example, in the kinematic study by Gentilucci 
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et al. (2001) participants were required to open their mouths while grasping objects, and the 
kinematics of the maximum opening of the mouth showed increased/decreased size in 
function of the manually grasped object size. Reciprocally, when participants were required to 
open their hands while grasping objects with the mouth, the hand grip also showed 
increased/decreased size in function of the grasped object size. A following study showed also 
that manual grasping of larger objects induced selective modulations (i.e., increasing) in lip 
kinematics parameters as in voice spectra of syllables produced during action execution 
(Gentilucci et al., 2004). This finding indicated that grasping with the hand is able to 
immediately affect the kinematics of speech itself. Thus, it has been proposed that in the 
course of phylogenetic evolution such a hand/mouth joint control mechanism could have 
favored the transfer, based on the mirror system, from a communication system based on hand 
movements to the contemporary one, based on mouth movements (e.g., Corballis, 2009; 
Gentilucci & Corballis 2006). 
Following the assumption that speech evolved from gestures, it is very likely that, 
during the gradual phylogenetic shift to verbal language, speech initially reproduced the 
characteristics of the gestural communication medium it emerged from. If we look to actually 
observable gestural languages, that are contemporary signed languages, the principal property 
they exhibit is iconicity. F or example, it has been estimated that in Italian Sign Language 
(LIS) about the 50% of the hand signs and the 67% of the bodily locations stem signs have an 
iconic representations (Pietrandea, 2002). Also in American Sign Language (ASL) the larger 
part of the signs are iconic, while only some are purely arbitrary (Emmorey, 2002). Iconicity 
means here that there is a degree of spatiotemporal resemblance in the mapping of meanings 
to signs. However, if for example the ASL sign for ERASE reproduces the action of erasing 
the surface of a blackboard, many signs are not so transparently iconic, thus often they are not 
recognized by inexpert observers (Pizzuto & Volterra, 2000). An important consequence of 
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sign languages analyses is the discovery that signs during recursive usage tend to become less 
iconic and more arbitrary. This process is known as conventionalization (Burling, 1999), and 
operates in order to maximize the efficiency of a communication system, reshaping its 
constraints and increasing its speed. Thus, at any step by which conventionalization has been 
phylogenetically established to a larger extent in a human gestural communication medium, 
there was less necessity to maintain iconic components and even to depend on visual indexes. 
However, even if humans seem to be very quick in learning arbitrary labels, manual and 
bodily gesturing might be still needed to establish referential links in the first developmental 
steps. For example, a young child could hardly acquire the meaning of the word CAT, if 
nobody draws the attention to the animal pointing to it while producing the name. Moreover, 
the labels themselves may facilitate the establishment of referentiality being directly based on 
certain patterns of sounds that immediately resemble their meanings, following a mechanism 
called sound-symbolism or phonosemantics (Hinton et al., 1994). Sound-symbolism is the 
iconicity of vocal languages. Indeed, it is not striking that words denoting for example 
concepts such as the calls of animals (e.g., MIAOW) rely on sound (rather than sight) in a 
way that the words’ sound results iconically related to the calls’ sound. This is the most 
evident case of sound-symbolism in modern lexicon, that is defined onomatopoeia. Anyway, 
as the largest part of words in contemporary languages seem not to bear any resemblance 
relation with their referents, the well-known principle of arbitrariness was indicated as the 
defining property of human (verbal) language (de Saussure, 1916), ending up it with the 
supposition that signed languages, with their foundation on iconic representations, are not true 
languages. The arbitrariness of words and morphemes, rather than being a necessary property 
of language, is better conceived as a matter of expedience depending on the kind of 
constraints imposed by language mediums. Indeed a more lucid analysis of speech realized 
that speech itself requires the information to be linearized and squeezed into sounds 
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sequences that are necessarily limited in terms of how much they resemble the physical nature 
of what they refer to (Corballis, 2009). In this direction it has been clearly noticed that “when 
a representation of some four-dimensional hunk of life has to be compressed into the single 
dimension of speech, most iconicity is necessarily squeezed out. In one-dimensional 
projections, an elephant is indistinguishable from a woodshed. Speech perforce is largely 
arbitrary, if we speakers take pride in that, it is because in 50,000 years or so of talking we 
have learned to make a virtue of necessity” (Hockett, 1978, pp. 274–275). On the contrary, 
signed languages gesturing does not seem to be so constrained, as hands and arms movements 
can freely mimic real-world objects shapes or reproduce action, with linguistic information 
being delivered in parallel in place of being forced into rigid schemata. Even so, 
conventionalization allowed signs in deaf languages to be simplified, speeding up 
communication, to the point that many of them may lose (at least in part) their iconic aspect. 
Thus, following well-known principles of cognitive load economy (Zipf, 1949), it is frequent 
use what made signs become more compact and, in a similar way, what made words shorter 
and detached from their referents (Corballis, 2009). Thus, arbitrariness is the result of this 
recursive process, rather than being the original form of human languages. 
Several scholars have already suggested that sound-symbolism played an important 
role in the evolution of contemporary languages, being a sort of phylogenetic grounding for 
verbal language (e.g., Kita, 2008; Kita, Kantartzis, & Imai, 2010; Kovic et al., 2009; 
Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001). Indeed, it is very likely that a key step in evolving 
languages would have been the emergence of a system for agreeing upon the referents of that 
communication medium signs, being them gestural or vocal. If visual iconicity sustained this 
step for gestural languages, sound-symbolism - intended as the natural, non-arbitrary link 
between the sound and the meaning of a word – did it for speech. Supposing the existence of 
a universal sound-symbolism seems to be the easiest and most economic way in which such 
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an agreement could have been reached in vocal languages. Indeed, if a sound-to-meaning 
linkage exists in everybody’s mind, then the listener would be able to rapidly identify the 
referent of the speaker’s novel word, making communication easier and efficient (Kantartzis 
et al., 2011). Thus, given that sound-symbolic words in modern languages can refer to sound-
meaning correspondences about information from various modality, such as vision, touch, 
smell, taste, movement manners, emotion, attitude (e.g., Kita, 1997), our ancestors’ sound-
symbolic proto-words may have had a considerable expressive power (Kita, 2008) and 
universal sound-symbolism could have facilitated a rapid growth of shared lexicon 
(Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001). Thus, universal sound-symbolism would have had a 
strong adaptive value for primordial hominins, and probably – as evolution is conservative - 
all humans are nowadays endowed with implicit abilities for sensing universal sound-
symbolism and using it for word learning. If the emergence of such dispositions was really a 
crucial step in language evolution, and if the capacity of using sound-symbolic relations in 
learning is really rooted in the evolutionary history, it should be observable in children who 
are learning languages (Kantartzis et al., 2011). And indeed it was; for example, it has been 
shown that Japanese children have a strong preference, even greater than in adults, to use 
sound-symbolic words when describing the manner of motion in a narrative task (Kita et al., 
2010). Previous research also demonstrated that generalization of novel verbs, which has been 
shown to be a complex task for children (e.g., Imai et al., 2005), becomes easier for 3-year-
olds when the verbs sound-symbolically match the action they represent (Imai et al., 2008). 
Novel verbs that sound-symbolically matched or not the actions they refer to were taught to 
Japanese 3-year-olds participants (the novel sound-symbolic verbs were created on the basis 
of real Japanese sound-symbolic words). Participants failed to generalize a novel verb to an 
instance of the same action performed by a different actor if it did not have a sound-symbolic 
relation to the referent, but they succeeded in the task when the novel verb sound-
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symbolically matched the action it denoted. The results clearly showed that Japanese children 
acquired new verbs in a way that made then possible to correctly generalize their meaning if 
the novel word sound-symbolically resembled the action it referred to. These findings led the 
authors to explicitly propose a sound-symbolism bootstrapping hypothesis which affirms that 
sound-symbolism helps children to single out the referent of a novel word in the complex 
reality, thus favored symbols grounding, allowing them to store the semantic representation in 
such a way that after they can correctly generalize the verb to new situations. 
Given the cross-linguistic recognizability of sound-symbolism, the question about 
whether the Japanese children had picked up regularities in the Japanese sound-symbolic 
lexicon or were sensitive to universal sound-symbolism was unsolved. To disentangle the two 
possible explanations, Kantartzis et al. (2011) performed a verb generalization task in which 
English-speaking 3-year-olds were taught novel sound-symbolic verbs created starting from 
Japanese sound-symbolic words, or novel non sound-symbolic verbs. English-speaking 
children performed better with the sound-symbolic verbs, just like Japanese-speaking 
children. These findings seem to confirm that children are sensitive to universal sound-
symbolism and can rely on it in word learning and meaning generalization regardless of their 
native language. Nygaard et al. (2009) also extended this results to adults by examining the 
influence of potential non-arbitrary sound-meaning mappings on word learning. In a 
vocabulary-learning task, English-speaking monolinguals learned meanings for Japanese 
words, with each spoken Japanese word being paired with English meanings that could either 
match the actual meaning of the Japanese word (e.g., HAYAI paired with FAST), or be 
antonyms for its meaning (e.g., HAYAI paired with SLOW), or be randomly selected from 
the total set of antonyms (e.g., HAYAI paired with BLUNT). The results showed that 
participants learned the actual English equivalents and antonyms for Japanese words more 
accurately and responded faster than when learning randomly paired meanings. Thus, these 
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findings confirmed that natural languages contain non-arbitrary sound-to-meaning mapping, 
to which learners are sensitive within spoken language (see also Brown, Black, & Horowitz, 
1955; Iwasaki, Vinson, & Vigliocco, 2007). In addition, also sound-to-shape correspondences 
(i.e., strident sounds assigned to jagged shapes; sonorant sounds assigned to rounded shapes, 
e.g., Kohler, 1947) have been reported by Maurer et al. (2006) in both 2.5-years-old children 
and adults, using a classic double-forced choice paradigm (my empirical research on this 
topic, with a number of methodological improvements in respect to this setting, is reported in 
chapter 9) . Participants were shown simultaneously two shapes, a rounded and a jagged one, 
and had to name each shape choosing the name within two alternatives, one with rounded 
vowels and the other with unrounded ones (a different explanation, based also on consonant 
sounds, is  suggested by Nielsen & Rendall, 2011). Results showed that children, as well as 
adults, matched sonorant words to rounded shapes and strident words to the jagged ones, 
confirming that if the sound-shape correspondences are at work at the earliest stages of 
language acquisition, this preference is then conserved during ontogenetic development.  
The evidence reviewed here boost recent hypotheses (e.g., Perniss et al., 2010) that 
indicated iconicity as playing a decisive role at different levels for both spoken and signed 
language. Indeed, it is very likely that symbolic resemblance relations might be crucial for 
more than one fundamental aspect of language. For example, in phylogenesis iconicity may 
facilitate displacement, thus the ability to refer about things distant in time and space. In 
ontogenesis, it might provide the mechanism for establishing referentiality, linking linguistic 
form and meaning facilitating word learning and following lexical access. Finally, in language 
processing iconicity might facilitate grounding of words in sensory-motor and emotional 
systems, determining embodied grounding (Perniss & Vigliocco, in press).  
On the whole, it seems that universal sound-symbolism in modern languages may be 
the heritage of an iconic (gestural and vocal) communication system once used by our 
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ancestors. Such heritage might have been preserved in contemporary spoken languages 
because children, and along with them adults, have a preference in using sound-symbolic 
words over non sound-symbolic words during early development and in novel words learning. 
Thus, both language phylogenetic evolution and linguistic ontogenetic development seem to 
be more natural affairs than what traditionally thought. 
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PART II 
Experimental work 
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4. Affordance-based compatibility effects in different contexts 
 
A growing body of research shows tight (bidirectional) relationships between visual objects 
and affordance activation. In the literature, affordance-based compatibility effects have been 
observed in the context of a number of cognitive tasks (e.g., deciding whether an object is 
upright/inverted, artificial/natural etc.; see chapter 2), implying a fundamental role for 
sensory-motor simulation in cognitive processing predicted by embodied cognition theories. 
This evidence, though compelling, as one evident limitation: these experimental studies 
typically focused on objects in isolation, while in every-day interaction objects are embedded 
in specific contexts (see chapter 5), which enclose also other agents’ actions. In the present 
study, affordance activation was investigated in visual contexts defined by different relations 
between 2 objects and a hand. Participants were presented with pictures displaying 2 
manipulable objects linked by a functional relation (e.g., scissors-sheet), by a spatial relation 
(e.g., scissors-stapler), or by no relation (e.g., scissors-bottle), and had to decide by key-
presses (performed with the hands in Experiment 1, and with the foot in Experiment 2) 
whether the objects exhibit a relation or not. To determine if observing others’ actions and 
understanding their goals would facilitate the judgments, a hand was displayed in the pictures: 
a. near the objects; b. grasping the active object to use it; c. grasping an object to 
manipulate/move it; d. not displayed. The results showed faster responses if the objects were 
functionally rather than only spatially related, revealing a modulation of the visual context on 
affordances. Crucially, in Experiment 1 manipulation postures were the slowest in the 
functional context and functional postures were inhibited in the spatial context, probably due 
to the mismatch between the inferred goal and the context. The absence of this interaction for 
foot responses in Experiment 2 confirms that the effects observed in Experiment 1 were due 
to a motor simulation, rather than to simple associations between contexts and hand-postures. 
On the whole, these results confirm that affordance-based compatibility effects are modulated 
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by the context in which objects are embedded, as spatial and social cues related to action 
influenced the responses of participants. 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The ability to act appropriately with objects, to respond to objects affordances, and to flexibly 
adapt our actions to the current situation, are important building blocks of human capability to 
interact with the environment. While affordances have been intensively studied, the 
mechanisms according to which their activation is modulated by the context, and particularly 
by the context in which actions of others are displayed, are poorly understood. 
About 30 years ago, Gibson (1979) used the term affordance to indicate properties the 
environment provides to acting organisms which are relevant for an organism’s goals. 
According to Gibson, affordances are variable and relational, as they emerge from the 
interaction between organisms, objects and the environment. For example, a chair affords 
sitting for human adults but not for other organisms such as elephants or mosquitos, nor for 
human toddlers. Today, the contribution given by Gibson is widely recognized, though the 
term affordances is used in slightly different ways. An example is given by Ellis and Tucker 
(2000) proposal to use the term microaffordances to indicate the activation of action 
components (e.g., reaching and grasping components) suitable for interacting with specific 
objects. The continuity with the view of Gibson is obvious. However, in antithesis with 
Gibson’s view, recognizing an object is necessary to activate its microaffordances. In 
addition, microaffordances would be represented in the brain, that is they are conceived of as 
the product of conjoining in the brain of specific visual and motor patterns. 
In the last 10 years a lot of evidence on affordances has been provided. On the neural 
side, many brain imaging studies have shown that observing an object activates possible 
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actions to perform with it (for a review see Martin, 2007). Specifically, activation of parietal 
and premotor cortex has been linked to perception of tools’ affordances (e.g., Jeannerod, 
Arbib, Rizzolatti, & Sakata, 1995; Johnson-Frey, 2004). On the behavioural side, many issues 
related to affordances have been investigated, particularly with compatibility paradigms (e.g., 
Borghi et al., 2007; Bub, Masson, & Cree, 2008; Caligiore, Borghi, Parisi, & Baldassarre, 
2010; Gianelli, Dalla Volta, & Gentilucci, 2008; Girardi, Lindemann, & Bekkering, 2010; 
Riggio et al., 2008; Tipper, Paul, & Hayes, 2006; Tucker & Ellis, 1998, 2001; Yoon & 
Humphreys, 2007). A typical way to study activation of affordances is to verify whether an 
object characteristic related to action, such as object size, has an impact on a task (e.g., 
categorization task) for which size is not relevant. If this is the case, this would mean that 
affordances related to object’s size and graspability are automatically activated. To notice that 
here the term ‘‘automatically’’ means ‘‘independently from the task’’. For example, Tucker 
and Ellis (2001) found that mimicking a precision or a power grip to decide whether an object 
is an artifact (e.g., hammer, nail) or a natural object (e.g. apple, cherry) was influenced by the 
object size, which was not relevant to the categorization task. A compatibility effect was 
found, that is small objects (e.g., nail) were responded to faster with precision grip than with 
power grip responses, whereas the opposite was true for larger objects (e.g., bottle). The 
authors interpreted their results claiming that observing an object automatically activates its 
affordances. 
This evidence, though compelling, has one limitation we have considered in this work. 
In the majority of current studies objects (which are typically images and, less frequently, real 
objects) are often considered independently from the context in which they are usually 
embedded. This is striking, given the great relevance of contexts for object recognition and 
categorization. We perceive the world in scenes: perceiving objects embedded in a context 
facilitates object recognition (Bar, 2004) and it is not surprising that humans have the peculiar 
131 
 
ability to be very fast in categorizing scenes (Thorpe, Fize, & Marlot, 1996). Furthermore, 
studies on categorization have shown that presenting objects in scenes facilitates 
categorization, particularly of superordinate level categories (e.g., musical instruments, 
Murphy & Wisniewski, 1989; see also Borghi, Caramelli, & Setti, 2005). In spite of the 
relevance of contexts for a variety of processes, only a few studies have accessed to what 
extent the activation of affordances is modulated by the context. To our knowledge there are 
only a few exceptions. For example, Pezzulo, Barca, Lamberti Bocconi, and Borghi (2010) 
investigated how expert and novice climbers remembered routes of different difficulty on a 
climbing wall. To perform the task climbers had to take into account the relationship between 
each hold (affordance) and the context given by the presence of other holds on the climbing 
wall in order to simulate how they could grasp the holds with the hands and use them as 
support for the feet. More directly relevant to the present work is the study by Yoon, 
Humphreys, and Riddoch (2010), who focused on affordances elicited by pairs of objects that 
appear in the same scene and are positioned for action, such as a frying pan and a spatula. The 
authors found an effect they called ‘‘paired object affordance effect’’: the time taken by right-
handed participants to respond whether the two objects were used together was faster when 
the active object (e.g., the spatula) was to the right of the other object. 
The aim of our work is to verify the effects of different kinds of contexts on activation 
of object affordances for tools (see also chapter 5). The context is suggested by the presence 
of a second object, which can be either spatially or functionally related to the tool. The active 
object and the second object are presented either alone, with a hand in potential interaction 
with them, or with a hand in effective interaction with them. Specifically, in our study we 
address three issues pertaining the relationship between affordances evoked by the active 
object and the context in which it is embedded. They concern the behavioural effects of the 
relation between the 2 displayed objects, of the eventual presence of a hand near the object, 
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and of the kind of interaction between the hand (when present) and the object. We will 
introduce these issues below. 
(1) Spatial vs. functional relations between objects. Our work aims to verify whether 
the activation of affordances of the active object is modulated by the presence of a second 
object, thematically related to the first, either through a spatial or a functional relation (Borghi 
& Caramelli, 2003; Estes, Golonka, & Jones, 2011; Kalénine, Bonthoux, & Borghi, 2009; 
Kalénine, Peyrin, et al., 2009; Lin & Murphy, 2001; Natraj et al., 2013; Yoon & Humphreys, 
2007). The notion of thematic relation is common in categorization literature. A given object 
may be categorized taxonomically, as a member of a given category (e.g., both elephants and 
foxes are animals), or thematically, as part of the same context or action (e.g., trees and 
houses, dogs and bones are linked by a thematic relation). Thematic relations between objects 
are known to be the preferential mode of categorization in young children (Lucariello, 
Kyratzis, & Nelson, 1992), but are still easily available in older children and adults (Borghi & 
Caramelli, 2003; Lin & Murphy, 2001). Here we consider two different kinds of thematic 
relations: we considered two objects as spatially related when they typically appear in the 
same context but are not directly used together; we classify them as functionally related when 
the two objects not only appear in the same context, but are also typically used together. For 
example, we have often experience of knives in the same context as coffee mugs – they are 
typically found in the kitchen, possibly on the table, but the two objects are only spatially and 
not functionally related. Instead, a knife is not only spatially but also functionally related to a 
stick of butter. 
(2) Presence of a hand near the objects. Previous studies using a categorization task 
(Borghi et al., 2007; Vainio, Symes, Ellis, Tucker, & Ottoboni, 2008; see also Fischer, Prinz, 
& Lotz, 2008) provide evidence of a compatibility effect between the posture of a hand-prime 
(displaying either a power or a precision grip) and the grip (power vs. precision) required to 
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grasp a target-object (see also studies on predictions we form based on observation of objects 
grasping, e.g., Becchio et al., 2012). However, the two aforementioned studies do not fully 
disentangle the effects given by the observation of the object and of the hand in potential 
interaction with it. Indeed, it is possible that the activation of different neural areas underlies 
observation of objects alone or of hands potentially interacting with objects. Studies on the 
premotor cortex in monkeys have demonstrated the existence of two different classes of 
visuomotor neurons, canonical and mirror neurons (see chapter 2). Canonical neurons 
(Murata et al., 1997; Raos, Umiltà, Murata, Fogassi, & Gallese, 1996) discharge during 
interaction with graspable objects and also during simple object presentation; mirror neurons, 
instead, discharge both during action execution and during observation of a conspecific 
interacting with an object (Di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992), but do 
not fire in response to a simple object presentation. Further neuroimaging studies have 
confirmed the existence of canonical and mirror neuron systems in humans (for a review see 
Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). Borghi et al. (2007) and Vainio 
et al. (2008) argued that it is possible for two different mechanisms, one related to canonical 
(affordances) and the other to the mirror neuron systems (motor resonance while observing 
others acting with objects), to be responsible for the effects found. Liuzza, Setti, and Borghi 
(2012), using a weight decision task (light vs. heavy), showed that when a grasping hand 
prime preceded the object, participants responded slower to heavy than to light objects, while 
no difference was found when no hand prime was present. This confirms that two different 
mechanisms might be at play. This is similar to what has been proposed in the perceptuo-
motor domain in considering living vs. non-living action affordance effects (Bennet, Thomas, 
Jervis, & Castiello, 1998; Castiello, 2005). The present study allows us to disentangle the 
contribution played by these two different mechanisms without using a priming paradigm but 
presenting the hand together with the object. Indeed, in one condition subjects saw the two 
134 
 
objects alone, without any hand: in this condition we hypothesize that only the Canonical 
neuron system would be activated. In a further condition, a hand was displayed close to both 
objects but not interacting with them (Still-Hand): this condition was aimed to verify whether 
the simple presence of a hand, even if not in a prehensile posture, produced a facilitation in 
processing action relations between objects. Since the Mirror Neuron System is typically 
activated when the action goal is present, it is possible that an action simulation occurs only 
when the hand is presented with a prehensile posture. If a mirroring mechanism is responsible 
of this simulation, then the simulation should occur only with manual responses (Experiment 
1), not with foot responses (Experiment 2), due to an effector-specific motor resonance 
mechanism (Paulus, Lindemann, & Bekkering, 2009). However, given the behavioural nature 
of our study, these proposals cannot be conclusive claims on the underlying neural 
mechanisms. 
(3) Relations between hand and object: manipulation vs. function. Psychological 
(Costantini, Ambrosini, Scorolli, & Borghi, 2011; Jax & Buxbaum, 2010; Pellicano, Iani, 
Borghi, Rubichi, & Nicoletti, 2010) and neuropsychological studies provide support for two 
different ways of interacting with objects (Buxbaum, Sirigu, Schwartz, & Klatzky, 2003; 
Jeannerod, Decety, & Michel, 1994), which have been termed by Bub et al. (2008) as 
volumetric and functional (see chapter 2). Volumetric gestures are associated with the overall 
shape and weight properties of objects and concern the hand posture used to grasp an object to 
lift or move it, rather than to use it for its defined purpose. Functional gestures, on the other 
hand, involve specific manipulation of objects in accordance with their proper conventional 
use. Recent studies by Buxbaum have focused on the so called ‘‘conflict objects’’ (see chapter 
5), that is objects that evoke different actions (and different ways to manipulate them) 
depending on the action goal (Jax & Buxbaum, 2010). In addition, Buxbaum and Kalenine 
(2010) have recently proposed that two different circuits underlying different affordances 
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might be activated, one based on the object structure (dorso-dorsal stream), and another 
related to object function (dorso-ventral stream; Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003) (see also Young 
(2006) and Borghi and Riggio (2009) for a similar proposal of different kinds of affordances, 
more related to manipulation vs. to use; see also Pellicano, Thill, Ziemke, & Binkofski, 2011). 
In our study the hand can interact with the object in a manipulative vs. functional way 
(Manipulation-Hand vs. Function-Hand). Thus observing an action suggests two different 
underlying goals. Consider for example grasping a fork in order to place it somewhere else; 
the fork does not necessarily have to be grasped by the handle. Instead, if a fork is grasped for 
use, then it has to be held by the handle with a very specific grip (Creem & Proffitt, 2001). If a 
specific motor program is activated when the hand interacts with the objects, and if by 
observing an action with an object we infer the underlying goals of the agent, we expect a 
different effect depending on whether the hand is presented in a functional interaction with 
the object or in a manipulative interaction with it. 
Based on these three issues concerning the relationship between affordances and the 
context in which objects are embedded, our predictions are the following: 
1. If the activation of the affordances of the active object (possibly mediated by the 
activation of the Canonical Neuron System) is sensitive to the context given by the presence 
of a second object, then participants should respond faster and more accurately to the 
functional than to the spatial context, given that the functional context allows using the two 
objects together, while the spatial context does not allow a combined action with the two 
objects. 
2. If observing a hand together with an object activates a simulated interaction with it 
(possibly through the mediation of the Mirror Neuron System), then participants should 
respond faster and more accurately when a hand is presented than when no hand is displayed, 
particularly if the hand is in a grasping posture. 
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3. If the activation of affordances is sensitive to fine-grained contextual information, 
then we should find an interaction between kind of context and kind of posture, due to a 
mismatch between the inferred action goal and the context. Thus, manipulation postures 
should be processed slower in the functional than in the spatial context; functional postures, 
instead, should lead to slower responses in the spatial than in the functional context. 
 
 
4.2. Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 was aimed to verify the aforementioned predictions; participants were required 
to respond by pressing two keys on the keyboard. 
 
4.2.1. Method 
4.2.1.1. Participants 
Sixty-two participants volunteered for participation in the experiment (24 males; mean age = 
28.18). All were right handed by self-report and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All 
were naive as to the purposes of the experiment. 
 
4.2.1.2. Materials 
A special care was taken in selecting the materials. 24 everyday manipulable objects were 
chosen. Every target-object was presented in three different pictures, paired with three 
different artifacts; thus we obtained a total of 72 pictures displaying pairs of objects, in which 
the active member of the pair was located on the right. For example, a picture displayed 
scissors (the active member of the pair) located on the right with respect to a sheet of paper. 
All images were presented in an egocentric position (Bruzzo, Borghi, & Ghirlanda, 2008). In 
each pair the target-object was composed by a part graspable for object use and a manipulable 
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part: for example, when we use a fork to eat we typically hold it by the handle (Function 
hand), but not by grasping it by its teeth (Manipulative hand). There were 3 kinds of pairs 
depending on the relation existing between the two objects. This relation could be: (1) 
functional, when objects are both typically located in the same context and are used together 
(e.g., knife–butter); (2) spatial, when objects typically occur in the same context but are not 
used together (e.g., fork–spatula); (3) no relation, when the two objects are unrelated (e.g., 
knife–nail, scissors–bottle). 
Before the experimental study, a separate group of subjects evaluated the pictures 
(without the hand) for familiarity. After asking participants to evaluate items familiarity, one 
item (‘‘potato-peeler’’) was eliminated. This lead to the removal of three pictures. Thus we 
obtained 69 object pairs that were selected to be used for the experiment. The pictures, 
presented in four different random orders, were rated by an independent groups of 20 subjects 
for visual complexity, using a 7-point-scale (7 very complex, 1 not complex at all), and were 
invited to use not just the poles but also the intermediate values of the scale. The analyses on 
visual complexity of the single objects revealed that there was no difference between the 
Functional (M = 2.59), the Spatial (M = 2.60) and the No Relation Context (M = 2.76), F(1, 
42) = 0.43, MSe = 0.47, p = .65 (consider that in some cases the same passive object was used 
in different pairs). 
For the experimental stimuli, the frame size was 730 pixels wide and 548 pixels high. 
Four  pictures of each pair were taken, as each pair was presented in 4 different conditions. In 
one condition only the objects were displayed (No-Hand condition), whereas in further three 
conditions a hand was presented as well. The hand was always presented in an egocentric 
perspective, since it has been shown that processing is faster when the hand and the 
participant’s perspective match (Bruzzo et al., 2008; Vogt, Taylor, & Hopkins, 2003), on the 
right side of the picture. The hand could simply be displayed near the object (Still-Hand 
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condition), or it could interact with the object in a posture relevant for using it, for example 
grasping the fork handle (Function-Hand condition), or in a posture apt to manipulate the 
object, for example holding the fork teeth (Manipulation-Hand condition). Note that in our 
study the hand configuration is exactly the same for both functional and manipulative 
postures, but realized in a way that the manipulative posture simply does not afford tool-
object interaction (see Figure 1, in which from the right top corner are displayed Function-
Hand, Manipulation-Hand and Still-Hand conditions) but some other manipulation 
movements (e.g. turning the object around, rotating or relocating it etc.). We think that 
creating identical physical hand postures for both manipulative and functional interactions 
makes it possible to measure more clearly what is the extent of the context influence on 
affordances activation. Furthermore, at a methodological level, reducing the visual difference 
between two basilar experimental conditions keeps them more controlled and comparable. 
The complete list of the selected materials can be found in the Appendix of the thesis. 
 
related or not related?
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Figure 1. Stimuli and procedure. Left side, from the top: Objects with spatial relation 
(scissors–stapler), no relation (scissors–bottle), functional relation (scissors–sheet). Right 
side, from the top: Hand in functional posture, manipulative posture, close to the objects. 
 
4.2.1.3. Design and procedure 
Participants sat 50 cm from the computer screen, with their right and left hands placed over 
the ‘‘3’’ and the ‘‘9’’ key on the keyboard. Each trial began with a fixation point (+) that 
remained on the screen for  500 ms. Then one of the photographs was displayed at the center 
of the screen and remained on the screen until a response was made. Participants read the 
following instructions: ‘‘In the center of the screen a little cross will appear, followed by a 
picture showing two objects and sometimes a hand. You are required to decide if the two 
objects are usually seen/used together or not. If the two objects are usually seen/used together 
(e.g., a flowerpot and flowers) press the 9 key with your right hand, if the two objects are not 
usually seen/used together press the 3 key with your left hand. Please respond as quickly and 
as accurately as you can. The experiment lasts approximately 15 min. Press a key to start’’. 
We decided to ask participants to simply decide whether the objects were linked by some sort 
of relationship, and not by a functional relation, since we wanted to avoid rendering the aims 
of the study too transparent for participants. Indeed, our aim was to simply assess what 
differentially drove the strength of the association, whether the context, the hand, or both. 
Since participants were required to decide whether the two objects were functionally 
or spatially related, or not, a ‘‘yes’’ response should occur in 2/3 of the trials, while a ‘‘no’’ 
response would occur in 1/3 of all trials. They had to respond ‘‘yes’’ with their dominant 
hand. Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible and 
received feedback for both correct and incorrect responses. Each pair was presented once for 
each of the four hand conditions. Overall, the experiment consisted of one practice block of 
12 trials and one experimental block of 276 trials. 
 
140 
 
4.2.2. Results 
We performed separate analyses on the ‘‘yes’’ trials (i.e. trials requiring a ‘‘yes’’ response 
with the right hand, characterized by functional or spatial relations between the two objects) 
and the ‘‘no’’ trials (i.e. trials implying a ‘‘no’’ response with the left hand, characterized by 
the absence of relation between the two objects). 
From the ‘‘yes’’ trials 12.79% of the trials were removed as errors. The low number of 
errors reveals that the task was easy to perform. Reaction times (RTs) more than two standard 
deviations from each participant’s mean were excluded from the analysis; this trimming 
method lead to the removal of 2.06% of the data. Errors and correct RTs were entered into a 2 
x 4 within-subject ANOVA with the factors Context (Functional, Spatial) and Hand (No-
Hand, Still-Hand, Manipulation-Hand, Function-Hand). Significant interactions were 
evaluated with Newman-Keuls post-hoc test (p < .05). 
The ANOVA on errors demonstrated reliable main effects of both Context and Hand. 
The Spatial context (M = 3.78) elicited more errors than the Functional (M = 2.30) context, 
F(1, 61) = 69.80, MSe = 3.89, p < .001. The factor Hand, F(3, 183) = 4.14, MSe = 2.09, p < 
.01 was significant due to the fact that the Functional-Hand (M = 2.73) elicited less errors than 
both the No-Hand (M = 3.18) and Still-Hand condition (M = 3.33). 
The ANOVA on RTs demonstrated reliable main effects of both the factors Context 
and Hand; the interaction was significant as well. The Spatial context reaction time (M = 803 
ms) was longer in duration than the Functional (M = 767 ms) context, F(1, 61) = 56.28, MSe 
= 2947.82, p < .001. The factor Hand, F(3, 183) = 14.41, MSe = 1544.72, p < .001 was also 
significant. Post-hoc analysis revealed that it was due to the fact that the No-Hand condition 
(M = 769 ms) was significantly faster than all other conditions, and to the fact that 
Manipulation-Hand condition (M = 802 ms) was significantly slower than all other conditions. 
The Context x Hand interaction, F(3, 183) = 2.78, MSe = 1424.95, p < .05, depicted in Figure 
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2, reveals that with the Spatial Context RTs in the No-Hand condition (M = 787 ms) are faster 
than Manipulation-Hand (M = 814 ms) and Function-Hand conditions (M = 812 ms), probably 
due to the lower visual complexity of the first. To testify the sensitivity to the combination 
between the hand posture and the context, with the Functional context RTs in the Function-
Hand condition (M = 760 ms) are slower than in the Still-Hand condition (M = 752 ms). 
However, with the Functional context, Manipulation (M = 789 ms) is slower than all other 
conditions (Newman-Keuls p < .05). 
 
 
Figure 2. Experiment 1 - Interaction Context x Hand posture (Response times). 
 
From the ‘‘no’’ trials 21.35% of the trials were removed as errors. We used the same 
trimming method as for ‘‘yes’’ trials: this method lead to the removal of 3.02% of the data. 
Errors and correct RTs were entered into a one-way within-subjects ANOVA with the four 
levels factor Hand (No-Hand, Still-Hand, Manipulation-Hand, Function-Hand). The ANOVA 
on errors did not show any reliable main effect, F(3, 183) = 0.22, MSe = 2.63, p = .87. 
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In the ANOVA on RTs, instead, we found a reliable main effect of the Hand factor, 
F(3, 183) = 12.74, MSe = 2329.46, p < .001, due to the fact that Manipulation-Hand (M = 967 
ms) was significantly slower than all other conditions. Function-Hand (M = 927 ms), No-
Hand (M = 916 ms) and Still-Hand (M = 929 ms) did not significantly differ. 
 
4.2.3. Discussion 
Based on our first hypothesis, as predicted, participants were more accurate and faster with 
the Functional context than with the Spatial context, suggesting that seeing functional pairs of 
objects heightens activity of the motor system. As to our second hypothesis, the presence of a 
hand did affect RTs. More crucially, related to the third hypothesis, the interaction we found 
indicate that manipulation postures were processed slower in the Functional than in the 
Spatial context. At the same time, the functional postures, which were processed rather fast in 
the Functional context, were slower in the Spatial context. This result can be explained in two 
different ways. The interaction can be simply the product of an association between the 
context and a specific hand posture. Alternatively, our results might be interpreted in terms of 
activation of a motor simulation. Participants would have more difficulties in simulating a 
manipulative action when the context implies using the object rather than simply 
manipulating it. Similarly, because in the Spatial context no functional use of the object is 
allowed, it is possible that the motor system continues to try to make sense of the scene, 
leading to longer RTs with the functional posture. It is therefore possible that in the Function-
Hand condition not only effector-independent action information is activated, but that the 
perception of a functional grip evokes an effector-specific simulation. Experiment 2 was 
aimed at ruling out the first purely associative interpretation of the interaction: for this reason 
we had participants using foot instead of hand responses. 
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4.3. Experiment 2 
The aim of Experiment 2 was to demonstrate that the interaction found in Experiment 1 was 
due to a motor simulation, related to a specific effector (i.e., the right hand). Indeed, it could 
be argued that Manipulation-Hand posture was slower in the Functional context and Function-
Hand posture was slower in the Spatial context because of the lower association degree 
between a given context and a given posture. Experiment 2 was aimed at ruling out this 
explanation. It was identical to Experiment 1, but responses were provided with the foot 
instead than with the hand. We predicted that, with a different effector, no grasping motor 
simulation would occur, thus the Context x Hand interaction effect should not be present. As 
to the hand, our results do not allow us to determine definitively whether the lowest RTs 
obtained with the No-Hand condition are due to the lower visual complexity or to the 
concurrent activation of two different mechanisms. Experiment 2 can help us in solving this 
issue, as the response effector is the foot instead of the hand. 
 
4.3.1. Method 
4.3.1.1. Participants 
Sixty-two participants volunteered for participation in the experiment (20 males; mean age = 
23.53). All were right handed by self-report and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All 
were naive as to the purposes of the experiment. 
 
4.3.1.2. Materials 
The same materials as in Experiment 1 were used; the frame size of the stimuli was 730 pixels 
wide and 548 pixels high. 
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4.3.1.3. Design and procedure 
Participants sat 50 cm from the computer screen, with their right and left feet placed over two 
pedals high 9 cm and wide 7.6 cm, placed 13.5 cm far from each other and at 20.5 cm from 
the frontal legs of the chair in which they sat. The procedure was exactly the same as in 
Experiment 1. The only difference was that participants were required to use foot responses: 
they had to respond ‘‘yes’’ with their right foot; ‘‘no’’ responses were 1/3 of the overall trials 
as in Experiment 1. 
 
4.3.2. Results 
As in Experiment 1, we split the data collected in two different groups depending on the 
required response (‘‘yes’’ right foot responses vs. ‘‘no’’ left foot responses), and performed 
separate analysis on them. 
From ’’yes’’ trials 8.97% of the trials were removed as errors. Reaction times (RTs) 
more than 2 standard deviations from each participant’s mean were excluded from the 
analysis; this trimming method leads to the removal of 2.10% of the data. Errors and correct 
RTs were entered into a 2 x 4 within-subject ANOVA with the factors Context (Functional vs. 
Spatial) and Hand (No-Hand, Still-Hand, Manipulation-Hand and Function-Hand). 
Significant interactions were evaluated with Newman-Keuls post-hoc test (p < .05). 
The ANOVA on errors demonstrated the reliable main effects of both the factors 
Context and Hand; the interaction was significant as well. As in Experiment 1, the Spatial 
context (M = 3) elicited more errors than the Functional (M = 1.83) context, F(1, 61) = 65.22, 
MSe = 2.58, p < .0001. The factor Hand was significant too, F(3, 183) = 4.80, MSe = 1.67, p < 
.01, due to the fact that Function-Hand (M = 2.09) elicited less errors than all other conditions, 
differing significantly from Manipulation-Hand (M = 2.42) and Still-Hand (M = 2.71), and 
almost significantly from No-Hand (M = 2.45) (Newman-Keuls p = .07). The Context x Hand 
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interaction, F(3, 183) = 6.30, MSe = 1.62, p < .001, revealed that, while within the Spatial 
Context there were no significant differences between the 4 Hand conditions, in the 
Functional context the Still-Hand condition (M = 2.43) elicited significantly more errors than 
the Manipulation-Hand (M = 1.61) and Function-Hand (M = 1.24) conditions, but not 
differing from the No-Hand condition (M = 2.04) as well (Newman-Keuls p = .09). 
The ANOVA on RTs demonstrated the reliable main effects of both the factors 
Context and Hand, but as predicted their interaction was not significant. RTs were slower in 
the Spatial context (M = 856 ms) than the Functional context (M = 800 ms), F(1, 61) = 91.92, 
MSe = 176.48, p < .0001. The factor Hand, F(3, 183) = 29.42, MSe = 1943.38, p < .0001, was 
also significant, due to the fact that Manipulation-Hand (M = 859 ms) was significantly slower 
than all other conditions. The Context x Hand interaction was not significant, F(3, 183) = 
0.80, MSe = 1784.62, p = .49 (see Fig. 3). 
 
 
Figure 3. Experiment 2 - Interaction Context x Hand (Response times). 
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We removed as errors 18.04% of the trials from the ‘‘no’’ response trials. Using the 
same trimming method as before, 3.83% of the data were eliminated. Errors and correct RTs 
were entered into a one-way ANOVA with the 4 levels factor Hand (No-Hand, Still-Hand, 
Manipulation-Hand, Function-Hand) manipulated within-participants. 
The ANOVA on errors demonstrated the reliable main effect of the factor Hand, F(3, 
183) = 3.26, MSe = 2.55, p < .05: Manipulation-Hand (M = 4.61) elicited more errors than 
Function-Hand (M = 3.79) and No-Hand (M = 3.94), but not of Still-Hand (M = 4.26) 
(Newman-Keuls p = .22). 
The main effect of Hand was significant also in the ANOVA on RTs, F(3, 183) = 
24.80, MSe = 2026.69, p < .0001, due to the fact that Manipulation-Hand (M = 1022 ms) was 
significantly slower and that No-Hand (M = 954 ms) was significantly faster than all the other 
conditions; the difference between Function-Hand (M = 985 ms) and Still-Hand (M = 972 ms) 
did not reach significance (Newman-Keuls p = .13). 
 
4.3.3. Discussion 
The sensitivity to the difference between Spatial and Functional context found in Experiment 
1 was confirmed. As to the role played by the displayed hand, the fact that we did not find an 
advantage of the No-Hand condition, as in Experiment 1, confirms that the result is not due to 
the lower visual complexity but to the activation of two mechanisms, one related to 
observation of others interacting with objects, the other to observation of objects evoking 
actions. More crucially for us, the absence of an interaction between Context and Hand for 
foot response rules out one of the possible interpretations of the interaction found in 
Experiment 1. Given that this interaction was present with the hand but not with the foot 
responses, we can argue that our main result is not due to the association between a given 
147 
 
context and a given hand posture. Rather, it suggests that the interaction is due to a motor 
simulation, which is related to the effector involved (and it might activate grasping). 
 
 
4.4. Comparison between the two experiments 
To better understand the differences between the two experiments, we performed a 2 x 2 x 4 
ANOVA for the ‘‘yes’’ responses. The factor Experiment (Manual responses vs. Foot 
responses) was manipulated between subjects, while the already used Context (Functional, 
Spatial) and Hand (No-Hand, Still-Hand, Manipulation-Hand, Function-Hand) factors were 
manipulated within subjects. Where permissible, interaction effects were evaluated with 
Newman-Keuls test (p < .05). 
The ANOVA on errors demonstrated reliable main effects of Experiment, Context and 
Hand. The first effect was due to the fact that Manual responses (M = 3.04) elicited more 
errors than the Foot ones (M = 2.42), F(1, 122) = 10.29, MSe = 9.48, p < .01. The Spatial 
context (M = 3.39) yielded more errors than the Functional (M = 2.07) context, F(1, 122) = 
69.80, MSe = 134.05, p < .0001. The factor Hand, F(3, 366) = 7.34, MSe = 1.89, p < .0001 
was significant as with the Function-Hand (M = 2.41) errors were less than in all other 
conditions. The interaction Context x Hand, F(3, 366) = 7.48, MSe = 1.80, p < .0001, was 
significant due to the fact that, with the Functional context, Manipulation and Function-Hand 
had an advantage over the other two conditions, while within the Spatial context the four hand 
conditions did not differ. 
In the ANOVA on RTs all main effects were reliable. RTs with Foot responses (M = 
827 ms) were longer in duration than RTs with Manual responses (M = 785 ms), F(1, 122) = 
5.35, MSe = 84864.67, p < .05. The factor Context, F(1, 122) = 205.87, MSe = 2562.33, p < 
.0001, was significant as RTs with the Functional Context (M = 783 ms) were faster than RTs 
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with the Spatial (M = 829 ms) one. The factor Hand was also significant, F(3, 366) = 41.06, 
MSe = 1744.04, p < .0001, due to the fact that the Function-Hand was significantly faster and 
that the Manipulation-Hand was significantly slower than all other conditions. The interaction 
between Experiment and Context, F(1, 122) = 8.81, MSe = 2562.33, p < .01, was significant 
due to the combined effect of the advantage in both experiments of the Spatial Context over 
the Functional Context, and of the Manual over the Foot responses. The other significant 
interaction, the Experiment x Hand, F(3, 366) = 4.49, MSe = 1744.04, p < .01, showed that, 
while with the Manual responses the Manipulation-Hand factor was slower compared to all 
others and the No-Hand factor was the fastest one, with the Foot responses only the 
Manipulation-Hand condition differed from the others as it was the slowest one. The Context 
x Hand interaction just approached significance, F(3, 366) = 2.18, MSe = 1822.69, p = .09. 
 
 
4.5. General discussion 
Our results allow us to address the three principal issues advanced in the introduction. First, 
they indicate that the relations existing between objects have a strong effect on the responses. 
Our results suggest that positioning the objects for action facilitated the responses. As 
predicted, in both experiments participants were more accurate and faster with the Functional 
context compared to the Spatial context. In this respect, referring to work by Yoon et al. 
(2010) might be useful. Yoon et al. (2010) presented pairs of objects and submitted 
participants to two different tasks, an action decision task (they had to decide whether two 
objects were typically used together) and a contextual decision task (they had to decide 
whether both objects were for example kitchen items). They propose that responses to Task 1 
depend on the time necessary to access action knowledge, whereas responses to Task 2 are 
dependent on the time necessary to access semantic knowledge. In our experiment, 
149 
 
participants were required to decide whether the two objects were related or not, and the kind 
of relation linking the two objects could be either spatial (the two objects are typically located 
in the same place, e.g., in an office or in a kitchen) or functional (the two objects are typically 
used together).  
The finding that responses were faster with functional contexts suggests that action 
knowledge is available earlier and accessed faster than the knowledge of objects’ common 
location. In addition, the advantage of functional over the spatial context in both experiments 
might suggest that the first evoked a lateralized compatibility effect for the right effector, 
either hand or foot, since in both experiments the ‘‘yes’’ response was associated with a 
movement of a right effector.  
One could argue that this might depend on the differences in semantic association 
between functionally and spatially related objects. This is certainly possible, and merits 
further investigation. In any case, we believe that the very fact that action relations between 
common objects lead to faster responses compared to spatial relations between common 
objects is in itself informative. A possible cause of this different accessibility can be found in 
the differences between functional and spatial relations. While functional relations between 
two objects are normally clear and, in some cases, even socially established (e.g., in Western 
societies you need to use a fork or spoon to bring food to the mouth), spatial relations are 
more subject to individual differences and less conventionalized (e.g., some people keep their 
scissors with their cutlery, others in their office desk). This higher variability might explain 
why participants needed longer and produced more errors to verify a potential spatial relation 
than a functional relation between two objects. 
A further, less plausible interpretation is that the possibility to interact with both 
objects is activated in all cases, independent from the relations linking them. When the objects 
are linked only by a spatial relation, this possibility is activated and then discarded; this would 
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slow down response times. However, in future studies we will give consideration to the idea 
that spatially related objects might be useful for a single bimodal action goal (Swinnen, 2002; 
Swinnen & Wenderoth, 2004) which is beyond what was presented in the present stimuli (one 
hand grasping one object). 
The evidence we found that observing functional objects together activates possible 
actions does not imply that this activation is always effector specific. Indeed the finding that 
we respond faster to objects linked by a functional than by a spatial relation could depend on 
their being typically acted upon together, and suggests that a simulated action is activated. 
However, the same effect was present in Experiments 1 and 2, with both hand and foot 
responses. A possible explanation is that the difference between functional and spatial context 
concerns the overall action goal, not the specific effector to use, and it is therefore present 
with both the hand and the foot responses. This interpretation is coherent with the idea that 
observing objects activate the canonical neuron system (Murata et al., 1997; Raos et al., 
1996), but not the mirror one. In other words, objects might evoke the simulation of an action 
that does not imply the involvement of a specific effector (hand, foot). When, instead, the 
functional hand posture is observed, then the Mirror Neuron System is activated as well, and 
the action is programmed at a more detailed and fine-grained level, through the recruitment of 
a specific effector. This interpretation is compatible with recent evidence on action hierarchies 
and action chains. It has been suggested that actions can be comprehended at different levels: 
the overall action goal (e.g., preparing a coffee), which can be segmented in short-terms goal 
(e.g. grasping the coffee-pot), as well as the kinematic level describing the hand posture (e.g. 
opposing the thumb to the index to take a mug) (Hamilton & Grafton, 2008). Studies on 
action chains, both in monkeys (Fogassi et al., 2005) and in humans (Cattaneo et al., 2007; 
Iacoboni et al., 2005), have confirmed that actions have a goal-based hierarchical 
organization. In terms of the Theory of Event Coding (Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & 
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Prinz, 2001), we could say that the absence of an effector-specific effect confirms that actions 
are primarily coded in terms of their distal features, not of their proximal ones. 
Our results do not allow us to clearly address the second issue we discussed in the 
introduction, i.e. the role played by the presence of a hand near the objects. Indeed, contrary 
to our expectations, in Experiment 1 we found that when no hand was displayed, RTs were 
faster than when the hand was present. A possible explanation is based on the higher visual 
complexity of the scenes in which the hand is presented together with the objects. However, if 
visual complexity were the determining factor, RTs in the No-Hand condition should always 
be faster than RTs in all conditions with a hand, regardless of Context, in both Experiments 1 
and 2. This was not seen. An alternative explanation suggests the more complex mechanism 
mentioned above. Our results might reflect the contemporary activation of two different 
systems, one triggered by the observation of the objects in the context (affordances), the other 
triggered by the hand together with the object (mirror mechanism). When only one 
mechanism is activated, as in the No-Hand condition, the responses are faster. Instead, when 
the hand interacts with the object, the concurrent activation of the two mechanisms slows 
down response times unless the context strongly activates action (as it happens in the 
Functional context). As to the Still-Hand condition, given that the fingers were flexed it is 
possible that it was perceived as slowly moving towards the object (Gangitano, Mottaghy, & 
Pascual-Leone, 2001). To verify this we submitted a group of 14 participants a rating task. 
They were required to determine using a 7 point scale whether the hand was moving or not. 
An ANOVA with the factor Relation manipulated within items was conducted. Results were 
significant, F(1, 44) = 4.75, MSe = .2496, p < .05, due to the fact that in the No-Relation 
context the hand was perceived less in motion as in the functional context. This suggests that, 
even if the hand displayed was in the same position, the context, and particularly the 
functional one, suggested implied motion of the hand toward the object. 
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As to the third issue, our results show that participants were not only sensitive to the 
kind of context (Spatial vs. Functional), but also to the adequacy of the hand posture to the 
kind of context (see also chapter 5). Importantly, the interaction between context and posture 
was significant in Experiment 1, when the response effectors were the hands, but not in 
Experiment 2, when participants provided foot responses; the effector dependency of the 
effect suggests possible involvement of motor simulation, not a simple association between 
contexts and hand postures. Specifically, in Experiment 1 in the Functional context observing 
a hand in the manipulative posture was inhibited, as the slowest RTs obtained with the 
Manipulation-Hand reveal. It is possible that object recognition was more difficult with the 
manipulation posture, as it occluded the object a bit. In order to rule out this hypothesis, we 
performed a rating task asking participants to determine using a 7-point-scale how easily 
recognizable was the object. Fourteen participants were shown with the images of the objects; 
each image was presented with the hand both in the manipulative and the functional posture. 
Participants were asked to what extent they found the object recognition easy. The ANOVA 
with the within-items factor Manipulation vs. Function did not reveal any difference, F(1, 22) 
< 1; p = .45. This result strongly reduces the probability that the delay with manipulation 
posture is due to the fact that it occludes the object. Even if Manipulation-Hand is the slowest 
posture in not related pairs and when responses are provided with the foot too, in Experiment 
1 in the Spatial context there is no difference in RTs between manipulation and functional 
postures. This result clearly suggests that in the Spatial context functional postures were 
inhibited, while they were facilitated in the Functional context. We propose that, when a 
functional grip is perceived, the effector-specific functional knowledge about the object is 
retrieved. However, in the spatial context no clear functional use of the object is possible. 
Given that effector-specific information is activated, this provokes an interference with the 
hand response, but not with the foot response. The idea that a motor resonance mechanism is 
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activated while observing a functional grip in interaction with an object is in line with recent 
findings on tool recognition and effector-dependency. Witt, Kemmerer, Linwenauger, and 
Culham (2010) have recently demonstrated, with a motor interference task (squeezing a 
rubber ball in one hand), that participants were faster in naming tools with the handle faced 
away from the ball than facing towards it. Paulus et al. (2009) manipulated the kind of motor 
interference (hand, foot, and attentional interference) during acquisition of functional 
knowledge of objects. They found an effector-specific interference during a subsequent object 
detection task: verbal learning of object function was impaired when a manual motor action 
was executed. Literature on selection for action is relevant to our results as well. For example, 
Tipper, Howard, and Jackson (1997) found with a kinematics study that, when two or more 
objects are presented in a scene, non-target objects evoke competing responses, slowing down 
the reach. Consistently, in our study the shortest RTs were found when the two objects were 
functionally compatible, thus the possibility for the non-target object to evoke a competing 
response was minimized. Our results suggest that participants infer from the context the goal 
underlying the observed action (Gallese, 2009). In this respect, this behavioural study 
complements and extends results found with fMRI study by Iacoboni et al. (2005) with a 
single object. They presented participants with grasping hand actions without a context (e.g., 
a hand grasping a cup), with the context only (scene containing object) (e.g., a table with 
objects arranged as before or after having tea) and with grasping hand actions performed in 
two different contexts, suggesting two different intentions, such as drinking from a cup or 
putting it away after tea. Results revealed that the context, beyond activating visual 
information, recruits the motor system as it prepares for situated action: observing both action 
and context videos activated the parietofrontal circuit for grasping. Our results are compatible 
with the Predictive Coding model (Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007) proposed to account how 
the Mirror Neuron System would interpret and predict actions. According to this model the 
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observed kinematics of an action can be interpreted at different levels, which are 
hierarchically organized. At each level of this hierarchy the mismatch between the predicted 
and the observed activity might lead to a prediction error. As highlighted by the authors, the 
goal inferred while observing an action is matched with information (priors) received from 
the context. Similarly, in our study, it is possible that participants observe the functional 
posture and infer both the short-term goal (grasping the object) and the long-term goal (using 
it). However, even if the short-term goal doesn’t conflict with the context, the long-term goal 
inferred by the kinematics of the functional posture does not match with the information 
provided by the Spatial context. This could explain why functional postures are interfered in 
the Spatial context when responses are provided with the hand. 
This result confirms what to our knowledge has not yet been found in a behavioural 
study, i.e., that functional information is more accessible than manipulation information, and 
that the activation of both functional and manipulation information is modulated by an action 
goal, which in this case is made explicit through the context. This result is in line with 
evidence by van Elk, van Schie, and Bekkering (2008) who demonstrated that objects 
presented in a location associated to the action goal were recognized earlier than objects in 
another location (e.g., cup at eye). This result bolsters previous findings showing that both 
manipulation and function are activated, and that a competition between the two takes place 
(Jax & Buxbaum, 2010). This competition is rather easily solved when the context 
disambiguates the situation. Given that typically we interact with objects in a functional way, 
the competition is more easily solved when the object’s function has to be taken into account. 
Overall, our study shows that affordances activation is modulated by the context. 
Other objects in a scene as well as cues related to action/interaction with objects, such as a 
hand, influence RTs. It remains an open issue, to be investigated in further research, whether 
and how the two mechanisms interact, one triggered simply by observation of objects and 
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another by observation of others in potential interaction with objects. Brain imaging studies 
are required, in order to investigate whether two different neural circuits underline object 
manipulation and object use. Further studies are needed, in order to understand the precise 
time course of activation of motor information associated to one object, to two objects and to 
the hand. In relation to context, there is evidence of ventral stream activation to images of 
man-made artifacts shown in incorrect contexts (Mizelle & Wheaton, 2010a, 2010b, 2011). 
The finding that affordance activation is modulated by the context might have 
important theoretical implications and might contribute to the ongoing debate on automaticity 
of activation of affordances. Indeed, it is unclear from current evidence and it is still hotly 
debated in the literature whether the object affordances are activated in an automatic way or 
whether they are modulated by the task and by the context (e.g., Buxbaum & Kalenine, 2010; 
Creem-Regehr & Lee, 2005). As clarified before, the automaticity of activation is often 
inferred from the fact that, even if the task requires processing a given aspect of an object (for 
example assigning it to a given a category, or deciding its color, etc.), affordances related to 
other aspects (e.g., grip, orientation) are activated. Studies so far have shown that affordances 
might be activated independently of the task – for example, affordances related to object 
grasping might be activated in a categorization task. However, very recent evidence has 
indicated that the kind of task flexibly modulates the activation of affordances: for example, 
Pellicano et al. (2010) and Tipper et al. (2006) have shown that affordance effects are not 
present with tasks implying simple perceptual processing of the stimuli, such as color 
discrimination tasks, whereas they emerge when the task implies deeper processing, as in 
categorization and decision on objects shape. Initial neuroimaging evidence further suggests 
that ventral stream areas for awareness of correct vs. incorrect contexts of man-made artifacts 
are not active when subjects are not seeking functional relationships between objects (Mizelle 
& Wheaton, 2010a). This evidence suggests that activation of affordances might be less 
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automatic and more dependent on the task and situation than previously thought. Our 
evidence bolsters these results, showing that not only the task, but also the context modulates 
activation of affordances, and that our cognitive systems responds flexibly to changing 
contexts (see also chapter 5). In other terms, we side with the ‘‘affordance competition 
hypothesis’’ (Cisek, 2007), according to which a competition between different available 
action opportunities is activated. In our study we demonstrated that context and relations 
between objects, as well as the presence of the hand of someone suggesting a specific action 
goal, can orient this competition. 
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5. Semantic categorization of conflict objects in different contexts 
 
Compelling evidence in the literature suggests that during conceptual processing of 
manipulable objects an embodied simulation of appropriate action is evoked (see chapter 2). 
These findings have been interpreted as evidence that objects are recognized by accessing to 
action features. However, as discussed in par. 2.5, many objects may be endowed with 
multiple, contrasting affordances (i.e., conflict objects) associated to different actions in 
relation of the agent intentions (e.g., a kitchen timer may be clenched with a power grip to 
move it, whereas it may be pinched with a precision grip to use it). In the present study, the 
hypothesis that affordance simulation is responsive to the visual scene in which objects are 
embedded was tested using conflict objects. Participants were asked to categorize object 
pictures presented in different naturalistic visual contexts that could evoke either move- or 
use-related actions. Categorization judgments (i.e., natural/artifact) were performed by 
executing a move- or use-related action (i.e., clench/pinch) on a manipulandum ad-hoc, with 
response times being assessed as a function of the action-context congruence. Although the 
actions performed to respond were totally irrelevant in order to successfully accomplish the 
categorization judgment, responses were significantly faster when actions were compatible 
with the visual context. This compatibility effect was largely driven by faster pinch responses 
when objects were presented in use- compared to move-compatible contexts. Thus, the 
present results confirm a strong influence of the visual scene in which objects are embedded 
on the emergence of affordance-based compatibility effects during semantic object 
processing. On the whole, these findings support the hypothesis (advanced in par. 2.5, and 
confirmed by the study reported in chapter 4) that the activation of different affordances 
linked to the same tool is flexibly biased by properties relevant for appropriately acting in the 
context in which the object is embedded. 
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5.1. Introduction 
Evidence from numerous behavioral studies suggests that conceptual processing of 
manipulable objects is associated with potentiation of action (e.g., Craighero, Bello, Fadiga, 
& Rizzolatti, 2002; Ellis & Tucker, 2000; Girardi, Lindemann, & Bekkering, 2010; Tucker & 
Ellis, 1998, 2001). Many of these studies show that conceptual processing of a visually-
presented object is facilitated when the motor response required for the task is compatible 
with the action typically associated with that object, even when that action is task-irrelevant. 
For example, participants are faster to categorize a small, “pinchable” object (such as a 
strawberry) as a natural rather than manufactured object when they indicate their 
categorization choiceby performing a precision (pinch) grip compared to a power (clench) 
grip on anexperimental apparatus (Tucker & Ellis, 2001). Such stimulus-response 
compatibility effects have been taken as evidence that conceptual object representationsare 
composed in part of sensorimotor features associated with object manipulation (e.g., 
Barsalou, 2008). 
Many manipulable objects, however, are associated with several actions, as discussed 
in par. 2.5. For example, a kitchen timer may be clenched with a power grip to move it, but 
pinched with a precision grip to use it. Recent studies have shown that object processing may 
recruit both of these action types (Bub, Masson, & Cree, 2008; Lee, Middleton, Mirman, 
Kalénine, & Buxbaum, 2013). In one such study, for example, participants were first trained 
to associate different actions with distinct colors,thenviewed objects whose color signaled the 
action to be performed on an experimental device. Despite the apparent irrelevance of the 
motor response to the object identification task, responsesthat were congruent with using or 
moving the objects (e.g. poking-calculator; clenching-spray bottle) were executed faster than 
incongruent actions (Bub et al., 2008). 
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More recently, Jax and Buxbaum (2010, 2013) demonstrated that use- and move-
related actions may compete with each other within single objects. In particular, initiation of 
use actions is slower for objects associated with distinct move-related actions (hereafter, 
“conflict” objects, e.g. calculator) as compared to objects for which use- and move-related 
actions are similar (“non-conflict” objects, e.g. drinking glass). This, and associated data 
indicating that initiation of move-related actions is no slower for conflict- than non-conflict 
objects, suggests that move-related activations may be relatively rapid, thus interfering with 
planning of use-related actions. Jax and Buxbaum (2010) proposed that the intention to act on 
an object triggers a race-like competition between functional and structural responses during 
action selection. Only functional responses require activation of long-term conceptual 
representations; thus, structural responses can be activated more quickly than functional 
responses. 
The evidence for two classes of actions associated with a given object raises questions 
about the factors that may influence the strength and time course of their activation. One 
possibility is that both types of action are invariably activated during object recognition.  
Alternatively, and more likely in our view, action activation may be responsive to task goals 
and context (see Buxbaum & Kalénine, 2010; see also chapter 4). In support of this latter 
possibility, a recent eye-tracking study demonstrated that activation of move- and use-related 
competition between objects in a visual arraymaybe accelerated by congruent verbal context 
(Lee et al., 2013). For instance, cueing of target identity with action sentences such as “he 
picked up the calculator” or “he used the calculator” accelerated competition between the 
target (calculator) and distractor objects that are picked up or used similarly, respectively. 
These data suggest that verbal context may influence the activation of both of these classes of 
action. 
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To our knowledge, the question of whether visual scene context may modify 
activation of move- and use-related actions has not previously been addressed.  In the present 
study, we tested the hypothesis that evocation of move- or use-related actions is indeed 
responsive to the congruence of the visual context in which objects are presented. To this aim, 
we used a stimulus-response compatibility paradigm first developed by Tucker and Ellis 
(2001) and presented conflict objects in move-compatible or use-compatible visual scenes. 
 
 
5.2. Method 
5.2.1. Participants 
Twenty-five healthy adults (10 females, mean age =62, SD =6.4, mean education  = 15.5 
years, SD = 2.7 years) took part in the study.All participants were recruited from the Moss 
Rehabilitation Research Institute Research Registry(Schwartz, Brecher, Whyte, & Klein, 
2005), Philadelphia, USA. They had no history of traumatic brain injury, neurologic 
disorders, alcohol or drug abuse, or history of psychosis, and achieved at least a score of 27 
on the Mini-Mental Status Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975). They 
gave informed consent according to guidelines of the Institutional Review Board of Albert 
Einstein Healthcare Network and were paid $15 for their participation. 
 
5.2.2. Materials and procedure 
The study included a baseline experiment designed to control for individual grasping time 
differences and a main experiment designed to test the influence of visual context on action 
activation during object semantic processing. Critical stimuli, which were only involved in the 
main experiment, were colored pictures of 20 manufactured objects associated with different 
move and use hand postures (e.g., kitchen timer). Objects were presented in either a MOVE 
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environment, in which the visual scene was a context in which the object would be clenched 
with a power grip (e.g., kitchen timer in drawer) or a USE environment in which the object 
would be pinched with a precision grip (e.g. kitchen timer on countertop, with food). The 
association between the MOVE and USE scenes and the gestures evoked by the conflict 
objects (clench or pinch) was confirmed in a norming study (see the Supplementary materials 
of chapter 5 in the Appendix of the thesis). There were 40 photographs corresponding to the 
two visual contexts for each of the 20 conflict objects (see example in Figure 1; the complete 
list is reported in the Appendix). The scenes represented an office, kitchen, or bathroom. In 
addition to the critical conflict objects, each scene also contained 4 distractor objects, both 
man-made and natural (e.g., fruit, vegetables, plants, flowers). A subset of these distractors 
was used as target objects on filler trials. Thirty natural and 10 man-made distractor objects 
appeared in both MOVE and USE context pictures. The other natural and man-made 
distractors objects only appeared in one picture. Distractor objects could afford either power 
or precision grips or both/none (e.g. plants). For each conflict object, we ensured that the 
different affordances were represented in equivalent proportions between use and move 
contexts. For instance for the kitchen timer (Figure 1), all distractor objects would be grasped 
with a clench, expect for broccoli (use context) and lime (move context) that may afford both 
clench and pinch grips.  
 
Figure 1. Conflict object (kitchen timer) presented in a move (left) or a use (right) scene. 
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Sound files corresponding to category labels “natural?” and “man-made?” were 
recorded by a female native speaker of American English. 
The response apparatus consisted of a 4-inch long by1-inch diameter cylinder2 that 
afforded both a power grip by clenching the whole cylinder and a precision grip by pinching 
the tip of the cylinder. The response device was programmed in E-prime to record reaction 
times when participants squeezed the cylinder (Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Experimental set up and use of the response device for clench and pinch grasps. 
 
5.2.3. Baseline experiment 
The goals of the baseline experiment was, first, to provide individual mean reaction times for 
clenching and pinching the device without visual stimuli or a semantic task, and second, to 
train them to associate the yes/no response to clench/pinch grip. A fixation cross appeared on 
the screen and participants began the trial by using the index finger of the left hand to press 
the middle key of a response box positioned in front of them. Participants were always asked 
to respond with their left hand while their right arm was immobilized in order to allow a 
future comparison with left hemisphere stroke patients. Thus, as left hemisphere stroke 
patients frequently have reduced right arm mobility, the mobility of the right limb of each 
participant was limited with an arm sling. Participants reached to and grasped the apparatus 
with either a pinch or a clench in response to “YES” and “NO” verbal cues. They were asked 
                                                 
2
 Thank to Rob Ellis and Mike Tucker for providing the response apparatus.  
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to keep the key depressed until presentation of a verbal cue. After a variable delay of between 
1500 and 3000ms, the word “YES” or “NO” was delivered through speakers. As soon as they 
heard the word, participants released the key and grasped the response device, which was a 
cylinder mounted vertically in a wooden support, located 13 inches from the response box 
(Figure 2). Participants were randomly assigned to one of 2 groups. Participants in Group 1 
had to clench the cylinder when they heard “YES” and pinch it when they heard “NO”, 
whereas those in Group 2 had to perform the opposite mapping. They were instructed to 
respond as quickly and accurately as possible. Initiation times (word offset to liftoff) and 
transport times (liftoff to cylinder contact) were recorded automatically in E-Prime. Accuracy 
was coded online by the experimenter (c = clench, p = pinch, n = none). Gesture videotaping 
was used for offline accuracy checking. There were 10 practice trials with reaction time and 
accuracy feedback (5 “YES” and 5 “NO” in random order), followed by 24 baseline trials 
where no feedback was provided (12 “YES” and 12 “NO” in random order). 
Correct movement initiation times were computed as a function of the Gesture 
performed on the device in response to “yes” and “no” labels (pinch or clench). After the 10 
practice trials, all participants were 100% correct on the 24 baseline trials. One participant 
was particularly slow in initiation times (3SD below the group mean) and was excluded from 
further analysis. For the remaining 24 participants, initiation times that were either shorter 
than 200ms or longer than 3 standard deviations below the mean of the group in the pinch and 
clench conditions were considered outlier trials and removed from the data (1.5%). 
 
5.2.4. Main experiment 
On each trial, a fixation cross appeared in the center of the screen. Participants began each 
trial by pressing and holding the middle key of the response box with the index finger of their 
left hand. As in the Baseline experiment, the mobility of the right limb of each participant was 
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limited with an arm sling. Immediately after pressing the key, the scene picture appeared on 
the screen. After a 1250 ms delay, a red box appeared around the target or one of the four 
distractors. Location of target and distractors was randomized.  Simultaneously, they heard an 
auditory cue, either “natural?” or “man-made?”. Participants then indicated whether the 
category label matched the object in the box by using the response device to indicatea “YES” 
or “NO” response. This was accomplished by releasing the response box key and reaching to 
grasp the cylinder with either a clench or a pinch. The picture disappeared when the start 
button was released. Participants in Group 1 clenched the device to respond “YES” and 
pinched it to respond “NO”, whereas participants in Group 2 performed with a reversed 
mapping. They were instructed to respondas quickly and accurately as possible. Movement 
initiation and transport times were recorded automatically in E-Prime. Accuracy was coded 
online by an experimenter (c=clench, p=pinch, n=none). Gesture videotaping was used for 
offline accuracy checking.  
Participants performed 12 practice trials with feedback on accuracy, using pictures 
that were not displayed in the experiment. The experimental block contained 120 trials. 
Indeed, each of the 40 scenes was presented 3 times in randomized order resulting in 120 
experimental trials. On 40 critical trials, the red box appeared around the conflict object in the 
scene. For the remaining filler trials, the box appeared around a natural distractor object on 60 
trials and around a man-made distractor on 20 trials. Thus, the target object was natural and 
man-made on an equal number of trials. Each scene was repeated 3 times: once with the 
conflict object as target and twice with a distractor object as target. Since each conflict object 
was the target twice, once in the MOVE and once in the USE scene, the number of repetition 
of distractor objects as target was varied among filler trials so that overall, object category, 
object repetition across pictures, and target repetition were not informative in predicting 
which object in the scene would be the target on a given trial. 
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On half of the trials, the target object was coupled with the label “natural?” and on the 
other half coupled with the label “manmade?”. Repeated target objects could be associated 
with the same label or a different label on both occurrences. Hence, when a given object was 
the target for the second time, the likelihood of hearing a repeated or new label was 
equivalent.  
 
5.2.5.  Data Analysis and results 
In the baseline experiment, individual initiation times3 for pinch and clench were calculated 
and used to reduce between-subject variability in the data from the main experiment (see 
below; also see Supplemental Materials for additional detail).  
In the main experiment, data were trimmed and adjusted as follows. First, participants 
who were at chance level in at least one condition (accuracy < 75% according to binomial 
probability) were excluded from further analysis (N=3). One participant was particularly slow 
in baseline initiation times (3SD below the group mean) and was also excluded. Thus, the 
final data set included 21 participants. Second, analyses on initiation times were conducted 
after removing incorrect trials (4% data) (Notrialswere excluded for being shorter than 200ms 
or longer than 3 standard deviations fromthe group meanin the corresponding condition). 
Finally, adjusted initiation times were computed at the individual level in each condition by 
subtracting initiation baseline times for pinch and clench fromthe respective initiation times in 
the main experiment.   
A 2 x 2 Analysis of Variance was conducted on mean adjusted initiation times from 
critical trials with Gesture (pinch, clench) and Context (MOVE, USE) as within-subject (F1) 
or within-item (F2) factors. Distribution normality and variance homogeneity were verified. 
                                                 
3
 Our analyses focused on movement initiation times since object action-related features have been 
shown to affect grasp planning prior to movement execution (e.g., Bub, Masson, & Cree, 2008; Jax & 
Buxbaum, 2010; Girardi, Lindemann, & Bekkering, 2010). Nonetheless, note that we did not observe 
any effect of the variables of interest on transport times (all ps  > .25). 
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Errors were extremely rare: of the total of 840 trials run by all subjects in the experiment, only 
35 trials had errors. Error distribution was highly skewed and not suited to a similar analysis 
as the one conducted on initiation times. Nevertheless, proportions of correct responses 
between conditions were compared using chi-square. 
 
Initiation times 
There was no main effect of Gesture [F1(1,20)= 0.31, R2=0.02 , p= .58; F2(1,19)= 1.08, R2= 0.05 
, p= .31] or Context [F1(1,20)= 1.15, R2= 0.05 , p = .29; F2(1,19)=  3.18, R2=0.14, p = .09]. 
Critically, the Gesture x Context interaction was significant in both the by-subject [F1(1,20)= 
4.8, R2= 0.19, p = .04] and by-item [F2(1,19)= 6.31, R2=0.25 , p =.02] analyses. As shownin 
Figure 3, there was a greater advantage of the use context compared to themove context in the 
pinch gesture condition compared to the clench gesture condition.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean correct adjusted initiation times (and standard errors) for clench and pinch 
categorization responses as a function of context (move/use). 
 
Post-hoc comparisons of the by-item analysis indicated that the interaction between 
Gesture and Context was likely due to shorter initiation times in the use than in the move 
context for pinch (t = 2.74, p = .01), whereas there was no difference between use and move 
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contexts for clench (t = -0.2388, p = 0.81).  None of the post-hoc tests reached significance in 
the by-subject analysis, though the results were consistent with those demonstrated in the by-
item analysis (t=1.6891, p = .10 between move and use contexts for pinch; t=-0.5447, p = .59 
between move and use contexts for clench). 
 
Correct responses 
Chi-square test on accuracy data did not show any significant different in proportion of 
correct responses between the four Gesture x Context conditions (χ2= 6.65, p = .08). As can 
be seen in Table 1, the number of correct responses was numerically inferior for pinch 
responses in the use context, but this was anecdotal considering the absence of significant 
difference between conditions and the very limited number of errors. Consequently, accuracy 
data will not be further discussed.  
Context Gesture Number of correct responses Proportion of correct responses 
Move Clench 203 96.2% 
Use Clench 204 96.6% 
Move Pinch 202 97.6% 
Use Pinch 196 92.9% 
Table 1. Number and percentage of correct responses in each condition. 
 
 
5.3. Discussion 
We report context-dependent compatibility effects between the motor responses performed 
during object semantic categorization and the action evoked by the object in a given visual 
context. Prior demonstrations indicate that action evocation during object processing may be 
modulated by verbal context (Costantini, Ambrosini, Scorolli, & Borghi, 2011; Lee et al., 
2013), affordances of distractor objects (Caligiore, Borghi, Parisi, Ellis, Cangelosi, et al., 
2013; Ellis, Tucker, Symes, & Vainio, 2007; Pavese & Buxbaum, 2002; Tipper, Howard, & 
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Jackson, 1997), and relationships to other objects or agents (Borghi, Flumini, Natraj, & 
Wheaton, 2012; Ellis et al., 2013; Girardi et al., 2010; Natraj et al., 2013; Yoon, Humphreys, 
& Riddoch, 2010; see chapter 4). The present data extend such findings by demonstrating that 
activation of move- and use-related gestures during semantic object processing may 
additionally be modulated by the visual environment in which objects are presented. The 
visual environments used here were composed of 5 objects naturally displayed on a furnished 
room background. The fact that we observed compatibility effects with complex visual 
contexts provides additional ecological validity to action evocation phenomena during object 
processing and reinforces the idea that affordances are flexibly activated in natural 
environmental conditions. In addition, the data suggest that the contextual modulation 
observed in the present study is the outcome of a global visual processing of the scene that 
can be distinguished from the influence of single object affordances. Although distractor 
objects may have also activated the actions associated with them, their affordances were 
equivalent between contextual conditions. Thus, the context-dependent compatibility effects 
reported here are likely related to the meaning conveyed by the array and by the action 
intention that emerges from the visual scene.  
The existence of such effects raises the challenge of identifying when and how visual 
context influences compatibility effects in the cascade of perceptual and motor processes. It is 
well-recognized that preparation of a motor response orients attention towards action-relevant 
features and may facilitate visual processing of stimuli that are congruent with that action (the 
“motor-visual attention” effect, e.g., Allport, 1987; Bekkering & Neggers, 2002; Botvinick, 
Buxbaum, Bylsma, & Jax, 2009; Craighero, Fadiga, Rizzolatti, & Umiltà, 1999; Hannus, 
Cornelissen, Lindemann, & Bekkering, 2005; Pavese & Buxbaum, 2002). Preparing a clench 
or a pinch may facilitate processing of distinct conflict object features (e.g., the entire kitchen 
timer or the timer dial, respectively). Consequently, faster object processing may be observed 
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when the features highlighted by response preparation are compatible with one of the actions 
evoked by the object. At the same time, visual object processing appears to activate action 
representations, even in tasks not involving a motor response (e.g., Kalénine, Mirman, 
Middleton, & Buxbaum, 2012; Lee et al., 2013; Myung et al., 2010). Additionally, visual 
context influences object processing (e.g., Gronau, Neta, & Bar, 2008; Mudrik, Lamy, & 
Deouell, 2010). In objects associated with more than one action, such as the conflict objects 
presented here, we may speculate that the visual context serves to amplify the action 
associated with it (e.g., Wurm, von Cramon, & Schubotz, 2012). In an iterative manner, this 
“bottom up” facilitation of an object-related action by the contextmay resonate with the 
intention-driven facilitation of action by the planned action (see Chambon et al., 2011; Shen 
& Paré, 2011 for related accounts). Further investigations of context-dependent compatibility 
effects could potentially employ variations in the timing of experimental perceptual and motor 
events to specify how environment-based and intention-based processes interact during object 
processing.  
Another main issue concerns the stage of object processing at which the observed 
context-relevant action effects emerge. While most studies on effect of context on action 
evocation from objects have induced “deep” object processing by using semantic decision 
tasks, a few studies have contrasted different processing levels and showed that affordances 
are not activated when the task requires shallow object processing (e.g., color judgments; 
Pellicano, Iani, Borghi, Rubichi, & Nicoletti, 2010; Tipper, Paul, & Hayes, 2006). One 
possibility is that context-relevant action modulation arises before conceptual object 
processing is completed, perhaps on the basis of associations between the target object, 
context and actions. Context-dependent activation of object affordances could then impact 
semantic processing while emerging from earlier (pre-conceptual) stages of perceptual 
processing. Alternatively, object-related actions might be automatically evoked during early 
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processing stages (Goslin, Dixon, Fischer, Cangelosi, & Ellis, 2012) and context modulation 
might arise later on during conceptual processing. Context could work as a late filter, which 
would enhance relevant action features and turn off irrelevant ones. Regardless, results overall 
suggest that all action features are not systematically integrated to object concepts and that 
context and goals play a decisive role in this integration. 
The affordance-based compatibility effects observed in the present study were largely 
driven by faster initiation of use-related actions when the object was presented in a use-
compatible context compared to a move-compatible context. In contrast, initiation of move-
related actions did not appear sensitive to visual context. This asymmetry could have been 
related to the fact that participants were required to respond with their left hand. Indeed, 
manual asymmetries have been reported in visually primed grasping (Vainio, Ellis, Tucker & 
Symes, 2006). However, manual differences were observed in the opposite direction, with an 
absence of object size-grip type compatibility effects when precision grip responses were 
performed with the left hand. A reduction of affordance effects has also been recently 
observed when right-handed participants used their left hand to execute memorized 
instructions on objects with handles that were spatially congruent or incongruent with the 
dominant hand (Apel, Cangelosi, Ellis, Goslin, & Fischer, 2013), suggesting that 
compatibility effects may be more difficult to observe when responses are performed with the 
left hand. Moreover, while manual asymmetries could possibly account for a main effect of 
grip type in the present paradigm  (which we did not observe), they could not explain the 
observed context effects on precision grips. If compatibility effects are overall 
enhanced/reduced for precision grips depending on the response hand, this should affect move 
and use context conditions equally. Thus, reasons for the asymmetry reported here remain 
uncertain, but several potential explanations can be formulated. First, pinch grasps might be 
more context-specific than clench grasps. For instance, pinch might be more associated with 
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opening a bottle with a corkscrew than clench is associated with moving this item. Second, 
use-related actions are often preceded by move-related actions, particularly in naturalistic 
environments. For example, one must first pick up a corkscrew with a clench prior to using it 
with a pinch. Accordingly, clenches may be equally triggered by use- and move-compatible 
contexts while pinches would be more strongly activated in use-compatible contexts. Finally, 
at the action planning level, one could consider the clench hand posture less specified than the 
pinch hand posture. In other words, the first phase of any grasping movement (pinch or 
clench) could start in some cases with a clench-like posture, and the position of the different 
fingers that are opposed to the thumb could require further determination. This possibility 
accords with neurophysiological data showing additional fronto-parietal recruitment for the 
control of precision grips compared to power grips (Ehrsson et al., 2001). Hence, clench 
action initiation would be as relevant for use-compatible and move-compatible environments 
and context would show little influence on clench responses.  
In summary, the present study confirms the influence of visual scene on stimulus-
response compatibility effects during semantic object processing (see also chapter 4). This 
finding brings additional support to action models that consider both action sub-types and 
context as key determinants for understanding interactions between object and action 
processing (e.g., Buxbaum & Kalénine, 2010). Moreover, this finding may have strong 
implications for object processing in naturalistic tasks where objects are perceived in their 
natural visual environments.  
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6. Activation of affordances by visual objects and their names 
 
Much research in the literature on embodied language has been collected with the aim of 
demonstrating the similarity between the simulation triggered by language a simulation the 
triggered by objects or actions processing. This evidence is compelling (see chapter 3), 
however, as proposed in par. 3.4, there might be differences that remains unexplored. In order 
to better understand this issue, this study investigated affordance-based compatibility effects 
with a categorization task (i.e., artificial/natural) in two experiments, identical in all but the 
stimuli used: in Experiment 1 the categorization was performed on pictures of objects, in 
Experiment 2 the categorization was performed on the names of the same objects of 
Experiment 1. Furthermore, as the real-time dynamics of affordance-based compatibility 
effects are currently unknown, the time course of the responses was tracked using 
MouseTracker software. Participants were required to report their choice using either a big 
mouse (requiring a power grip, a hand-posture compatible with the grasping of big objects) or 
a small mouse (requiring a precision grip, a hand-posture compatible with the grasping of 
small objects). The results of Experiment 1 showed a compatibility effect between the grip 
required by the mouse and the grip elicited by picture of objects, even if it was irrelevant to 
the task. The results of Experiment 2 on linguistic stimuli referring to the same objects of the 
previous experiment failed to exactly reproduce this effect, nevertheless a compatibility effect 
mediated by the target-word category (i.e., artificial/natural) was observed. On the whole, the 
present study confirmed at the behavioural level the hypothesis, advanced in par. 3.4, that 
visual and linguistic stimuli trigger simulation processes that show not only similarities, but 
also differences as well. These finding are predicted by theories of reuse and neural 
exploitation, which suggest that language recruits structures and mechanisms characterizing 
the sensory-motor system to modify and build on them. 
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6.1. Introduction 
The ability to grasp objects in the appropriate way, using the adequate kind of grip and timing 
of opening and closing the hand, represents one of the more complex and sophisticated motor 
abilities humans are endowed with, as its progressive refinement during development testifies. 
While grasping has been mostly and extensively studied in the framework of motor control 
(Oztop & Arbib, 2002; Shadmehr et al., 2010), in the last years the interest for grasping 
actions and grasping postures has risen in the literature on visuo-motor transformations and 
affordances. Building on the notion of affordance proposed by (Gibson, 1979), according to 
which objects invite organisms to act, recent studies have shown that observing objects 
activates possible motor responses.  
Studies on action preparation have provided evidence of a shifting of attention toward 
the action-relevant property of the objects, leading to compatibility effect between the hand 
posture used to respond and some characteristics of the stimuli. For example, Craighero et al., 
(2002) asked participants to prepare to grasp a bar that could have different orientations; when 
the picture of a hand was displayed, they had to grasp the bar as fast as possible. Results 
revealed a compatibility effect between the orientation of the bar (clockwise, counter-
clockwise) and the grasping hand final position. Most relevant to the present work are studies 
on the affordance-based compatibility effect between the object size and the kind of grip used 
to respond. In an influential work, Tucker & Ellis (2001) instructed participants to categorize 
as natural or artifact real objects differing in size by mimicking either a precision or a power 
grip with a customized device. The compatibility effect they found between the object size 
(large, as apple, hammer, or small, as cherry, nail) and the grip used to respond (power or 
precision) indicates that observing objects potentiates their affordances. Importantly, the 
action-relevant dimension (i.e., size) influenced response times even if it was not relevant to 
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the categorization task. Further experiments with briefly presented objects (Tucker & Ellis, 
2004) revealed that the effects are maintained even when the object disappears: the objects do 
not need to be visible during the response selection; additionally, also the presentation of the 
object name exerted the effects. Thus, they seem to be due to long-term associations between 
objects and actions. Further recent studies have investigated the compatibility effects induced 
by the context. In some studies the context was given by the presence of a hand in potential 
interaction with the object and by another object which might be functionally connected to the 
first or not (e.g., Borghi et al., 2012; Natraj et al., 2012, 2013; Yoon et al., 2010; see chapter 
4). In a recent work, Kalenine et al. (2013) used conflict objects, i.e., objects that had different 
affordances related to use and to movement (Jax and Buxbaum, 2010; Lee et al., 2013; see 
also Bub et al., 2008; Creem & Proffitt, 2001) and found that the compatibility effect between 
hand posture (precision vs. power) and objects was modulated by the visual scene in which 
objects were embedded, eliciting either use-related or move-relate actions (see chapter 5).  
Further studies on visuo-motor priming investigated the effect of showing different 
hand postures on subsequent tasks. Vogt et al. (2003) and Bruzzo et al. (2008) manipulated 
the perspective of the hand prime demonstrating its effect on grasping and categorization 
tasks. More relevant to the present work are studies on compatibility effects between the hand 
posture and the object size. Borghi et al. (2007) asked participants to categorize pictures of 
objects differing in size into artifact and natural objects by pressing two different keys on the 
keyboard; the stimuli were primed by pictures of hands displaying either a precision or a 
power grip. A compatibility effect between the hand prime (power, precision) and the object 
size (large, small) was found, provided that before the experiment participants mimicked the 
displayed hand postures. The compatibility effect between the hand prime and the size of the 
targets was replicated and extended by Vainio et al. (2008) with dynamic hand stimuli.  
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As this brief overview shows, a number of experiments have demonstrated the 
presence of an interaction between the hand posture and objects action-based characteristics, 
particularly size. In some studies different hand postures were used to provide the response, in 
other studies different hand postures were displayed as primes, or embedded in a scene. In all 
cases compatibility effects were found (see chapter 2). Overall, the evidence on the interaction 
between hand posture and object size raises questions about the factors that influence the 
involved processes and their time course. However, to our knowledge no study so far has 
focused on how the effects of the compatibility vs. incompatibility between the information 
derived from the object and from the hand posture unfolds in time and is reflected in an 
explicit movement. In the present study we intend to investigate the time course of the 
congruency effect. We aim to assess when does the conflict between the information derived 
from the posture of the hand used and the object size come into play, and how it is reflected in 
overt movements. In addition, we intend to verify the role played by a distractor compatible in 
size with the target in deviating the trajectory to reach for the object.  
With respect to the current literature, our work presents several novelties. The first is 
that it investigates static hand postures rather than full prehension movements. In real life we 
often use static precision and power postures: we hold nails and nuts, coconuts and umbrellas, 
etc. In the studies on affordance-based compatibility participants were either required to 
simply press a button on the keyboard (e.g., Borghi et al., 2007, 2012; Riggio et al., 2008; 
Fagioli et al., 2007) or alternatively they were asked to squeeze the device mimicking a power 
grip and to press a switch mimicking a precision grip (e.g., Tucker & Ellis, 2001); this 
resembles more to the experience of squeezing some fruit or vegetable, while artifacts are 
often hard and not squeezable (Anelli et al., 2010). In the present study we used a mouse that 
participants held and dragged with their dominant hand; the mouse could be small, graspable 
with a precision grip, or large, graspable with a power one. Compared to previous study, in 
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the current one the precision grip was not characterized by the opposition between the thumb 
and the index finger but was the one required to hold a small mouse; that is, closer to the 
power grip in terms of fingers configuration, but it was adapted to a smaller object.  
Using the mouse has a further advantage, which represents the second novelty of our 
study. In the experiments conducted by Tucker & Ellis (2001, 2004) the hand posture was 
relevant for the response to provide, while in studies with hand primes (e.g., Borghi et al., 
2007) it was not, since a simple key-press response was required. In our study, participants' 
motor response consists in moving the mouse in different directions regardless of how the 
mouse is grasped; still we manipulate participants’ prehension. Participants saw a cue-word 
on the screen (“artificial” vs. “natural”) and were instructed to drag the mouse to two different 
locations to decide which of the displayed images represented an object of the category 
indicated by the word, thus mimicking the reaching of the object. Objects were either natural 
or artificial, differing in size (graspable with a precision vs. a power grip). Similar to the 
original study by (Tucker & Ellis, 2001), participants' hand posture was irrelevant to the task 
but was manipulated - by providing participants with a small or big mouse - to unveil 
compatibility effects with stimuli dimensions (e.g., size of target and distractors).  
The third important novelty of the present work is that we used a continuous measure 
of performance: we tracked participants' mouse trajectories during the choice. This procedure 
is increasingly used to study the real-time dynamics of decision and is particularly useful to 
reveal the fine-grained effect of conflicting cognitive processes (Barca & Pezzulo, 2012; 
Freeman & Ambady, 2010; Song & Nakayama, 2009; Spivey, 2007). In our study, the mouse-
tracking procedure allows us to investigate the effect played by congruent or by conflicting 
information as they unfold in time and are reflected in hand movements. The trajectory 
followed while moving the mouse to reach for the object can indeed inform us on the effects 
of congruent or conflict information on the response selection. To our knowledge the only 
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study investigating similar issues is an EEG experiment conducted by Goslin et al. (2012) on 
compatibility effects between the response hand and the handle location of objects. Results 
revealed that visual processing and motor information are integrated very early, before 200 
ms of stimulus onset (see also Bub & Masson, 2010, on the dynamics of aligned effects 
elicited by handled objects). 
If participants are sensitive to static hand postures and this sensitivity is reflected in 
the trajectory followed while reaching for the object, we predict a compatibility effect 
between the grip required by the mouse (small, large) and the grip elicited by the object. 
Furthermore, we predict an inverse compatibility effect between the target and the distractor. 
The degree of uncertainty of the reaching trajectory should be higher when the target and the 
distractor are compatible in size than when they are not, and when the mouse and the 
distractor are compatible in size than when they are not.  
 
 
6.2. Experiment 1 
 
6.2.1. Method 
6.2.1.1. Participants 
Twenty-four under graduated students from the University of Bologna (9 males; mean age = 
21.25 (2.88); all Italian monolingual and right-handed by self-report) participated for course 
credits. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were naive as to the 
purposes of the experiment.  
 
6.2.1.2. Materials  
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Participants performed a semantic categorization task. They were presented with color images 
of everyday objects. Sixteen pictures were used, 8 depicting natural objects and 8 depicting 
artifacts. Within each category, 4 objects afforded a power grip (e.g., 'courgette') and the other 
4 afforded a precision grip (e.g., 'nut'). Two pictures were presented in the upper corners of 
the screen, one depicting an artifact and one depicting a natural object (i.e., one target and one 
distractor). Pictures were preceded by the central presentation of the word 'ARTIFICIAL' or 
'NATURAL', which instructed the participants on which item they have to click with the 
mouse to respond correctly. Stimuli were combined in 64 pairs presented twice, once for the 
categorization of the 'ARTIFICIAL' target, once for the categorization of the 'NATURAL' 
target. Objects images were scaled to preserve the real size differences, and always presented 
in a 200x250 pixels box, color print on white background (see Fig. 1). 
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Figure 1. Sample stimuli used in the experiment 
 
6.2.1.3. Design and procedure  
Participants sat 60 cm from the computer screen, with their right hand placed over the mouse 
they found in front of them, already positioned to begin the experiment.  
Each trial began with the appearance of the 'START' button (displayed at the bottom-
centre of the screen) that remained on the screen until a single mouse-click was performed on 
it. The cue-word ('ARTIFICIAL' or 'NATURAL') was displayed after the mouse-click at the 
centre of the screen for 1500 ms (50% of the trials were preceded by the word 'ARTIFICIAL', 
the other half by the word 'NATURAL'). Then, the two experimental stimuli appeared on the 
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top-left and top-right corners of the screen and remained on the screen until a response was 
made by mouse-clicking one of them. Participants were instructed to decide which among the 
two stimuli matched the category indicated by the cue-word (see Fig. 2). They were asked to 
respond as quickly and accurately as possible. A feedback message was provided in case of 
incorrect response (a red 'X' at the centre of the screen). To avoid any repetition effect, pairs 
of stimuli were presented in random order.  
Stimuli were presented in two blocks where mouse dimension was also manipulated, 
so that in one block participants were asked to respond using a big mouse (length 11 cm x 
width 6 cm x height 3.5 cm) and in the other block they had to use a small mouse (length 7 
cm x width 3.5 cm x height 2.2 cm). Each block consisted of 128 experimental trials preceded 
by 4 training trials, so each participant responded overall to 8 training trials and 256 
experimental trials.  
In each experiment the following factors were manipulated: Response Device (big 
mouse/small mouse), Target Type (artifact/natural), Target Dimension (big/small), Distractor 
Dimension (big/small). 
MouseTracker software was used for stimulus presentation and data collection 
(Freeman & Ambady, 2010): an open-source software package, freely available at the web 
page http://www.dartmouth.edu/~freemanlab/mousetracker/dl.htm, which allowed us to 
record and analyze the continuous stream x-y coordinates of the hand movements performed 
by participants who decided among alternative responses. Thus, precise characterizations of 
both temporal and spatial dynamics of the mouse trajectories were available to be analyzed. 
Individual trajectories were first rescaled to a standard coordinate space and then 
normalized into 101 time steps, see also (Freeman & Ambady, 2010). Data were then 
exported in Microsoft Office Excel using the utilities included in the MouseTracker package, 
then trimmed in Excel, while all the ANOVAs were performed in StatSoft STATISTICA 6.0. 
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6.2.2. Results 
Accuracy, Initiation Time and Trajectory time  
We removed 0.98% of trials as errors. This very low rate reveals that the task was easy to 
perform. Total trajectories times exceeding 2 standard deviations from each participant's mean 
were excluded from the analysis, leading to the removal of additional 8.27% of the data. The 
total trimming was of the 9.25% of trials.  
The remaining data were entered into a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 within subjects ANOVA, with the 
factors Response Device (Big mouse vs. Small mouse), Target Type (Artifact vs. Natural), 
Target Dimension (Big vs. Small) and Distractor Dimension (Big vs. Small). Where possible, 
interaction effects were evaluated with Newman-Keuls post-hoc test (p <.05). 
The ANOVA on Initiation times showed significant main effects of Response Device 
and Target Type. The time to initiate the movement was longer when using the Big mouse 
than when using the Small mouse (422 ms and 290 ms, respectively; F(1, 23) = 58.19, MSe = 
29074.1, p <.001); and for categorizing Natural than Artifact items (364 ms and 348 ms, 
respectively; F(1, 23) = 9.13, MSe = 2664.66, p <.01). The three-way interaction between the 
factors Response Device, Target Type and Target Dimension (F(3, 92) = 4.135, MSe = 
1623.09, p =.06) almost reached significance, showing that different patterns for the two 
devices were modulated by the target category too (Mouse big / Artifact: Target big M = 431 
ms - Target small M = 432 ms, Natural: Target big M = 405 ms - Target small M = 421 ms; 
Mouse small / Artifact: Target big M = 290 ms, Target small M = 302 ms, Natural: Target big 
M = 287 ms - Target small M = 280 ms).  
No other main effects or interactions were significant.  
The different size of response devices implies also a difference in their weight and 
friction, which might be partly responsible for the observed effect on initiation time. Given 
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such side effect, no theoretical conclusion will be drawn on the effect of mouse dimension on 
temporal measures of the response. 
The analyses on total Trajectory times, which here are the overall Response Times, 
revealed as significant the main effect of Target Type (F(1, 23) = 15.39, MSe = 8805.26, p 
<.001) with faster response for Natural (M = 1312 ms) than Artifact (M = 1350 ms) items.  
No other main effects or interactions were significant. 
 
Trajectory spatial analysis 
The Area Under the Curve (AUC) is a measure of spatial attraction towards the opposite 
response alternative, i.e., the distractor item the influence of which has to be suppressed to 
give the correct response. Positive AUC mean values indicate that the mouse trajectory is 
above the idealized straight line between the START button and the target-object. Thus, the 
AUC values measure how much the hand movement is attracted toward the distractor item, 
indexing the indecision during the choice. 
The ANOVA on AUC demonstrated the main effects of the factors Response Device 
and Target Type. Two interactions were reliable as well, whereas another almost reached 
significance. 
The Response Device main effect showed that the Big mouse mean AUC (M = 0.33) 
was smaller than the Small mouse mean AUC (M = 0.42 ms), F(1, 23) = 7.73, MSe = 
0.10106, p <.05, probably due to the lightness of the small mouse (more subject to 
involuntary deviations). The factor Target Type, F(1, 23) = 12.03, MSe = 0.07857, p <.01, 
was significant because the Natural items AUC (M = 0.32) was smaller than the Artifacts 
AUC (M = 0.42).  
The expected interaction of Response Device and Target Dimension was significant, 
F(2, 46) = 11.06, MSe = 0.04411, p <.01, confirming our prediction about a compatibility 
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effect between the hand posture and the dimension of the target,. Indeed, when participants 
were using the Big mouse it was easier to go straight over a Big target-object (M = 0.29) than 
a Small one (M = 0.37) (Newman-Keuls p < .05), while the opposite was true when using the 
Small mouse, with greater AUC for Big target-object (M = 0.45) than for Small ones (M = 
0.38) (Newman-Keuls p <.05, see Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, Graph a). 
 
 
Figure 2. Experiment 1 - congruent (black line) vs. incongruent  
(grey line) trials mean trajectories 
 
The two-way interaction between Response Device and Distractor Dimension was 
significant as well, F(2, 46) = 8.73, MSe = 0.03408, p <.01. It showed that an effect reciprocal 
to the one described above for the target stimuli was present for the distractor items, as when 
participants were using the Big mouse trajectories drew a greater AUC for Big (M = 0.36) 
than for Small distractor (M = 0.29) (Newman-Keuls p <.05), while the opposite was true 
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when using the Small mouse (Big distractor M = 0.44, Small distractor M = 0.40) (Newman-
Keuls p =.07) (see Fig. 3, Graph b).  
Finally, the Target Type x Target Dimension interaction, F(2, 46) = 3.59, MSe = 
0.03071, p =.07, almost reached significance. It showed that when the target stimulus was an 
Artifact it was easier to go straight to a Small target (M = 0.41) than to a Big one (M = 0.44), 
while the opposite was true for Natural target stimuli (Big target M = 0.30, Small target M = 
0.34). 
No other main effects or interactions were significant. 
The Maximum Deviation (MD) is a further measure of spatial attraction to the opposite 
response alternative. It determinates which of the points in the trajectory is the most far from 
the idealized straight line between the START button and the target-object by measuring the 
perpendicular line from that point to the idealized straight line. As for the AUC, positive MD 
mean values indicate that the mouse trajectory is above the idealized straight trajectory, so the 
MD values index again how much the hand movement is attracted toward the distractor item. 
The ANOVA on MD demonstrated the main effects of the factors Response Device and 
Target Type. Three interactions were reliable as well. 
The factor Response Device was significant due to the Big mouse mean MD (M = 
0.18) being smaller than the Small mouse mean MD (M = 0.23 ms), F(1, 23) = 6.03, MSe = 
0.0318, p <.05 (probably for the lightness of the small mouse). The factor Target Type, F(1, 
23) = 14.48, MSe = 0.01748, p <.001, showed that the Natural items MD (M = 0.18) was 
smaller than the Artifacts MD (M = 0.23). 
The interaction of the factors Response Device and Target Dimension was significant 
in this measure too, F(2, 46) = 17.01, MSe = 0.01307, p <.001. This confirmed again our 
prediction of a facilitation effect in case of compatibility between hand posture and target-
object dimension. Indeed, when participants used the Big mouse it was easier to go straight 
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over a Big target-object (M = 0.16) than over a Small one (M = 0.21) (Newman-Keuls p < 
.01); the opposite was true when using the Small mouse, with greater AUC for Big target-
object (M = 0.25) than for Small ones (M = 0.21) (Newman-Keuls p <.05) (see Fig. 3, Graph 
c).  
The Target Type x Target Dimension interaction, F(2, 46) = 5.13, MSe = 0.00861, p 
<.05, also reached significance. When the target stimulus was an Artifact it was easier to go 
straight to a Small target (M = 0.22) than to a Big one (M = 0.24), and the opposite was true 
for Natural target stimuli (Big target M = 0.16, Small target M = 0.19) (Newman-Keuls p < 
.05).  
Finally, the interaction between Response Device and Distractor Dimension was 
significant as well, F(2, 46) = 10.56, MSe = 0.01004, p<.01, as when participants were using 
the Big mouse trajectories drew a greater MD for Big (M = 0.20) than for Small distractor (M 
= 0.17) (Newman-Keuls p < .05), while the opposite was true when using the Small mouse 
(Big distractor M = 0.21, Small distractor M = 0.24) (Newman-Keuls p < .05). Thus, it 
showed a compatibility effect for the distractor items too (see Fig. 3, Graph d).  
No other main effects or interactions were significant. 
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Figure 3. Experiment 1, all the results 
 
6.2.3. Discussion 
The continuous recording of mouse movements allowed us to study the influence of 
participants' hand postures and target object size. We found that response trajectories were 
affected by the power grip required by a big mouse and the precision grip required by the 
small mouse. The results confirmed our prediction of a compatibility effect between mouse 
dimension and stimuli. We found the predicted compatibility effect in both MD and AUC: the 
trajectories followed by participants were more direct, revealing less uncertainty in the 
decisional process, when the dimension of the mouse and the object size matched. In addition, 
we found a clear influence of the distractor size on the response. When the dimension of the 
mouse matched with that of the distractor, responses were more uncertain, as the interaction 
on MD indicated. Furthermore, the degree of uncertainty as revealed by AUC was higher 
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when the object and the distractor size matched than when they did not. Overall, these results 
reveal that participants were sensitive to the static hand posture they used, and that the 
compatibility effect was present even if the object size was neither relevant to the task, a 
semantic categorization, nor to the response provided, consisting in moving the mouse in a 
given direction. Crucially, to our knowledge this is the first evidence of compatibility effect 
between object size and static hand posture; importantly, the effect is obtained analyzing the 
trajectory of a reaching movement. 
Further results, less crucial for our main hypotheses, confirm and extend previous 
findings in the literature. They indeed complement studies showing that responses to artifacts 
are slower than to natural objects (Borghi et al., 2007; Vainio et al., 2008). This might appear 
counterintuitive, since artifacts are designed to be used, but as suggested in the literature it is 
probably due to the fact that they do not only activate manipulation but functional information 
as well, and also to the fact that these two kinds of information might collide (e.g., Jax and 
Buxbaum, 2010; see also chapter 5).  
The effects obtained raise the issue of whether and to what extent our effects depend 
on online computation (plausibly supported by the dorsal stream), or whether they depend on 
information stored in memory. To better investigate this issue we performed a second 
experiment in which we presented the names of the objects instead of the images; this allowed 
us to determine whether the effects were due to information stored in memory rather than on 
online computations.  
 
 
6.3. Experiment 2  
 
6.3.1. Method 
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6.3.1.2. Participants 
Twenty-four under graduated students from the University of Bologna (12 males; mean age = 
22.37 (3.19); all Italian monolingual and right-handed by self-report) participated for course 
credits. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were naive as to the 
purposes of the experiment.  
 
6.3.1.3. Materials, design and procedure  
Participants performed the same semantic categorization task of Experiment 1. In this case, 
they were presented with the names of the 16 objects of Experiment 1. Linguistic stimuli were 
presented in a 200x250 pixels box in ARIAL font upper case, black print on white 
background. Experimental procedure and task instructions were exactly the same as in 
Experiment 1. 
 
6.3.2. Results 
Accuracy, Initiation Time and Trajectory time  
2.44% of trials were removed as errors, a very low rate which again confirmed that the task 
was easy to perform. Total trajectories times exceeding 2 standard deviations from each 
participant's mean were excluded from the analysis, leading to the removal of additional 
8.99% of the data. The total trimming was of 11.43% of trials.  
As in Experiment 1, the remaining data were entered into a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 within 
subjects ANOVA, with the factors Response Device (Big mouse vs. Small mouse), Target 
Type (Artifact vs. Natural), Target Dimension (Big vs. Small) and Distractor Dimension (Big 
vs. Small). Where possible, interaction effects were evaluated with Newman-Keuls post-hoc 
test (p <.05).  
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The ANOVA on Initiation times showed the main effect of Response Device; two 
interactions were significant as well, while a third one almost reached significance. 
As in Experiment 1, the initiation times were longer with the Big than with the Small 
mouse (416 ms and 284 ms, respectively; F(1, 23) = 21.29, MSe = 78356.5, p <.001).  
The three-way interaction between the factors Response Device, Target Type and 
Distractor Dimension (F(3, 92) = 4.34, MSe = 3787.41, p <.05) was significant too (Mouse 
big / Artifact: Distractor big M = 416 ms - Distractor small M = 432 ms, Natural: Distractor 
big M = 413 ms - Distractor small M = 404 ms; Mouse small / Artifact: Distractor big M = 
291 ms, Distractor small M = 281 ms, Natural: Distractor big M = 274 ms - Distractor small 
M = 292 ms), even if no one of the differences between critical conditions were reliable in the 
post-hoc analysis. The three-way interaction between the factors Response Device, Target 
Dimension and Distractor Dimension (F(3, 92) = 4.34, MSe = 3787.41, p <.05) almost 
reached significance (Mouse big / Target big: Distractor big M = 421 ms - Distractor small M 
= 411 ms, Target small: Distractor big M = 408 ms - Distractor small M = 424 ms; Mouse 
small / Target big: Distractor big M = 283 ms, Distractor small M = 295 ms, Target small: 
Distractor big M = 281 ms - Distractor small M = 277 ms). 
A four-way interaction, the Response Device x Target Type x Target Dimension x 
Distractor Dimension (F(4, 184) = 6.93, MSe = 3619.86, p <.05) was significant as well 
(Mouse big / Artifact / Target big: Distractor big M = 433 ms - Distractor small M = 418 ms, 
Target small: Distractor big M = 399 ms - Distractor small M = 445 ms, Natural / Target big: 
Distractor big M = 409 ms - Distractor small M = 405 ms, Target small: Distractor big M = 
416 ms - Distractor small M = 403 ms; Mouse small / Artifact / Target big: Distractor big M = 
281 ms - Distractor small M = 294 ms, Target small: Distractor big M = 301 ms - Distractor 
small M = 267 ms, Natural / Target big: Distractor big M = 286 ms - Distractor small M = 297 
ms, Target small: Distractor big M = 262 ms - Distractor small M = 287 ms).  
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No other main effects or interactions were significant. 
The analyses on total Trajectory times revealed as significant only the main effect of 
Target Type (F(1, 23) = 11.58, MSe = 7252.6, p <.01), with shorter latencies for Natural (M = 
1403 ms) than Artifact (M = 1433 ms) items. No other main effects or interactions were 
significant. 
 
Trajectory spatial analysis 
The ANOVA on AUC demonstrated the main effects of the factors Response Device, Target 
Type and Distractor Dimension. Two interactions were reliable as well, whereas another 
almost reached significance. 
The Response Device main effect showed that, as in Experiment 1, the Big mouse 
mean AUC (M = 0.33) was smaller than the Small mouse mean AUC (M = 0.52 ms), F(1, 23) 
= 12.03, MSe = 0.29052, p <.01.The factor Target Type, F(1, 23) = 6.72, MSe = 0.05682, p 
<.05, confirmed also in the AUC results a advantage for Natural items (M = 0.40) over 
Artifacts (M = 0.45). The Distractor Dimension factor, F(1, 23) = 5.22, MSe = 0.05406, p 
<.05, showed a smaller AUC for the Small (M = 0.40) than for the Big distractor (M = 0.45). 
The interaction Target Dimension x Distractor Dimension was significant, F(2, 46) = 
4.57, MSe = 0.02833, p <.05, due to the fact that when the target-word referred to a Big object 
a greater deviation was observed for Distractor big (M = 0.48) than Small (M = 0.39) 
(Newman-Keuls p < .01), while no difference was observed for Small targets (Distractor big 
M = 0.42, Distractor Small M = 0.41) (Newman-Keuls ns) (see Fig. 4, Graph a).  
The three-way interaction between Response Device, Target Type x Target Dimension 
was significant as well, F(3, 92) = 4.87, MSe = 0.06818, p <.05 (Mouse big / Artifact: Target 
big M = 0.37 - Target small M = 0.34, Natural: Target big M = 0.29 - Target small M = 0.33; 
Mouse small / Artifact: Target big M = 0.53-Target small M = 0.59, Natural: Target big M = 
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0.54 - Target small M = 0.43). It showed that for word presentation a subtle compatibility 
effect was modulated by the target stimulus category; the difference concerned especially the 
small target when using the small mouse, with the natural items showing significantly lower 
AUC mean values than the artifacts (Newman-Keuls p < .05) (see Fig. 4, Graph b).  
The ANOVA on MD demonstrated the main effects of the factors Response Device, 
Target Type and Distractor Dimension. Two interactions were reliable as well. 
The Response Device main effect was due to the Big mouse mean MD (M = 0.19) 
being smaller than the Small mouse mean MD (M = 0.28 ms), F(1, 23) = 11.65, MSe = 
0.07837, p <.01.The factor Target Type, F(1, 23) = 8.99, MSe = 0.01232, p <.01, confirmed 
again the significant advantage for Natural items (M = 0.24) over Artifacts (M = 0.21). The 
Distractor Dimension main effect, F(1, 23) = 6.93, MSe = 0.01095, p <.05, showed a smaller 
AUC for the Small (M = 0.21) than for the Big distractor (M = 0.24). 
The interaction of the factors Target Dimension and Distractor Dimension was 
significant, F(2, 46) = 5.10, MSe = 0.00633, p <.05, because when the target-word referred to 
a Big object a greater MD was observed for Distractor big (M = 0.25) than Small (M = 0.21) 
(Newman-Keuls p < .05), while no difference was observed for Small targets (Distractor big 
M = 0.23, Distractor Small M = 0.22) (Newman-Keuls ns) (see Fig. 4, Graph c).  
Finally, the three-way interaction between Response Device, Target Type and Target 
Dimension was significant too, F(3, 92) = 5.45, MSe = 0.02005, p <.05 (Mouse big / Artifact: 
Target big M = 0.21 - Target small M = 0.18, Natural: Target big M = 0.15 - Target small M = 
0.18; Mouse small / Artifact: Target big M = 0.28-Target small M = 0.31, Natural: Target big 
M = 0.28 - Target small M = 0.24) (see Fig. 4, Graph d).  
No other main effects or interactions were significant.  
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Figure 4. Experiment 2, all the results 
 
So, in Experiment 2 the interaction of the factors Response Device and Target 
Dimension was not significant in the two considered measures, implying a difference for 
visual and linguistic stimuli, which will be discussed further. 
 
6.3.3. Discussion  
In Experiment 2, results with words are quite different from those obtained with objects. The 
continuous recording of participants’ mouse movements did not show the predicted 
compatibility between the hand posture and the implied dimension of the target stimulus. 
Thus we failed to replicate with the present paradigm and the present measures the results 
obtained by Tucker & Ellis (2004), who found a compatibility effect in RTs not only with 
objects but also with words. However, the absence of the interaction between the factors 
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Response Device and Target Dimension in the AUC analysis may not tell the whole story, as 
indicated by the interaction of Response Device, Target Type and Target Dimension. The 
interaction between object size and distractor size in MD and AUC, due to higher response 
uncertainty when the big target was matched with the big than with the small distractor, 
reveals that participants are sensitive to the size of object the words refer to. Note that more 
interesting for our analysis would be a putative interaction between category, mouse and 
target, in particular the presence of a compatibility effect between the mouse and the target, 
even if confined to natural objects; but this interaction did not reach significance. Finally, the 
main effects of the object kind both in MD and AUC, due to the higher uncertainty with 
artifacts compared to natural objects, strictly matches the results of Experiment 1.  
At first sight, the absence of the predicted compatibility effect might seem problematic 
for an embodied account of language processing, according to which words are grounded in 
perception, action and emotional systems, see (Barsalou, 2008; Fischer & Zwaan, 2008; Jirak 
et al., 2010; Meteyard et al., 2012). However, even if we did not find the same results with 
words and images, we found evidence of the activation of motor information with words as 
well. The presence of the effect of size suggests that words indeed elicit modal information as 
part of an embodied re-enactment or simulation of the associated sensorimotor experience 
(Barsalou, 2008; Pezzulo et al., 2011; Pezzulo, Barsalou et al., 2013; Pezzulo, Candidi et al., 
2013). Still, the putative simulation is not so fine-grained as the one formed during object 
processing and so effect of object size seems to dominate over the compatibility one.  
Our results can be read in terms of recent proposals emerging in literature on 
embodied cognition. Theories of reuse and motor exploitation suggest indeed that language 
recruits and reuses structures and mechanisms characterizing the motor system (Anderson, 
2010; Pezzulo & Castelfranchi, 2009; Gallese, 2008). However, this is not the end of the 
story, since language also modifies these structures and mechanisms and builds on them 
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(Borghi, 2012; Gallese, 2008). For example, it has been shown that language recruits only 
some kinds of affordances, as those linked to stable characteristics of objects, as for example 
object size and not object orientation (Borghi, 2012; Borghi & Riggio, 2009; Ferri et al., 
2012; Myalkykov et al., 2013). Our results interestingly indicate that, while the compatibility 
between the executed grip and the observed visual object occurs online, motor information on 
object size is processed offline and influences language comprehension.  
 
 
6.4. General discussion 
We report that static hand postures facilitate compatible responses with objects requiring 
either a precision or a power grip. Specifically, we demonstrated this investigating the effects 
of compatible or conflicting information as they were reflected in the trajectories of overt 
hand movements: participants were instructed to use a mouse to reach for objects or for words 
referring to objects on the computer screen. To our knowledge the present is the first work 
that provides evidence of this kind, obtained with kinematics measures.  
This evidence clearly favors an embodied account of cognition, according to which 
observing objects activates the motor system. While object observation leads to the activation 
of fine-grained motor information aimed at preparing a specific kind of grip, the story is 
different for words. With words we found indeed evidence of activation of motor information, 
as the effect of size suggests, but we failed to replicate the compatibility effect previously 
found by Tucker & Ellis (2004) with a different paradigm. As argued in the discussion of 
Experiment 2, this can be interpreted in the framework of embodied theories of reuse, 
according to which language recruits some characteristics of the motor system, modifying and 
building on them.  
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The comparison of the results obtained with objects and words suggests that the 
compatibility effects found with objects occur online, thus are likely due to the activation of 
the dorsal route rather than of the ventral stream (Milner & Goodale, 1995). Further research 
should explore whether the effects would be similar with words and with not scaled images, 
i.e., with images that do not allow computing online the object size. Notice indeed that the 
images we used in Experiment 1 were scaled, i.e., they maintained some resemblance to the 
original size, even if larger objects were more reduced in dimension compared to small ones, 
to fit them within the square.  
Less crucial to our main hypothesis but still important for an embodied cognition view 
is the advantage of artifacts over natural objects. This advantage, which is likely due to the 
activation (with artifacts) of both manipulation and functional information, is present with 
both objects and words, thus it is probably not merely due to the dorsal route activation.  
Overall our study shows that static hand posture influences the on-line dynamics of a 
decision even if it is irrelevant to the performance of the task. Unexpectedly for opponents to 
an embodied cognition view, the way the mouse is held seems to have a number of effects on 
human thought processes. 
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7. Simulating concrete and abstract words acquisition 
 
The Words As social Tools theory (WAT, Borghi & Cimatti, 2009, 2010), described in par. 
3.5 while discussing the embodied accounts of abstract language grounding, formulates 
precise predictions about the grounding of both concrete and abstract concepts/words. 
According to WAT, abstract words meaning is more strongly related to the experience of 
being exposed to socio-linguistic situations than concrete words meaning, which rely more on 
sensory-motor experiences. Thus, the difference between abstract and concrete words is 
directly related by this theory to their different modalities of acquisition (MoA). This study 
tested in four experiments if different acquisition modalities effectively lead to the emergence 
of the differences typically found between concrete and abstract words in the literature. In 
order to mimic the acquisition of concrete and abstract concepts, participants either 
manipulated novel objects or observed groups of objects interacting in novel ways on a screen 
(Training 1). In a following recalling task (Test 1) participants decided whether two elements 
belonged to the same category or not. Then, each item were presented with a category label 
(Training 2), with labels being or not accompanied by an explanation of the meaning of the 
category. In a subsequent category-label verification task, participants were presented with the 
previously seen exemplars along with novel elements and one of the learned label, being 
required to decide which of the items corresponded to the label (Test 2). The results showed 
that, across the experiments, it was more difficult to form abstract than concrete categories 
(Test 1), even if the labels were added (Test 2). A third task (Test 3) differed across the 
experiments: in Experiment 1 participants performed a feature production task, the results of 
which showed that the properties produced with the novel categories matched the patterns 
evoked by real existing concrete and abstract words. In Experiment 2, 3 and 4, the third task 
(Test 3) consisted of a color verification task with manual and vocal responses (i.e., 
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keyboard/microphone), with the main difference between the experiments being the fact that 
the color could be or not predictive of the categories. The results showed an advantage for 
vocal over manual responses for abstract words, especially if they were previously learned 
with the explanation. Interestingly, this advantage disappeared in the case in which linguistic 
information contrasted with perceptual one. On the whole, these results support WAT 
predictions: due to their different MoA, concrete words evoked more manual information, 
while abstract words more verbal information.  
 
 
7.1. Introduction  
This study on novel categories has its focus on what differs in the acquisition of concrete and 
abstract words. One standard way of differentiating between concrete and abstract words is to 
refer to their perceivability. Concrete words refer to entities that can be perceived through the 
senses. Abstract words refer to entities more detached from physical experience (Barsalou et 
al., 2003; Paivio et al., 1986; Crystal, 1995). However, the distinction between concrete and 
abstract words cannot be conceived of as a dichotomy (Wiemer-Hastings et al., 2001). For 
example, words referring to social roles (e.g., “physician”) might be more abstract than words 
referring to single objects (e.g., “bottle”), but less abstract than purely definitional words (e.g., 
“odd number”) (Keil, 1989). In addition, words referring to emotions probably require special 
classification (Altarriba et al., 1999). Further, basic and subordinate words, such as “cat” and 
“siamese cat”, referring to single entities, can be seen as more concrete than superordinate 
words, such as “animal”, that refer to sets of entities that differ in shape and other perceptual 
characteristics (e.g., Borghi et al., 2005). To summarize, the distinction between concrete and 
abstract words is not clear-cut, and should be rather intended as a continuum. However, we 
believe that this distinction captures some aspects of word meaning, and that it is important to 
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understand how the process of abstraction occurs, from single instances to categories at 
different levels of abstraction. In particular, explaining the ways in which abstract words are 
represented constitutes a major challenge for embodied and grounded views of cognition, as 
well as for embodied computational models and robotics. The problem abstract words pose 
for embodied and grounded theories is clearly synthesized by Barsalou (2008, p. 634) as 
follows: “Abstract concepts pose a classic challenge for grounded cognition. How can 
theories that focus on modal simulations explain concepts that do not appear modal?”. We 
will first clarify why explaining abstract concepts is a crucial challenge for embodied 
cognition, and later clarify its importance for research in robotics.  
According to the standard propositional view (e.g., Fodor, 1998), the representation of 
both concrete and abstract concepts is abstract, symbolic and amodal. In contrast, according to 
standard embodied accounts (e.g., Barsalou, 1999) both concrete and abstract concepts are 
grounded in the sensory-motor system, and therefore are modal (see chapter 1). Notice that 
both standard propositional and embodied accounts evoke a single kind of representation, 
either amodal or modal, for both concrete and abstract concepts (see par. 3.5).  
In contrast, recent views propose that multiple representational systems are activated 
during conceptual processing (for a non embodied version of this view see Dove, 2009). 
According to these views both sensory-motor and linguistic information play a role in 
conceptual representation. This idea is not entirely novel. The seminal dual coding theory by 
Paivio et al. (1986) applies two different kinds of representations, a linguistic and a sensory-
motor code, to explain how concrete and abstract words are represented and recalled. 
Concrete words are recalled more easily because they activate both sensory-motor and 
linguistic information; differently abstract words are not “grounded”, they only evoke 
linguistic information. Recent support to Paivio’s theory comes from studies on brain imaging 
showing that abstract word processing is strongly lateralized towards the left hemisphere, 
202 
 
while activation during processing concrete words is bilateral (for a review, see Sabsevitz et 
al., 2005). However, this might be due to the fact that the majority of the studies employ 
single words and tasks requiring a superficial level of processing. Recent studies requiring 
deeper processing, such as sentence sensibility evaluation tasks, do not provide evidence in 
favor of a pronounced laterality (e.g., Desai et al., 2010). The major difference between 
Paivio’s view and embodied accounts is based on the concept of multiple representation; to 
elaborate, Paivio argues that abstract words are not “grounded” in perception and action 
systems, whereas according to the embodied perspective both concrete and abstract words 
activate both linguistic and perception-action information, even if these two kinds of 
information are differently distributed.  
The Language And Situated Simulation (LASS) theory is probably the most well-
known of the multiple representation theories (Barsalou et al., 2008). In this view both the 
linguistic and the sensory-motor system are activated during word processing. The 
understanding of word meanings always implies activation of the sensory-motor system 
(simulation), but for tasks which do not require deep processing the linguistic system might 
suffice. While presenting the LASS theory, Barsalou et al. (2008) suggest that for abstract 
concepts, linguistic information might be more relevant than for concrete concepts, but they 
do not advance clear predictions pertaining the differences in processing between concrete 
and abstract concepts, independently from the task. Thus, they argue that “different mixtures 
of the language and simulation systems support the processing of abstract concepts under 
different task conditions” (Barsalou et al., 2008, pp. 267).  
More precise predictions concerning the difference between concrete and abstract 
words are advanced by the Words As social Tools (WAT) proposal (Borghi & Cimatti, 2009; 
2010), which assumes the existence of multiple representations and also idea, initially 
proposed by Wittgenstein (1953) and Austin (1962), that words are tools (see also Clark, 
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1998). Similarly to real tools, words can be considered as instruments to act in the social 
world, thus as social tools. The difference between concrete and abstract words is explained 
by WAT referring to the fact that, due to a different acquisition process, the role played by 
actions performed through words – by linguistic information – is more relevant for abstract 
than for concrete words. The present work aims to directly test the WAT proposal using novel 
categories and novel linguistic labels. According to WAT, perception and action are crucial in 
the acquisition of concrete words. Instead to acquire the meaning of an abstract word people 
also rely on verbal explanations (for example, explaining the meaning of “democracy” to a 
children requires many more other words than for explaining the meaning of “bread”). In this 
respect, the role played by words as social tools is more important for abstract than for 
concrete words. Evidence relevant to this issue was obtained by Wauters et al. (2003), who 
studied different Modalities of Acquisition (MoA) of words. They did not however, speak 
directly about concrete and abstract words. According to the authors, the meaning of a word 
like “ball” is acquired through perception, because every time the child hears the word, he/she 
sees a real ball, or a picture of it. The meaning of a word like “grammar”, instead, has to be 
explained linguistically. Finally, the meaning of a word like “tundra” can be acquired in both 
ways, depending on the environment where it is learned. WAT predicts that this difference in 
the acquisition process can explain why, for concrete and abstract words both perception-
action and linguistic information are activated. Linguistic and social information however, 
plays a more important role for abstract than for concrete words (e.g., Crutch & Warrington, 
2005; Sabsevitz et al., 2005).  
From a different perspective, an embodied and grounded account of the difference 
between concrete and abstract words is crucial in the process of developing intelligent 
machines capable of autonomously creating categories and using language. In computational 
cognitive science, robotics offers new opportunities for the design of artificial agents in which 
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language is grounded on their ability to manipulate and experience the external world by 
means of physical interactions. The symbol grounding problem (Harnad, 1990) highlights the 
fact that, in traditional computational models, symbols are self-referential entities that require 
the interpretation of an external experimenter to identify the referential meaning of the lexical 
items. This issue has been widely discussed in the realm of cognitive science, and robotics 
offers a completely different way to solve the grounding problem. Indeed, in the last 20 years 
many different models were created with the explicit aim of grounding symbols and language 
in perception (e.g., Steels, 2003) and, more recently, in action (Marocco et al., 2010; Sugita & 
Tani, 2005). Although the embodied approach to language in robotics is gaining increased 
interest, both in terms of cognitive modeling and applications, the current trend is strongly 
focused on systems capable of autonomously acquiring concrete concepts and words, that can 
be grounded on perception and action processes of the robot. Existing models do not focus on 
the acquisition of abstract words, except for highlighting that such abstract concepts and 
words permeate the entire domain of human language experience and cannot be neglected. 
Nevertheless, an extension of the actual grounding approach in robotics to abstract words is 
not automatic. In this regard, we believe that the WAT proposal offers an interesting way to 
incorporate abstract words in future cognitive robotic models without compromising the 
grounding and the embodied approach, which should be the milestone of the future robotics. 
On the other hand, a robotic model could be useful to complement traditional psychological 
experiments, and provide further evidence on the feasibility of a novel theory, such as the 
WAT proposal presented. 
In this research we used novel categories to mimic the different ways in which 
concrete and abstract word meanings are acquired and then represented. Reported 
experiments are designed in a way that allows for replication with a computational model. 
Similar stimuli and training processes can be used to create a cognitive based controller for a 
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humanoid robot (Tikhanoff et al., 2008) that will be able to perform an identical 
categorization task. We defined concrete concepts as having a concrete, manipulable object as 
a referent. Abstract concepts, on the other hand, do not have a single, manipulable object as 
referent; instead they refer to rather complex relations between entities. We acknowledge that 
the distinction we made for operational simplicity is not exhaustive and that it covers only a 
subset of items. For example, it leaves out word meanings referring to perceivable but not 
manipulable objects or entities, such as “cloud”, “mountain”, and “moon”. Even if the 
referents of these words cannot be manipulated, we would consider them as concrete, as their 
referents are clearly perceivable, can be scanned (acted upon) with the eyes, and are easy to 
imagine. We decided to address the distinction between concrete and abstract words starting 
from the extremes of the continuum: for this reason we decided to focus on concrete, 
manipulable objects. As for abstract word meanings, here we did not refer to purely 
definitional abstract word meanings, simply based on verbal explanations (as it might be the 
case for a word like “philosophy”) but to word meanings that evoke complex relationships 
between entities. Due to their complexity, we predicted that applying a linguistic label and 
explaining their meaning would be crucial in order to form categories. Consider that the 
referents of our abstract categories were interacting moving objects – thus they were 
perceivable, similarly to the referents of concrete categories. As a matter of fact, in our view 
the formation of abstract categories always starts with some form of perception, be it visual, 
acoustic, tactile or otherwise.  
Due to the difficulties involved in reproducing the acquisition of different kinds – 
concrete vs. abstract – of novel concepts/words in an artificial setting (i.e., laboratory), we 
operationalized the acquisition process considering two phases – the experience and the word 
acquisition – as follows: 
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a - Novel concepts acquisition: Training 1 (Experience) was designed to mimicking 
the acquisition of concrete and abstract concepts. The idea underlying these two different 
acquisition processes is that, where typically concrete concepts refer to category members 
which are perceptually similar or elicit similar actions, abstract concepts refer to entities that 
show complex interactions, or do not share an evident perceptual similarity (i.e., common 
features are not perceptually salient). We showed participants 3D figures of novel objects vs. 
3D figures of objects interacting in novel ways. Then participants were tested (TEST 1: 
Categorical Recognition). 
b - Novel labels acquisition: During Training 2 (Words Acquisition) participants were 
taught the category name; in some conditions a verbal explanation of the category meaning 
was added. Then participants were tested (TEST 2: Words-Objects Match). We predicted that 
in both tests participants would produce less errors with concrete than with abstract 
categories, as the first can be formed more easily on perceptual and motor basis. This 
difference should be reduced when a category label and a linguistic explanation of what the 
category members had in common was given. The manipulation of TEST 3 in the different 
experiments allowed us to check for the effectiveness of our operationalization of acquisition 
processes (Experiment 1), as well as to test if the verbal labeling, possibly strengthened by a 
verbal explanation, reinforces learning of both concrete and abstract categories in different 
ways (Experiment 2, 3 and 4). 
c - Real words evidence match: TEST 3 of Experiment 1 consisted of a feature 
production task. We predicted that the pattern of produced properties would match that 
typically obtained in feature generation tasks with concrete and abstract words. 
d - Linguistic vs. manual Information: In Experiments 2, 3, and 4, TEST 3 consisted of 
a property verification task. We chose to ask participants to respond to the items color 
because color was not relevant to the motor response. In one condition participants were 
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required to provide a manual response (i.e. to press a key on the keyboard), and in another a 
verbal response (i.e. to respond “yes” with the microphone; see Scorolli & Borghi, 2007). We 
predicted facilitation for manual responses with concrete words and for mouth responses with 
abstract words. This would demonstrate that language is part of the representation of abstract 
words meanings.  
 
 
7.2. Experiment 1 
This experiment was designed to mimic the acquisition of concrete and abstract categories 
and to verify whether the novel categories we used reproduced the acquisition process that 
occurs with real world categories. As anticipated, in Experiment 1 TEST 3 consisted of a 
property production task. Before starting the experiment, participants were randomly assigned 
to two groups. One group was first shown the category and then tested on concrete items; 
later participants were shown and then tested on abstract items; the other group first learned 
and then was tested on the two kinds of items in reverse order. Across the experiment the 
order of presentation of the two blocks (concrete block; abstract block) was counterbalanced. 
The same methodological choice was applied to all the other three experiments. 
 
7.2.1. Method 
7.2.1.1. Participants  
16 students of the University of Bologna took part in the study (3 men; mean age = 20.31 
years; s.d. = 1.62). All were native Italian speakers, both right- and left-handed (2 left-
handed) and all had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The study was approved by the 
local ethics committee. 
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7.2.1.2. Materials 
7.2.1.3. 3D figures of novel objects and related new labels 
We invented four novel words (calona, fusapo, norolo, tocesa) all having the same number of 
syllables and letters. We avoided using new words with ambiguous accents. Two of the four 
words ended with the vocal “a”, which in Italian characterizes the female gender; the 
remaining two words ended with the vocal “o”, which in Italian characterizes the male 
gender. The new words corresponded to four new categories of objects, composed of twelve 
exemplars each (4 x 12). The criteria we followed to construct the “original” three new 
objects were the following: 
1. CALONA was a 3D concave figure (“C” shaped). The colors we used were sky-
blue and light-grey; 
2. FUSAPO was a 3D figures with five protuberances (“*”shaped). The colors we 
used were blue and yellow (Fig. 1);  
3. NOROLO was a 3D figure with small convex nooks (“N” shaped). The colors we 
used were red and grey;  
4. TOCESA was a 3D figure shaped as wavy slash, without internal convexities or 
concavities (“I” shaped). The colors we used were violet and beige. 
The other nine exemplars for each category were both built by inverting the surface 
and depth colors (3 x 2), and by rotating the original figures by 180 degrees (6 x 2). Finally, 
we built 40 3D figures that were used as fillers: they did not belong to a category and were 
not assigned a name. 
 
7.2.1.4. 3D figures of novel relations and related new labels 
We invented four new words (cofiro, latofo, panifa, rodela) by following the same criteria as 
described for the linguistic labels used for the 3D figures of novel objects. These new words 
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referred to new categories of relations between two 3D figures; each of these categories was 
composed by twelve exemplars (4 x 12). We followed the following criteria to construct the 
“original” three new relations (that is, novel groups of 3D interacting objects):  
a. COFIRO: two 3D moving figures. After the contact just one 3D figure remained, 
and it moved in a straight line or in a curved line;  
b. LATOFO: one 3D static figure and two 3D moving figures. After the contact two 
3D figures appeared at the opposite diagonal sides of the computer screen (e.g., one at the top 
right of the screen and the other at the bottom left of the screen), and they moved converging 
towards the central point of the screen;  
c. PANIFA: two 3D moving figures. After the contact one of them moved in a straight 
line; the other one executed a turning movement with a different velocity (Fig. 2);  
d. RODELA: one 3D static figure and two 3D moving figures. After the contact the 
two 3D figures moved in a same (straight) line and with the same velocity, but in an opposite 
direction, as if the figures were pushed away from each other. 
All the 3D figures were sky-blue cylinders; they were arranged horizontally, one came 
from one part of the screen and the other from the other side. For LATOFO and RODELA we 
added a 3D static figure to the two interacting ones. This aimed to reproduce real life abstract 
word acquisition: some abstract words can evoke both relations between entities and static 
visual images (e.g., “freedom” can evoke a bird flying in the sky as well as an image of the 
Statue of Liberty). In other words, it can happen that objects which would be first categorized 
as exemplars of a concrete category (e.g. a statue) can be re-categorized and evoked by 
abstract words. 
The other nine exemplars for each category were built by using parallelepipeds (3 x 2) 
instead of cylinders; the movement of the 3D figures followed a vertical instead of a 
horizontal direction (6 x 2). Finally, we built 40 3D figures to use as fillers, and we 
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constructed 40 relations between 3D figures to use as fillers. They did not belong to a 
category and were not assigned a name. The duration of each relation was the same for both 
the categories’ exemplars and the fillers (4 seconds). 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of entity pertaining to a concrete category (FUSAPO). 
 
 
A. Initial phase  B. Intermediate phase  C. Final phase 
Figure 2. Example of relation pertaining to an abstract category (PANIFA). 
 
7.2.1.5. Procedure 
Across all experiments, participants were trained and tested individually in a quiet laboratory 
room. They sat on a comfortable chair in front of a computer screen. All participants were 
submitted to 2 training phases (Experience; Word Acquisition) and to 3 different tests 
(Categorical Recognition; Word-Object Match; Production).  
 
7.2.1.6. Training 1: Experience 
Training 1 aimed to reproduce the different processes underlying the acquisition of concrete 
and abstract concepts. Whereas typically concrete words refer to category members which are 
perceptually similar or elicit similar actions, abstract words refer to entities that show 
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complex interactions or do not share an evident perceptual similarity (i.e. common features 
are not perceptually salient). For example, the word “truth” binds experiences and situations 
that might be rather complex and different. During this training session participants were 
sitting in front of the computer screen. They were exposed to 20 trials. In each trial either 
three 3D figures (in the concrete concept acquisition condition) or three relations between 3D 
figures (in the abstract concept acquisition condition), were shown. Both the 3D figures and 
the relations were novel, i.e. participants had never experienced them before. In order to 
mimic the acquisition of concrete concepts (e.g., BOTTLE), participants were presented with 
3D figures of novel objects as previously described. They were instructed to verify whether 
the objects could be inserted inside a doughnut shaped 3D figure. The experimenter invited 
them to manipulate the objects with the mouse for 12 seconds each. In order to simulate the 
acquisition of abstract concepts (e.g., TRUTH), participants were instructed to observe the 
groups of dynamic objects until the end of their interaction (12 seconds). The 3D figures 
interacted in ways that revealed the existence of a common structure. For example, two 
objects moved toward each other, then only one of them remained on the screen, moving in a 
straight line (COFIRO). 
 
7.2.1.7. TEST 1: Categorical Recognition 
Training 1 was followed by a categorical recognition task (TEST 1). Participants were 
instructed to look at a fixation cross that remained on the screen for 500 ms. Then they were 
shown two exemplars of the same or different categories, and were asked to judge whether the 
stimuli belonged to the same category or not by pressing two different keys (left, right). The 
key-response mapping was counterbalanced. They were shown 24 randomly ordered trials, 
with different combinations of the exemplars or of the exemplars and fillers, that is:  
1) two exemplars of the same category; 
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2) two exemplars belonging to two different categories; 
3) one exemplar of a category and one filler, that did not belong to any learned 
category. 
Concrete concepts’ exemplars remained on the screen for 2 seconds, while abstract 
concepts’ exemplars were displayed for 10 sec. The 24 experimental trials were preceded by 2 
training trials. 
The Categorical Recognition task aimed to verify whether the training phase allowed 
participants to form a category on a purely sensory-motor basis, and to contrast it with a 
different category. We collected and analyzed errors, as this is the more reliable and 
informative measure for this particular task. We predicted that participants would produce 
less errors with concrete than with abstract categories, as the first can be formed more easily 
without the aid of language. 
 
7.2.1.8. Training 2: Words Acquisition 
After TEST 1, participants were trained to associate a linguistic label to each learned 
exemplar. Five exemplars from each category were randomly selected and they were 
presented once to participants together with the appropriate linguistic label. In order to mimic 
the acquisition of concrete words participants were shown 20 3D figures together with the 
related linguistic labels (“calona”, “fusapo”, “norolo”, “tocesa”), presented in random order. 
Each trial lasted 2 seconds. Symmetrically, in order to simulate the acquisition of abstract 
words, participants observed the 20 relations together with the related linguistic labels 
(“cofiro”, “latofo”, “panifa”, “rodela”), presented in random order. Each trial lasted 4 
seconds. Participants were instructed to learn the linguistic labels associated with the 3D 
figures and with the relations. 
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7.2.1.9. TEST 2: Words-Objects Match 
After the Training 2 participants had to perform a Words-Objects Match task. They were 
presented with 24 trials. One of the learned names and 2 figures/relations were displayed on 
the computer screen: the target object, corresponding to the label, and another nearby, which 
in half of the trials was novel and in the remaining 12 trials was an exemplar already 
associated with a different label. One of the two figures/relations was located on the left of the 
screen, the other on the right; the figure location was counterbalanced. Participants were 
required to decide by pressing a different key (left, right) on the keyboard which of the two 
was named with the shown label. This second test aimed to verify whether participants had 
associated a label with a category, and whether they were able to generalize it to a different 
category. We predicted that participants would produce fewer errors with concrete than with 
abstract categories, as the first rely more than the second on perception and action. However, 
the difference between concrete and abstract categories should be reduced compared to TEST 
1, given that participants could now rely on linguistic labels as well.  
 
7.2.1.10. TEST 3: Production task 
After TEST 2, TEST 3 consisted of a feature production task with novel category names. The 
experimenter told participants each category name (in 4 random orders) asking them to 
produce the first properties that came to their mind. They were prompted to produce 
properties until they stopped for about 15 seconds. Properties produced were transcribed; both 
their frequency and production order was recorded. We predicted that the pattern of produced 
properties would match that typically obtained in production tasks with concrete and abstract 
words. Behavioral studies with production tasks, such as word association and property 
generation tasks, have shown that, whereas concrete words activate mainly perceptual and 
thematic relations, abstract words typically elicit more taxonomic relations (Borghi & 
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Caramelli, 2001); in addition, they elicit more situations and introspective relations compared 
with concrete words (Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005). 
 
7.2.2. Results 
7.2.2.1. TEST 1: Categorical Recognition 
We performed a one-way ANOVA on errors produced in the categorical recognition task, in 
which the factor Concept (Concrete vs. Abstract) was manipulated within participants. As 
predicted, Abstract Concepts (M = 5.21%) elicited more errors than Concrete Ones (M = 
2.34%), F (1, 15) = 12.70, MSe = 5.17, p <.01 (see Tab. 1). 
 
7.2.2.2. TEST 2: Words-Objects Match 
An ANOVA was performed on the errors produced. Consider that on the screen two objects 
were presented, the target one and another object. Therefore in the ANOVA two factors were 
entered, both manipulated within participants: the factor Word (Concrete vs. Abstract) and the 
factor Other Exemplar (Novel vs. Learned). Both factors reached significance; Abstract 
Words (M = 5.01% ) elicited more errors than Concrete Ones (M = 1.37%), F (1, 15) = 11.96, 
MSe = 17.79, p <.01, and more errors were produced when the target exemplar was presented 
with a Learned (M = 4.17%) than with a Novel Other Exemplar (M = 2.21%), F (1, 15) = 
15.70, MSe = 3.89, p <.01 (see Tab. 1). 
 
7.2.2.3. TEST 3: Production task 
Different analyses were performed on the production task. The number of produced properties 
did not differ significantly between Concrete (M = 4.18) and Abstract Words (M = 3.73); p = 
.29. The properties produced with each word were put together, organized in 2 different 
random orders, and an independent group of 12 participants were asked to rate the produced 
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properties on a 7 point scale. They were asked to select 1 if they believed that the property 
was typical of words having “concrete” referents, such as bottles, screwdriver, building, 
cellular, and cat, and 7 if they thought the property was typical of words having “abstract” 
referents, such as happiness, philosophy, risk, fantasy, democracy. The raters did not know 
which situation the properties had been produced in. We performed an ANOVA on the ratings 
of the properties produced with concrete and abstract words. As predicted, we found that 
abstract words elicited significantly higher scores than concrete words (M =3.93; M = 3.13), 
F (1, 11) = 27.51, MSe = 0.14, p <. 001. In addition, the scaled ratings were applied to the 
individual protocols in order to verify whether the properties produced and the production 
order of the properties for each word reflected the properties typically produced for concrete 
or for abstract words (the same method was used by Borghi, 2004; Wu & Barsalou, 2009). 
The average rating of each property was multiplied by the frequency of the produced property 
for each of the participants. A one-way ANOVA was performed on the obtained means, with 
participants as the random factor. The only factor manipulated was significant, F (1, 11) = 
27.51, MSe = 0.14, p <. 001, as the means obtained with Abstract Words (M = 4.14) were 
higher than those produced with Concrete Words (M = 3.04), indicating that the novel 
Abstract Words we created elicited properties typical of real-life abstract words (e.g., 
“singularity”; “variation”; “linear motion”); this was symmetrically true for the novel 
Concrete Words which elicited a higher number of properties such as “hole in the middle”, 
“stick-shaped”, “crab-shaped”. In addition, the average rating on each property was multiplied 
by the position of the property produced for each participant according to the formula (n+1-p) 
/ (n-1)*r, where n is the total number of properties produced by each participant for each 
word, p the position in which each property was produced and r the average rating on that 
particular property (for a similar procedure, see Wu & Barsalou, 2009). This normalized p is 
the position in which each property was produced, in relation to n, the total number of 
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properties produced by each participant. One ANOVA was performed on the obtained means, 
with participants as random factor; the factor manipulated was the kind of Word (Abstract vs. 
Concrete Words). The ANOVA again revealed lower means for Concrete (M = 3.11) than for 
Abstract Words (M = 4.48), F (1, 15) = 55.38, MSe = 0.27, p < .001. This indicates that with 
our novel Concrete Words properties typically elicited by real concrete words were elicited 
earlier, and the same was symmetrically true for our novel Abstract Words (see Tab. 1). 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 
Categorical Recognition 
Concept Concrete  Abstract 
 2.34 (2.62)  5.21 (2.95) 
 
Words-Objects Match 
Word Concrete  Abstract 
 1.37 (1.64)  5.01 (4.90) 
Other Exemplar Novel Exemplar   Learnt Exemplar 
 2.21 (3.66)  4.17 (4.27) 
 
Production 
Scaled ratings (1 concrete referent → 7 abstract r.) applied to the individual protocols 
Word Concrete  Abstract 
 3.04 (0.29)  4.14 (0.29) 
Normalized position in which each property was produced (n+1-p) / (n-1)*r 
Word Concrete  Abstract 
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 3.11 (0.25)  4.48 (0.46) 
Table 1. Experiment 1 - Errors and standard deviations (in parenthesis) in percentage for 
TEST 1 and 2; for TEST 3 we reported results on rating scores. 
 
 
7.2.3. Discussion 
Results of Experiment 1 indicate that with our training with novel categories and words we 
were able to recreate the real-life situation in which concrete and abstract words are learned.  
Results for TEST 1 (categorical recognition) indicated that it is more difficult to form abstract 
categories than concrete ones. In addition, results of TEST 3 (property generation task) 
showed that the properties produced for the concrete and abstract words we created 
corresponded to those typically obtained with existing concrete and abstract words. Results of 
TEST 1 and TEST 3 revealed that abstract categories are more difficult to form, and that 
abstract words are represented differently from concrete ones, as they elicit less perceptual 
properties, such as properties related to shape, and more abstract and relational properties.  
The higher difficulty of abstract words compared to concrete ones was also maintained 
in TEST 2 (Words-Objects Match), when participants learned to associate a novel word to a 
category. Results on TEST 2 showed that the use of linguistic labels did not further facilitate 
the acquisition of abstract in comparison to concrete words. This reveals that the higher 
complexity of abstract concepts is not reduced thanks to the use of linguistic labels. A 
possibility is that, in order to reduce the complexity of abstract words, a verbal explanation of 
the category meaning is needed. 
 
 
7.3. Experiment 2 
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Given our results on Words-Objects Match (TEST 2) in Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 we 
decided to add a verbal explanation to the linguistic label used for abstract categories. This 
should mirror the way the acquisition process works. Abstract words differ from concrete 
words insofar that the first refer to a variety of situations, states, events. Due to this 
complexity, linguistic labels should be more relevant for abstract than for concrete words 
acquisition, and the first might also require a verbal explanation of their meaning. This is 
often not the case for concrete words, for which the linguistic label is usually associated with 
the presence of the object. Experiment 2 aimed to test whether there is a facilitation effect 
when the meaning of abstract words is explained linguistically, compared to when only the 
linguistic label is provided.  
In addition, the aim of Experiment 2 is to verify whether the different acquisition 
modality has an impact on the response modality. We designed a property verification task 
(TEST 3), to be performed in substitution of the production task of Experiment 1 in order to 
address this aim. We chose to use color as the target property as color was not relevant to the 
motor response and to the response device that we used. 
Specifically, we predicted that, given that for concrete words manual information is 
more relevant than for abstract ones, participants should be faster to perform a property 
verification task with concrete words when they had to respond using a keyboard instead of a 
microphone. Symmetrically, if it is true that linguistic information is more important for the 
acquisition of abstract word meanings than for concrete ones, faster responses should be noted 
with regard to abstract words while responding with the microphone than with the keyboard. 
We expect a stronger effect when abstract words are presented not only with novel verbal 
labels but with the explanations as well. 
 
7.3.1. Method 
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7.3.1.1. Participants 
Thirty-two students of the University of Bologna took part in the study (8 men; mean age = 
20.44 years; s.d. = 1.41). All were native Italian speakers and right handed. 
 
7.3.1.2. Procedure 
All participants were submitted to 2 training phases (Experience; Word Acquisition) and to 3 
different tests (Categorical Recognition; Word-Object Match; Property verification task). 
Training 1 and TEST 1 were identical to Experiment 1. However, Training 2 varied, as 
participants were randomly assigned to two different conditions, the Explanation or No 
Explanation condition. In the Explanation condition with abstract words half of the 
participants were told the name of the abstract category and were given an explanation 
clarifying the similarities of the members of a given category; in the No Explanation 
condition only the name was associated to the category. Training 2 for concrete categories 
was the same of Experiment 1. 
In TEST 3 participants took part in a color verification task. Questions appeared on the 
screen, for example, “Is a LATOFO yellow?”. To respond “yes” or “no” they had to press two 
keys on the keyboard in one block (24 trials), or to pronounce the word “yes” or “no” in the 
microphone in another block (24 trials). The block order was counterbalanced. Both response 
times and errors were recorded. Forty-eight responses were recorded; “yes” responses 
corresponded to questions on five different colors (blue, red, violet, yellow for concrete words 
and sky-blue for abstract), and “no” responses corresponded to questions about 5 wrong 
colors (black, brown, green, orange, white). 
 
7.3.2. Results 
7.3.2.1. TEST 1: Categorical Recognition 
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In the one-way ANOVA conducted on error rates the factor Concept (Concrete vs. Abstract), 
which was manipulated within participants, was highly significant. As predicted and as in 
Experiment 1, Abstract Concepts (M = 6.18%) elicited more errors than Concrete Ones (M = 
1.82%), F (1, 31) = 51.32, MSe = 5.92, p <. 001 (see Tab. 2). 
 
7.3.2.2. TEST 2: Words-Objects Match 
We performed two different ANOVAs on the errors produced, one for the No Explanation 
group (A) and another for the Explanation group (B). In the first ANOVA two factors were 
manipulated within participants, Word (Abstract vs. Concrete, both without explanation) and 
Other Exemplar (Novel vs. Learned). In the second ANOVA the same factors were 
manipulated but, as far as the Word factor is concerned, we contrasted Abstract Words with 
Explanation vs. Concrete Words without Explanation. In the first ANOVA, Abstract Words 
(M = 4.04%) elicited more errors than Concrete Ones (M = 1.17%), F (1, 15) = 12.01, MSe = 
10.93, p < .01, and more errors were produced when the target exemplar was associated with 
a Learned (M = 3.52%) than with a Novel Other Exemplar (M = 1.69%), F (1, 15) = 13.35, 
MSe = 3.98, p < .01 (see Tab. 2). In addition, the interaction between Word and Other 
Exemplar was significant, F (1, 15) = 5.46, MSe = 3.19, p < .05. LSD post-hoc showed that 
all differences were significant (p <.05), with the exception of the difference between 
Concrete Words accompanied with a Learned vs. Novel Exemplar. With Abstract Words, 
instead, a Target Exemplar presented together with a Learned Exemplar elicited more errors 
than a Target Exemplar associated with a Novel Exemplar (p < .0004). In the second ANOVA 
both main effects were significant: Abstract Words with Explanation (M = 3.19%) elicited 
more errors than Concrete Words without explanation (M = 0.98%), F (1, 15) = 6.09, MSe = 
12.87, p < .05, and more errors were produced when the target exemplar was associated with 
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a Learned (M = 2.67%) than with a Novel Other Exemplar (M = 1.50%), F (1, 15) = 6.09, 
MSe = 12.87, p < .05 (see Tab. 2). 
 
7.3.2.3. TEST 3: Property verification task with keyboard vs. microphone 
In TEST 3 we collected both RTs and errors, for a number of reasons. First, previous work on 
the influence of action sentences on keyboard and microphone response devices was 
performed recording response times (e.g., Scorolli & Borghi, 2007). Second, differently from 
TEST 1 and TEST 2, no figures were presented, and participants had to read and respond to 
verbal questions. Thus there were no differences in the presentation timing of concrete 
categories (static figures) and abstract ones (videos). We will report results based on LSD test 
(p <.05) and discuss the results crucial for our hypotheses. Even though we collected RTs as 
well, we believe that, given that we study word acquisition, accuracy probably represents the 
most important measure of participants' performance. 
24.77% of the trials were removed as errors. RTs above or below two standard 
deviations from each participant’s means for correct trials were excluded from this analysis. 
This trimming method leads to the removal of further 3.39% of the data. The mean RTs for 
correct responses for true trials for each participant were submitted to two ANOVAs, one for 
the No Explanation group (A) and another for the Explanation group (B). In the first ANOVA 
two factors were manipulated within participants: Word (Abstract vs. Concrete, both without 
explanation) and Response Device (Keyboard vs. Microphone). In the second ANOVA we 
manipulated the same factors but, with the factor Word, we contrasted Abstract Words with 
Explanation vs. Concrete Words without Explanation. In both ANOVAs the factor Word was 
significant. Abstract Words (M = 958 ms; M = 950, respectively) were responded to 
significantly faster than Concrete ones (M = 1192 ms; M = 1200 ms), F (1, 15) = 12.52, MSe 
= 69871.63, p <. 005; F (1, 15) = 57.04, MSe = 17525.17, p < .001 (see Tab. 2). Crucially in 
222 
 
the second ANOVA we found an interaction between the kind of Words and the kind of 
Device, F (1, 15) = 11.18, MSe = 91173.10, p <. 01: Concrete Words were responded to 
significantly faster with the keyboard (M = 1057 ms) than with the microphone (M = 1343 
ms) (LSD post hoc, p < .05); symmetrically Abstract Words were responded to faster with the 
microphone (M = 841 ms) than with the keyboard (M = 1059 ms) (LSD post hoc, p = .06; see 
Fig. 3).  
The main effect of Word on both the analyses is of marginal interest, as it is probably 
due to the fact that the task was easier to perform when using Abstract Words, as the figures / 
entities referred to through abstract words were always light blue colored, whereas objects 
referred to by concrete words differed in colors. Much more crucial for our hypotheses is the 
interaction between Word and Response Device found in the second ANOVA (group B): as 
predicted, with Abstract Words provided by a verbal Explanation RTs were faster with the 
microphone than with the keyboard; symmetrically with Concrete Words RTs were slower 
with the microphone than with the keyboard (see Fig. 3). Finally it is interesting to notice the 
difference between Abstract and Concrete Words, still present without the Explanation (group 
A, 234 ms), was increased by the introduction of the verbal Explanation (group B, 250 ms), 
particularly in case of mouth responses. 
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Experiment 2_group B: Property Verification Task
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Figure 3. Experiment 2, group B: Interaction between Words (Abstract with Explanation, 
Concrete) and Response Device (Keyboard, Microphone). 
 
Two further ANOVAs on errors were performed, in which the same factors were 
manipulated. In both analyses the factor Word reached significance: Concrete Words (group 
A: M = 15.69%; group B: M = 15.04%) elicited more errors than Abstract Words (group A: 
M = 10.55%, F (1,15) = 4.49, MSe = 94.38, p < .05; group B: M = 7.75%, F (1,15) = 26.04, 
MSe = 32.69, p < .001), probably due to the different difficulty level involved in processing 
the color property. Crucially, the introduction of the explanation strongly reduced errors with 
Abstract Words (10.55% vs. 7.75%) (see Tab. 2). 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
Categorical Recognition 
Concept Concrete  Abstract 
 1.82 (2.17)  6.18 (3.45) 
 
Words-Objects Match 
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Group A Word Concrete without explan.   Abstract without explan. 
 1.17 (1.75)  4.04 (3.99) 
 Other Exemplar Novel Exemplar  Learned Exemplar 
 1.69 (2.62)  3.52 (3.83) 
Group B Word Concrete with explan.   Abstract with explan. 
 0.98 (1.75)  3.19 (3.55) 
 Other Exemplar Novel Exemplar  Learned Exemplar 
 1.05 (2.44)  2.67 (3.40) 
 
Property verification task: keyboard vs. Microphone 
Group A Word Concrete without explan.  Abstract without explan. 
 15.69 (8.47)  10.55 (8.52) 
Group B Word Concrete without explan.   Abstract with explan. 
 15.04 (5.77)  7.75 (5.63) 
Table 2. Experiment 2 - Errors and standard deviations (in parenthesis) in percentage 
for each TEST. 
 
7.3.3. Discussion 
Results of Experiment 2 confirmed and extended those obtained in Experiment 1. Results on 
the recognition test confirm the results of Experiment 1, indicating that it is more difficult to 
form abstract categories than concrete ones. As in Experiment 1, TEST 2 showed that when 
participants learned to associate a novel word with a category, abstract words caused more 
difficulty in comparison to concrete words. Interestingly, abstract words without Explanation 
(group A) produced a significantly higher frequency of errors when the exemplar nearby has 
already been learned: this suggests that the categorical boundaries are less marked with 
exemplars referred to by abstract rather than by concrete nouns. By adding an Explanation to 
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the label (group B), the categorical boundaries with exemplars referred to by abstract nouns 
become marked as the ones referred to by concrete nouns.  
More crucial to our hypotheses are the results of TEST 3. As predicted, we found that 
Abstract Words produced faster responses with the microphone than with the keyboard; by 
introducing the Explanation (group B) this difference becomes significant. Symmetrically, 
Concrete Words (group B) were responded to more quickly with the keyboard than with the 
microphone. This clearly supports the WAT proposal, as it suggests that concrete words 
evoke more manual information, whereas abstract words elicit more verbal information. 
 
 
7.4. Experiment 3 
A potential problem of Experiment 2 was that TEST 3 (the property verification task) was 
submitted separately for concrete and abstract words. It is possible that, because abstract 
words always referred to blue objects, participants did not have to retrieve the perceptual 
properties of the single categories to respond, whereas this was necessary for concrete words. 
This could explain why RTs were faster with abstract than with concrete words. Experiment 3 
is very similar to Experiment 2, with some modifications. First, given the interesting results 
obtained with explanations, we decided to use only the explanation condition with abstract 
words. Second, we balanced color information of objects referred to by both concrete and 
abstract categories, coloring the abstract figures. We used both concrete and abstract figures 
of different colors. We introduced this variation in order to solve the potential limitations of 
Experiment 2, thus to avoid any facilitation with abstract words in responding to the property 
verification task due to the fact that all abstract words’ referents were blue in color. Third, in 
order to precisely control for the influence of learning the new labels of categorization we 
decided to perform the category recognition task both before and after learning the category 
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labels. Fourth, and most importantly, we decided to perform the property verification task at 
the end of the experiment, so that both concrete and abstract words were presented. This 
modification was introduced in order to be sure that participants referred to the learned 
category names to respond. 
 
7.4.1. Method 
7.4.1.1. Participants 
Eighteen students of the University of Bologna took part in the study (9 men; mean age = 
23.00 years; s.d. = 2.30). All were native Italian speakers, both right and left-handed (1 left-
handed).  
 
7.4.1.2. Procedure 
All participants were submitted to 2 training phases (Experience; Word Acquisition) and to 4 
different tests (Categorical Recognition without labels; Categorical Recognition with labels; 
Word-Object Match; Property verification task). The procedure was identical to that of 
Experiment 2. We only introduced three variations: 1. all abstract words were presented using 
both the noun and the explanation, thus the No Explanation condition for abstract words was 
eliminated; 2. we added a further categorical recognition task after Training 2, in order to 
verify whether using category labels (for both concrete and abstract words) and explanations 
(for abstract words) would facilitate recognition; 3. the entities to which the abstract words 
referred to were presented in different colors. Similarly to what we did with concrete ones, we 
assigned to each abstract category a specific color (light blue, light green, orange, and pink). 
 
7.4.2. Results 
7.4.2.1. TEST 1: Categorical Recognition 
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In an ANOVA conducted on errors two factors were manipulated within participants, the 
factor Concept (Concrete vs. Abstract), and the factor Language (Before vs. After learning the 
label designating the category). Only the factor Language was significant, showing that more 
errors were produced before (M = 1.01%) than after learning the label (M = 0.29%), F (1, 17) 
= 36.26, MSe = 0.26, p <. 001. Thus, both concrete and abstract category formation appears to 
benefit from language (see Tab. 3). 
 
7.4.2.2. TEST 2: Words-Objects Match 
An ANOVA was performed on errors produced in the word-object match. Both the factors 
Word and Other Exemplar were significant. Abstract words (M = 4.46%) elicited more errors 
than concrete ones (M = 2.20%), F (1, 17) = 8.42, MSe = 10.89, p <. 01, and more errors were 
produced when the exemplar nearby had already been learned (M = 4.57%) than when it had 
not (M = 2.08%), F (1, 17) = 61.85, MSe = 1.80, p < .001 (see Tab. 3). 
 
7.4.2.3. TEST 3: Property verification task with keyboard vs. microphone 
In TEST 3 we collected both RTs and errors for the reasons previously explained (see 
8.3.2.3). 12.93% of the trials was removed as errors. The same trimming method of 
Experiment 2 was used; this lead to the removal of 3.22 % of the data. An ANOVA was 
performed with two factors Words (Abstract vs. Concrete) and Response Device (Keyboard 
vs. Microphone) manipulated within participants. As expected, the difference between 
Abstract and Concrete Words found in Experiment 2 disappeared (means were respectively M 
= 1150 and 1151 ms): this demonstrates that this difference was due to the fact that processing 
color was easier in Experiment 2 for abstract words, as the entities they referred to were all of 
the same color. Crucial to our aims, the interaction between Word and Response Device was 
significant, F (1, 17) = 5.69, MSe = 6173.39, p <. 05 (see Fig. 4). LSD post-hoc showed that 
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responses with the keyboard were slower than responses with the microphone for both 
Abstract and Concrete Words; however, with the first the difference was more marked (p < 
.001) than with the second (p < .01). In addition, responses with the Microphone in trend were 
faster with Abstract than with Concrete Words (p =.09).  
The interaction was also significant in a further ANOVA we performed on errors with 
the same factors, F (1, 17) = 35.62, MSe = 0.80, p <. 001. Post-hoc LSD showed that, as 
predicted, Abstract Words elicited more errors than Concrete Words with the Keyboard (p < 
.001), while they elicited less errors than Concrete Words with the Microphone (p < .05). 
Abstract Words using the Keyboard produced more errors than all other conditions except 
Concrete Words using the Microphone. Whereas Concrete Words using the Keyboard 
produced fewer errors than all other conditions except for Abstract Words using the 
Microphone (see Tab. 3). 
 
EXPERIMENT 3 
 
Categorical Recognition: without/with label 
Language  Before learning the label   After learning the label 
 
 1.01 (0.68)  0.29 (0.53) 
 
Words-Objects Match 
Word Concrete  Abstract 
 2.20 (1.99)  4.46 (3.63) 
Other Exemplar Novel Exemplar   Learned Exemplar 
 2.08 (2.49)  4.57(3.22) 
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Property verification task: keyboard vs. microphone 
  Device 
 
 Keyboard  Microphone 
Word Abstract 4.17 (1.87  2.87 (1.34) 
 Concrete 2.35 (1.72)  3.56 (1.92) 
Table 3. Experiment 3 - Errors and standard deviations (in parenthesis) in percentage 
for each TEST. 
 
 
Figure 4. Experiment 3 - Interaction between Word (Abstract, Concrete) and Response 
Device (Keyboard, Microphone). 
 
7.4.3. Discussion 
Results of Experiments 3 confirmed and extend those of Experiment 2, eliminating some 
potential problems. Differently from Experiments 1 and 2, in TEST 1 (Categorical 
Recognition Task) we found no difference between abstract and concrete words, probably due 
to the fact that adding a property (color) to referents of abstract words increased their 
difference from contrast categories. Interestingly for us, in this experiment results of TEST 1 
allowed us to conclude that the introduction of category labels facilitated categorization. The 
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comparison between the same tasks performed before and after the linguistic training reveals 
this.  
In TEST 2, the same pattern of results as Experiment 1 and 2 emerged: abstract words 
elicited more errors than concrete ones, thus confirming their higher complexity as well as the 
fact that their borders are not so clearly marked as those observed between referents of 
concrete words.  
In TEST 3, as expected, the advantage of abstract words over concrete ones 
disappeared. This confirms that it was due to the modifications we made: we introduced color 
differences between the entities to which abstract categories referred to, in order to be certain 
that the task did not differ in difficulty for concrete and abstract words. The interaction 
between Response device and Words revealed that responses with the keyboard were always 
slower than responses with the microphone but that the discrepancy between microphone and 
keyboard was more marked with abstract than with concrete words. The pattern was 
complemented by the results on errors, which were fully in line with our predictions: more 
errors were elicited by abstract words using the keyboard, and by concrete words when using 
the microphone. 
 
 
7.5. Experiment 4 
The two last experiments left two issues unsolved. In Experiment 2 we manipulated the 
presence of explanations, but only for abstract words. In Experiment 3 participants were given 
explanations to clarify abstract word meanings because this would mirror the typical 
acquisition process of abstract categories. However, manipulating explanations only for 
abstract words did not allow us to precisely determine if there is an effect of explanation also 
for concrete words. Therefore, in Experiment 4 we presented only the category label or the 
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label and the explanation for both concrete and abstract words. In addition, in this experiment 
for abstract words the information provided by perceptual input and that provided by the 
verbal label plus explanation were disentangled. To dissociate these two sources of 
information we used different colors for the members of abstract categories, in order to induce 
participants to categorize them on the basis of color, but the labels and explanations for these 
items still rested on items’ reciprocal interaction, rather than on their perceptual features. 
Therefore, with concrete items the label and the explanation converged with the category 
formed on the basis of perceptual Experience (Training 1), whereas with abstract items the 
verbal and perceptual experience did not match. This manipulation was introduced in order to 
verify whether the advantage of the microphone responses was simply due to phono-
articulatory aspects of the words or to their conceptual content as well. Our major predictions 
concerned TEST 3: 1) If the mouth activation found in Experiment 3 (TEST 3, vocal 
responses) is due to a motor phono-articulatory activation pertaining to the superficial 
linguistic information, in Experiment 4 (TEST 3) we should find an advantage of vocal 
responses both with concrete and abstract words, as well as a main effect of the verbal 
explanation. 2) If, consistent with the WAT proposal, the previously found advantage for 
vocal responses pertains also the category content, then it should play a major role if it 
complements information given by perception and action, not if it contrasts with it. Therefore 
we should find a difference with results of Experiment 3: there should be an advantage of the 
microphone over the keyboard only when the label and the explanation do not contrast with 
perceptually-based categories. In this experiment, this contrast characterizes abstract 
categories.  
 
7.5.1. Method 
7.5.1.1. Participants 
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Eighteen students of the University of Bologna took part in the study (7 men; mean age = 
24.55 years; standard deviation = 3.66). All were native Italian speakers and right handed. 
 
7.5.1.2. Procedure 
The procedure was similar to that of Experiment 3, except for two variations. First, during 
Training 2 (Words Acquisition) half of the participants were taught the linguistic labels 
(Label group) vs. the linguistic labels plus the verbal explanation (Label+Explanation group), 
both for abstract and concrete items. The verbal explanations for abstract items were the same 
used in Experiment 2 and 3, so they basically described the kind of interaction. For concrete 
items the verbal explanations focused on the figure shape, avoiding any reference to its color 
(e.g., CALONA: “a figure having a concavity”). The number of words for each explanation 
across both the abstract and the concrete blocks was even. Second, in Experiment 4 we used 
different colors for each category member: for both concrete and abstract items, two members 
of each category had the same color as two members of another category. For example, 
FUSAPO surface could be yellow, blue, red or sky blue; its thickness was always the same, 
i.e. dark blue. NOROLO surface shared with FUSAPO surface yellow and blue colors, but it 
could be also green or violet; the color of the thickness was always dark blue.  
 
7.5.2. Results 
7.5.2.1. TEST 1: Categorical Recognition 
We performed two different ANOVAs on errors: one for the Label group and another for the 
Label+Explanation group. In the first ANOVA two factors were manipulated within 
participants, the factor Concept (Concrete vs. Abstract), and the factor Language (Before vs. 
After learning the category label). In the second ANOVA we manipulated the same factors, 
but the levels of Language factor differed (Before vs. After learning the category label with 
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explanation). In the first ANOVA, both main effects were significant: more errors were 
produced with Abstract (M = 7.41%) than with Concrete Concepts (M = 3.36%22), F (1, 8) = 
7.73 , MSe = 19.12, p < .05, and more errors were produced before (M = 6.54%) than after 
learning the label (M = 4.22%), F (1, 8) = 17.31, MSe = 2.79, p < .01. The factor Concept was 
also significant in the second ANOVA: more errors were produced for Abstract (M = 
11.17%) than for Concrete Concepts (M = 3.60%), F (1, 8) = 32.61, MSe = 15.38, p < .001. 
The factor Language did not reach significance, but we found a significant interaction 
between Concept and Language, F (1, 8) = 7.26, MSe = 1.83, p < .05 (see Table 4), due to the 
fact that after learning label+explanation errors decreased with concrete words (LSD post-
doc, p < .01), but not with abstract ones. 
 
7.5.2.2. TEST 2: Words-Objects Match 
We performed two different ANOVAs on errors: one for the Label group and another for the 
Label+Explanation group. In the first ANOVA two factors were manipulated within 
participants: Word (Concrete vs. Abstract) and Other Exemplar (Exemplar already learned, 
with only linguistic label vs. Exemplar not learned). In the second ANOVA the same factors 
were manipulated, but the levels of the Other Exemplar factor differed (Exemplar already 
learned, with label+explanation vs. Exemplar not learned). 
In both ANOVAs we found a significant main effect of the factor Word: fewer errors 
were produced with Concrete than With Abstract Words (group A: M = 2.55%22, M = 6.48% 
respectively, F (1, 8) = 8.31, MSe = 16.77, p < 0.05; group B: M = 2.66%, M = 7.29% 
respectively, F (1, 8) = 22.13, MSe = 8.71, p < .01; see Tab. 4). 
 
7.5.2.3. TEST 3: Property verification task with keyboard and microphone 
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In TEST 3 for RTs 35.63% of the trials was removed as errors. We used the same trimming 
method as previous experiments; this lead to the removal of 2.38% of the data. An ANOVA 
was performed with three factors: Word (Abstract vs. Concrete), Response Device (Keyboard 
vs. Microphone) and Verbal Explanation (Without vs. With), the last one manipulated 
between participants. We found that vocal responses (M = 1128.73 ms) were 147.57 ms faster 
than manual responses (M = 1276.30 ms), even if the factor Response Device did not reach 
significance, F (1, 16) = 3.48, MSe = 112633, p = .08. The interaction between the factors 
Word and Response Device was significant, F (1, 16 = 4.58), MSe = 47804.8, p < .05. The 
advantage of the microphone over the keyboard did not reach significance with abstract words 
(M = 1221.67 vs. M = 1184.37, respectively), while with concrete words responses with the 
microphone (M = 1073.09) were faster than responses with the keyboard (M = 1330.93) 
(LSD, p <.01) (see Fig. 5). 
 
 
Figure 5. Experiment 4 - Interaction between Word (Abstract, Concrete) and Response 
Device (Keyboard, Microphone). 
 
Finally in the ANOVAs on errors with the same factors, we found that abstract words 
(M = 20.01%) elicited more errors than concrete ones (M = 15.63%), F (1, 16) = 7.84, MSe = 
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44.13.08, p < .05. The significant interaction between Word and Response Device, F (1, 16) = 
5.87, MSe = 37.90, p < .05, was due to the fact that abstract words with the microphone (M = 
21.79%) elicited more errors than concrete words with both the keyboard (M = 17.36%) and 
the microphone (M = 13.89%) (LSD post-hoc, p <. 05) (see Tab. 4). 
 
EXPERIMENT 4 
 
Categorical Recognition: without/with label 
Group A: label  Concept  
  Concrete  Abstract  
 3.36 (2.59)  7.41 (5.04) 
Group B: label+explanation  Concept  
 Concrete   Abstract 
 3.70 (2.35)  11.17(4.47) 
 
Words-Objects Match 
Group A: label  Word  
  Concrete  Abstract  
 2.55 (4.08) 6.48 (4.57)  
Group B: label+explanation  Word  
 Concrete   Abstract 
 2.66 (4.45) 7.20 (4.36)  
 
Property verification task 
   Device 
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 Keyboard  Microphone 
Word Abstract 
 18.23 (8.37)   21.79 (6.17) 
 Concrete 
 17.36(6.38)   13.89 (5.19) 
Table 4. Experiment 4 - Errors and standard deviations (in parenthesis) in percentage 
for each TEST. 
 
7.5.3. Discussion 
Results of TEST 1 indicate that the difference between the condition Label and No-Label 
increases when an explanation is added to the category name. Thus explanations facilitate 
categorization, as they render clearer category boundaries. However, the contribution of 
explanations is relevant only for concrete categories. For abstract categories, explanations do 
not help, as the information they provide is in contrast with perceptually based categorization.  
Results of TEST 3 are the most intriguing. As predicted, participants were faster to 
respond with the microphone than with the keyboard with all words: this suggests that the 
phono-articolatory aspect of the words pronounced during acquisition affects performance. It 
is unclear, however, why no effect of explanation was present. The most important result is 
the interaction showing that the advantage of the microphone over the keyboard is more 
marked with concrete than with abstract words, both in RTs and accuracy. This suggests that 
not only phono-articolatory but also conceptual information is at play in explaining the 
advantage of responses with the microphone. In fact this advantage shows up only when there 
is a convergence between the linguistic information (label and explanation) and the category 
formed on sensory-motor basis, that is only with concrete words. One could object that the 
effect is due to the fact that explanations used with concrete words might have reduced the 
importance of manual interaction with objects. However, this doesn’t account for the 
advantage of the microphone with concrete over abstract words.  
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7.6. General discussion 
Four experiments were designed to study the acquisition of concrete and abstract categories 
and words. We chose to use novel categories, in order to avoid confounds often associated 
with research on concrete and abstract words. We identified some characteristics which are 
typical of abstract but not of concrete categories, and we created novel categories according to 
these criteria. First, abstract categories do not refer to a single object but rather to a complex 
relationship between different objects. In addition, the entities to which abstract categories 
refer are not manipulable, even though they are perceivable, as they are interacting moving 
objects. Notice that our distinction does not cover the whole continuum ranging from abstract 
to concrete categories. Further work is needed for a thorough investigation of different 
typologies of concrete and abstract words (for attempts in this direction, see Setti & 
Caramelli, 2005). Here we used two different examples of concrete and abstract words and 
have shown that different processes are involved in their acquisition.  
In Experiment 1 we controlled, using a standard properties production task, that the 
pattern of produced properties with our novel concrete and abstract categories was similar to 
that typically elicited by concrete and abstract words. In Experiment 2, 3, and 4 we introduced 
a modification: abstract words were not only learned by associating a label with the 
entities/relations they referred to, but also when an explanation of their meaning was 
provided. This learning situation should resemble the learning process of children, as studies 
on MoA show. We found that this learning process influenced a later property verification 
task: participants responded earlier to concrete words while using the keyboard, while 
responses with abstract words were faster while using the microphone. Similar results with 
action words and effectors showed that, while comprehending sentences referring to mouth-
related actions, response times were faster with the microphone than with the keyboard 
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(Scorolli & Borghi, 2007). In addition, in line with WAT, participants performance with 
abstract words was improved when provided with a verbal explanation (Experiment 2, group 
B; Experiment 3). This effect was not observed in concrete words. The fact that the advantage 
of the explanation was confined to abstract words revealed that the difference is not simply 
due to phono-articulatory aspects, but that for accessing the meaning of abstract words 
linguistic information plays a major role. This was confirmed in Experiment 4, in which we 
found that, due to the fact that with abstract words the verbal label and explanation were in 
contrast with the already formed perceptually-based category, the advantage of the 
microphone over the keyboard was reduced compared to the other experiments.  
Our results are in line with embodied and grounded theories of categorization and 
language comprehension. Namely, both the concrete and the abstract categories we used are 
grounded, as they have objects or relations as referents. We were able to demonstrate that they 
are not only grounded in perception and action systems, but that for forming them language is 
important. This leads to the prediction that abstract words would not only activate linguistic 
areas in the brain, but also classic motor and sensory-motor areas.  
Results are in line with the predictions advanced by the WAT proposal. They reveal 
that a different learning process might lead to differences in performance on different tasks, 
such as a production task versus a property verification task. In addition, it provides evidence 
that for representing abstract concepts motor linguistic information is more important than 
manual information, whereas for representing concrete concepts the pattern is opposite.  
In addition, our results clearly show that the formation of both concrete and abstract 
categories benefits from learning a linguistic label. As it emerges from the categorical 
recognition task in Experiment 3, language is relevant because it helps to better differentiate 
between categories (Mirolli & Parisi, 2011). The recognition test in Experiment 4 (TEST 1a-
1b) shows that labeling is mostly helpful when an explanation of the category meaning is 
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added. As shown in test 2 and test 3 of Experiment 2, the benefit provided by language is 
higher in the case of abstract categories when a verbal explanation (group B) supports the 
linguistic label. Nevertheless, when no explanation is provided, labeling is useful for both 
concrete and abstract categories. In sum: labeling helps categorization, independently of 
category complexity. However, even when no explanation is provided, given that abstract 
words do not refer to manipulable objects and are linked by complex relational properties, 
language plays a major role in their representation. 
This opens an interesting scenario. Language is relevant for both concrete and abstract 
words because it helps better differentiate between categories. However, in tasks for which 
categorization is not relevant, such as the color verification task, it is more accessible in the 
representation of abstract than of concrete word meanings. This might occur because: a. the 
members of abstract categories are not manipulable; and b. more linguistic information is 
typically associated with the acquisition of abstract word meanings. 
Further work should address unsolved issues in this research. One important expansion 
could be to introduce the social development component implied in word acquisition. We 
used language in a very simple way, through adding labels or explanations to read and to 
associate with the relevant categories. Thus, language was not associated with a real social 
experience, as in real life. Further work should take aspects of social development which 
characterize language acquisition into account. A further limitation is that the variety of real-
life concrete and abstract words is very broad, and we were able to model only a subset of 
these.  
Finally, we believe this work has important implications for modeling. The design of 
the task is particularly suitable for further modeling applications and replication. We 
succeeded in isolating some properties we believe to be relevant in real life categories and 
built novel categories based on our assumptions. We could verify that the behavioral 
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responses produced within these novel categories were similar to the ones produced within 
real life categories and settings. This procedure demands an additional modeling 
development. We believe that computational models can integrate and generate a more 
general description the experimental results. For example, a robotic model, as discussed in the 
introduction, can benefit from a psychological theory, that provides a possible way to tackle a 
new and complex problem for robotics itself, such the theory described focusing on the 
grounding and acquisition of abstract words. On the other hand, the same robotic model can 
be tested in many different experimental situations, some of them not even applicable to 
human subjects. Experiments of this nature can complement and integrate experiments with 
human participants and can offer new insights and hypotheses to test. Furthermore, the 
process of developing artificial cognitive models always requires a profound articulation of 
the theory implemented. This fact forces the researcher to well define and to operationally 
describe every aspect of the theory and, at the same time, it emphasizes the importance of the 
central aspects of the theory, that can be fully exploited and validated by the model, at least as 
a preliminary proof of concept. 
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8. The activation of the left-right mental timeline is context-dependent 
 
The central assumption of Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT, Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 
1999) is that the conceptual metaphors observed in every-day language are at work at a deep 
cognitive level. This basic principle of CMT is supported especially by those empirical 
findings on conceptual metaphors that discovered the existence of metaphoric mappings 
which are not explicitly attested in language. In par. 3.5, CMT view was related to the 
possible grounding of abstract concepts/words. Indeed, in the last years one of the most 
studied example of implicit conceptual mappings has been the TIME IS SPACE metaphor 
which maps temporal reference onto a horizontal spatial axis (e.g., left-to-right in Western 
cultures). Thus, the TIME IS SPACE metaphor consists in the use of a concrete, spatial 
schema (i.e., the mental timeline) to organize and represent the abstract contents of temporal 
expressions. In the literature, a growing body of research has investigated the characteristics 
of this mapping, but one important aspect that remains undetermined is whether these space-
time mappings can be activated automatically (i.e., independently from the goals of the task). 
Prior attempts to settle this issue have provided mixed, unclear results. In this study, the 
design of prior investigations has been improved by performing both a time-relevant and a 
time-irrelevant task (i.e., temporal reference judgment and lexical decision, respectively) on 
the very same pool of tensed Spanish verbs and pseudo-verbs (i.e., both categories of stimuli 
were endowed with past and future tense markers). This allowed a trustworthy statistical 
comparison of their results (i.e., overall between tasks ANOVA). Furthermore, as in previous 
research only reaction times and accuracy were measured, in the present study also the 
MouseTracker software were used, in order to record the participants’ responses mouse 
trajectories, as they can be considered as a more sensible index of the decision process. On the 
whole, the results confirmed that the left-right space-time mapping is active only when the 
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task requires temporal discrimination. This finding support a flexible account for the 
activation of the TIME IS SPACE metaphor, and confirm the general hypothesis on 
conceptual effects that guides this thesis. 
 
 
8.1. Introduction 
How are internally represented concepts grounded in the external world? This question is the 
Symbol Grounding Problem (Harnad, 1990), one of the central problems of cognitive science 
(Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg, 1997; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Santiago et 
al., 2011). The “hardest part” of the problem regards abstract concepts, which by definition 
refer to things that cannot be seen or touched  (e.g., Borghi et al., 2011). In search of possible 
solutions, embodied and grounded cognition theories (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Gibbs, 2006; 
Glenberg, 1997; Zwaan, 2004) suggest that in order to gain meaning, abstract concepts are 
grounded on more concrete dimensions, which are in turn grounded on sensory-motor 
experiences (see chapter 3). 
Under the embodied and grounded view, language processing elicits an embodied 
simulation which is carried out by the very same neural systems used by perception, action 
and emotion (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Gallese, 2008; Glenberg & Gallese, 2011; Glenberg et al., 
2008; see chapter 3 and 7). When abstract concepts are referred to, such simulation follows 
the guide of stored mappings between abstract and concrete concepts. One of the strongest 
line of support for this idea comes from empirical studies on the abstract domain of TIME, as 
grounded on the concrete domain of SPACE. Indeed, a large number of studies have reported 
interactions between the processing of the temporal reference of words and sentences and 
irrelevant spatial dimensions of the task, such as lateralized keypresses or word presentation, 
forward-backward manual movements, and front-back word presentation (e.g., Boroditsky, 
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2001; Ouellet et al., 2010; Santiago et al, 2007; Sell & Kaschak, 2011; Torralbo et al., 2006; 
Ulrich & Maienborn, 2010; Ulrich et al., 2012). Analogous conceptual congruency effects 
have been reported in many other studies that focus on different concrete and abstract 
dimensions, such as left-right space and number (Dehaene et al., 1993), vertical space and 
evaluation (Meier & Robinson, 2004; Santiago et al., 2012), brightness and evaluation (Meier 
et al., 2004), or vertical space and power (Schubert, 2005). Conceptual congruency effects are 
usually  interpreted as indexing the use of underlying concrete representations to think about 
the abstract dimension (see Santiago et al., 2011, 2012).    
Although now well established, much research remains to be done on the boundary 
conditions of conceptual congruency effects. More specifically, it is still an open question 
whether such effects arise automatically whenever the concrete and abstract dimensions are 
processed simultaneously. One of the strongest cases of automatic activation in the literature 
concerns the mapping of affective evaluation to front-back responses. Chen & Bargh (1999) 
reported that participants were faster responding to positive items with a pulling response, and 
to negative items with a pushing response, and this occurred not only when the decision was 
explicitly based on the valence of the stimuli, but also when the subjects performed a lexical 
decision task (Wentura et al., 2000) and even a simple stimulus detection task (Chen & Bargh, 
1999), which really minimized the task-relevance of the evaluative dimension. The mapping 
of numbers on left-right space has also been shown to be quite automatic (e.g., Fisher et al., 
2003; Ruiz Fernández et al., 2011). In contrast, space-time mappings do not seem to be 
activated so automatically. Recently, two studies extending prior findings with temporal 
words (e.g., Santiago et al., 2007) to full sentences aimed to test the automaticity of the 
mental time-line in congruency tasks involving both the left-right (Ulrich & Maienborn, 
2010) and front-back (Ulrich et al., 2012) spatial axes. These studies presented sensible and 
non-sensible sentences in a go-no go procedure: participants only responded when the 
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sentence made sense. In one task (time-relevant), participants were required to decide whether 
the correct sentence referred to the past or the future by either pressing a left or a right button 
(Ulrich & Maienborn, 2010) or moving a lever forward or backward (Ulrich et al, 2012). 
Results in the time-relevant tasks were compared to time-irrelevant variants, where the 
responses were used to discriminate between sensible and nonsensical sentences. The results 
in both studies showed space-time congruency effects only on the former (time-relevant) task.  
However, it is difficult to defend the absence of an effect. The findings of Ulrich & 
Maienborn (2010) on the left-right mental time line left open the possibility that participants 
simply did not need to process the temporal reference of the sentences to successfully 
complete the lexicality judgment task. The non-sensible sentences were constructed by 
matching agents and objects that did not fulfill the meaning restrictions of the verb (i.e., as in 
the past sentence “The fir trees have put on their coat while bathing”, or in the future sentence 
“On next Sunday, the town-hall will marry the pea”). In order to judge whether these 
sentences were correct or not, participants might have only assessed whether the action 
mentioned by the verb could be done by the actor (with the object) on the patient. In order to 
address this concern, Ulrich et al. (2012) adapted the dual-task procedure of Ouellet et al. 
(2010) in the time-irrelevant experiment. After each response, participants were asked to 
answer a question about the temporal reference of the prior sentence, thus assuring that their 
temporal meaning was grasped. This experiment also failed to find any trace of interaction 
between front-back responses and past-future reference. Although it relieves concerns about 
the depth of processing of sentence meaning in the front-back task, no similar control is 
available for the left-right task of Ulrich & Maienborn (2010). It might be the case that the 
activation of the front-back timeline is not automatic, but we cannot be certain that this is true 
also for the left-right mental timeline.  
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In addition, their time-relevant and time-irrelevant tasks differed in several other 
respects. Firstly, the materials included equal amounts of sensible past, sensible future, and 
nonsensical sentences, what means that participants responded on 60% of the trials in the 
time-relevant task, whereas they did not have to hold any responses in the time-irrelevant 
task. This may have made the latter easier than the former. In the same direction, their time-
relevant tasks interleaved two judgements (on lexicality and time), whereas the left-rigth 
time-irrelevant task of Ulrich & Maienborn (2010) only required judging lexicality, and the 
front-back time-irrelevant task of Ulrich et al. (2012) allowed participants to focus on each 
judgement sequentially: initially on lexicality, in order to produce the front-back response, 
and then on time, in order to answer the final control question). Again, the simultaneous 
double judgement in the time-relevant tasks may have increased their difficulty.  
There is also the possibility that processing complex sentences does not afford 
automatic activation of the mental timeline. Meaning access at sentence level is less automatic 
than at word level, because the meaning of the sequence of words needs to be composed into 
the overall sentence meaning. This latter process could be sustained by different neural 
structures than those involved in tasks with single words (e.g., Friederici, 2004).  
Finally, there always remain the possibility that a more sensitive measure might detect 
a smaller, but significant congruency effect in time-irrelevant tasks. Thus, the issue of the 
automaticity in the activation of the mental timeline is still far from being solved. 
In the present study we wanted to address simultaneously several of these possibilities. 
We focused on the processing of time-related single words in tasks requiring left and right 
responses (thereby testing the activation of the left-right mental time line) in both time-
relevant and time-irrelevant conditions. We created linguistic stimuli acquirable in single 
fixations designed to assure the processing of temporal reference even when it is not task 
relevant. Participants performed either a temporal reference judgment task (decide whether 
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the stimulus refers to the past or the future) or a lexical decision task (decide whether the 
stimulus is a word or a nonword). All stimuli (both words and nonwords) were presented in 
each task, which allowed a subsequent trustworthy statistical comparison of the two tasks 
results. Finally, we measured participants reaction times in Experiment 1, as in previous 
studies, and also mouse trajectories (using MouseTracker software; Freeman & Ambady, 
2010) in Experiment 2. Indeed, we reasoned that mouse-tracking has the potential of 
capturing the conceptual congruency effect during the real-time unfolding of the response, as 
it has been shown in several studies (e.g., Barca & Pezzulo, 2012). If the left-right space-time 
mapping can be activated automatically, at least one of the experiments will capture the 
conceptual congruency effect in both the time-relevant and time-irrelevant tasks. Otherwise, 
this effect should arise only in the time-relevant task.  
 
 
8.2. Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 used centrally presented Spanish tensed verbs (technically corresponding to full 
sentences as Spanish is a PRO-DROP language) and nonverbs in both an explicit temporal 
judgment task, where temporal reference was task relevant, and a lexical decision task, for 
which temporal reference was irrelevant. The design of the experimental materials made sure 
that temporal reference information was equally present, salient, and could be acquired in a 
single fixation, in both the words and the nonwords. Responses were given by means of 
bimanual lateralized keypresses, and participants’ response latencies and accuracy were 
measured. 
 
8.2.1. Method 
8.2.1.1. Participants  
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Forty-eight Psychology students from the University of Granada (6 males; age range 19-26 y.; 
6 left-handed by self-report) participated for course credit. All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and were naive as to the purposes of the experiment. Participants 
were randomly assigned to two groups: 24 participants carried out the temporal judgment 
task, and the rest carried out the lexical decision task. 
 
8.2.1.2. Materials  
We selected 148 Spanish intransitive verbs (or with at least one very common intransitive 
use). Such a kind of verbs was chosen because Spanish is a PRO-DROP language, so the 
subject of a verb can be dropped from the sentence. Thus, single conjugated intransitive verbs 
as used here can stand as full, grammatically correct sentences. In order to create the nonword 
set, each verb was modified by changing one letter in their morphological stem, with the only 
constraint of resulting in sequences of pronounceable phonemes in Spanish. Therefore, the 
nonverbs did not pop out as such (e.g., “dormir” was changed to “dorpir”).  
The 148 verbs and 148 nonverbs were then conjugated in both the simple past perfect 
indicative and the simple future indicative, and all six possible grammatical persons were 
almost equally represented over the whole set (the choice of grammatical person avoided 
ambiguous forms such as “amamos” which means both “we love” and “we loved”). The 
nonverbs thus also carried past and future inflections (e.g., “durpió”). Therefore, in order to 
distinguish the verbs from the non-verbs, participants had to pay close attention, and deeply 
elaborate the stimulus also in the lexical decision task. This resulted in 592 experimental 
stimuli of four types: past and future verbs, and past and future nonverbs. This total set was 
randomly divided into four lists of 148 stimuli each, avoiding item repetition. For example, 
from the item “faltar/falbar” the following four third person singular tensed versions were 
created: “faltó” (“he failed” - past verb), “faltará” (“he will fail” - future verb), “falbó” (past 
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nonverb), “falbará” (future nonverb). Each of these different versions of the original item was 
randomly assigned to one of the four different lists with no item repetition. Each list was 
composed of 37 items from each of the four stimulus type conditions. Direct control for 
factors already known to affect word recognition times, such as frequency, length, age of 
acquisition, and so on, was not required because the theoretically relevant effect we were 
looking for was the interaction between temporal reference and response hand when 
participants processed the very same list of stimuli using the two possible response-key 
mappings.  
 
8.2.1.3. Procedure  
Stimuli were presented at the center of a LCD computer screen (Courier New font, 38 points, 
lower case), black printed on white background. Participants sat at a distance of 60 cm from 
the computer screen, and placed their left index finger on the Q key and their right index 
finger on the 9 key of the numerical keyboard in a standard Spanish QWERTY keyboard. The 
distance between response keys was 32 cm. Each trial began with the presentation of a central 
fixation cross (500 ms) followed by the target verb, that remained on the screen until a 
response was made. Incorrect trials were followed by a 500 ms red uppercase “X” at the same 
location of the stimulus. Each incorrect trial was then followed by a 1000 ms blank screen. 
Correct trials were followed by a 1500 ms blank screen. Participants in the time-relevant 
condition were instructed to decide whether the presented verb or nonverb referred to either 
the past or the future. Participants in the time-irrelevant condition decided whether the stimuli 
were real Spanish verbs or not.  
Each task was composed by two experimental blocks of 148 trials (separated by a two 
minutes break) in which the same list of stimuli were responded to using a different mappings 
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of responses (past/future or correct/incorrect) to keys (left/right). The order of presentation of 
the two mappings was counterbalanced over participants.  
Each block was preceded by a short four trials training with a different set of stimuli to 
familiarize participants with the procedure. Overall, each subject responded to 296 
experimental trials, plus 8 training trials. The experiment was programmed and run using E-
prime 2.0 (Psychological Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA). 
 
8.2.1.4. Design and Analysis 
Data were analyzed using a mixed factorial ANOVA with the between-participants factor 
Task (temporal judgment vs. lexical decision) and the within-participant factors Lexical status 
(word vs. nonword) x Temporal reference (past vs. future) x Key (left vs. right). 
Counterbalance was included in the design as a between-subjects factor in order to reduce 
noise, but it is not reported further because its main effect or interactions had no theoretical 
relevance. 
 
8.2.2. Results 
There were errors in 6.43% of trials in the temporal judgment task and 5.19% of trials in the 
lexical decision task. Errors and latency in correct trials were analyzed independently. 
Reaction times (RTs) were trimmed by mean of fixed cut-offs that left out a pre-established 
proportion of 2% of trials. In temporal judgement, cut-offs were set at 250 ms and 2400 ms, 
what left out 2.13% of the trials. In lexical decision, RTs out of the temporal window between 
250 ms and 1750 ms were cut off, leaving out 1.97% of trials.  
The ANOVA on RTs revealed three significant main effects, and showed also five 
significant interactions. We report the results starting from the more important for our 
hypotheses. First of all, there was an overall significant interaction between Temporal 
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reference and Key (F(2, 92) = 4.13, MSe = 10857.24, p <.05), which showed faster responses 
to past verbs and nonverbs with the left than with the right key (left key M = 959 ms vs. right 
key M = 963 ms) and to future verbs and nonverbs with the right than with the left key (left 
key M = 986 ms vs. right key M = 947 ms). Of central importance, the interaction of 
Temporal reference and Key was modulated by Task (F(3, 184) = 4.39, MSe = 10857.24, p 
<.05; Temporal judgment: Past verbs - left key M = 1069 ms, right key M = 1095 ms; Future 
verbs - left key M = 1084 ms, right key M = 1022 ms - Newman-Keuls all ps <.05. Lexical 
decision: Past verbs - left key M = 848 ms, right key M = 833 ms; Future verbs - left key M = 
887 ms,  right key M = 873 ms) (see Fig. 1). This three-way interaction is due to a null effect 
of space-time conceptual congruency in lexical decision, whereas the effect was clear in time 
judgement. This is in line with the findings of Ulrich & Maienborn (2010).  
 
 
Figure 1. Experiment 1 - Mean latencies for the interaction Task x Temporal reference x Key. 
 
To better understand this crucial interaction, we decided to collapse the two levels 
Temporal reference and Key in a Compatibility factor (congruent vs. Incongruent trials) and 
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to report also the Task x Compatibility interaction (F(2, 92) = 4.39, MSe = 5428.62, p <.05; 
Temporal judgment: congruent M = 1046 ms, incongruent M = 1089 ms; Newman-Keuls p 
<.01. Lexical decision: congruent M = 861 ms, incongruent M = 860 ms) in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Experiment 1 - Mean latencies for the interaction Task x Congruency. 
 
Less importantly for our current purposes, there was also a clear effect of Lexical 
status (F(1, 46) = 122.04, MSe = 8172.35, p <.001), due to longer latencies being observed for 
nonwords (M = 1015 ms) than words (M = 913 ms). This is in line with the psycholinguistic 
literature about the lexicality effect (e.g., Kinoshita el al., 2004; Pagliuca et al., 2010). The 
main effect of Task was significant too (F(1, 46) = 17.72, MSe = 232148.58, p <.001), 
showing longer mean latencies for the temporal judgment (M = 1067 ms) than lexical decision 
(M = 861 ms). The final significant main effect was Key (F(1, 46) = 6.80, MSe = 4123.65, p 
<.05), with longer latencies for the left key (M = 972 ms) than the right key (M = 955 ms). 
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Additionally, other three interactions were reliable. First, the Task x Lexical status 
interaction (F(2, 92) = 5.01, MSe = 8172.35, p <.05), due to the lexicality effect being smaller 
in the lexical decision task (word M = 820 ms vs. nonword M = 901 ms) than in the temporal 
judgment task (word M = 1006 ms vs. nonword M = 1129 ms). This interaction supports that 
participants paid close attention to lexical status in the time judgement task. Second, the Task 
x Temporal reference interaction (F(2, 92) = 22.79, MSe = 5020.66, p <.001), due to 
responses to past stimuli being faster than to future stimuli in lexical decision (past M = 841 
ms vs. future M = 881 ms), whereas the opposite occurred in temporal judgment (past M = 
1082 ms vs. future M = 1053 ms). Finally, the interaction of Task, Lexical status and 
Temporal reference was significant as well (F(3, 184) = 6.45, MSe = 3192.59, p <.05; 
Temporal judgment: Word - past verbs M = 1011 ms, future verbs M = 1001 ms; Nonword - 
past verbs M = 1153 ms, future verbs M = 1105 ms - Newman-Keuls p <.001. Lexical 
decision: Word - past verbs M = 805 ms, future verbs M = 835 ms - Newman-Keuls p <.05; 
Nonword - past verbs M = 876 ms, future verbs M = 926 ms - Newman-Keuls p <.001). 
No other main effects nor interactions were significant. 
The analysis of accuracy revealed only a lexicality main effect (F(1, 46) = 15.85, MSe 
= 0.01, p <.001), showing the greater easiness of processing words than nonwords (95% vs. 
93% correct responses, respectively). No other main effects nor interactions were significant. 
 
8.2.3. Discussion 
In Experiment 1 we found a significant interaction between the temporal reference of the 
stimulus (past vs. future) and the side of response (left key vs. right key) in the time-relevant 
temporal judgement task, taking the form of a standard left-right space-time congruency 
effect: responses to past stimuli were faster with the left finger and responses to future stimuli 
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were faster with the right finger, independently of their lexicality. This was not observed in 
the time-irrelevant lexical decision task.  
Thus, Experiment 1 replicates prior findings in the literature (Torralbo el al., 2006; 
Santiago el al., 2007; Ulrich & Maienborn, 2010) suggesting, firstly, that a left-to-right mental 
time-line is activated in the temporal judgment task; and secondly, that this only occurs when 
the processing of temporal reference is task relevant (i.e., when it is required to select the 
correct response). This occurred in spite of both tasks being based on exactly the same set of 
stimuli, short single words and nonwords that could be apprehended in one fixation and which 
all of them carried morphological markers of tense. In the temporal judgment task, the 
emergence of the effect was independent from the lexicality of the stimuli, thereby confirming 
that the design of the materials made sure that the information about temporal reference was 
equally present and salient in both words/nonwords. Present data relieve several concerns 
raised in the introduction regarding the automaticity of the activation of the left-right mental 
timeline. The possibility remains, however, that a more sensitive measure may reveal a space-
time congruency effect in the time-irrelevant lexical decision task. In order to test this 
possibility, Experiment 2 collected mouse trajectories instead of reaction times.  
 
 
8.3. Experiment 2  
Experiment 2 was almost identical to Experiment 1, changing only the data collection 
technique. Instead of reaction times, we chose a kinematic measure (mouse movements), 
which was collected using the MouseTracker Software Package (Freeman & Ambady, 2010). 
This software records the stream of x-y coordinates of participants’ mouse trajectories, 
allowing a precise characterization of both the spatial and temporal dynamics of the 
responses. Thus, we were able to track continuous hand movements during the task with the 
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aim of observing the graded effects of competition between items attracting the trajectory of 
the mouse. This technique, which has been successfully adopted in several psychological 
studies (Freeman et al., 2011), could be considered as a novel complement for more 
traditional techniques such as the measurement of reaction times. The use of MouseTracker 
implicated some procedural differences. Participants were instructed to click with a standard 
mouse used with their dominant hand a start button located at the bottom center of the screen. 
The stimulus was then presented at the center of the screen, with participants being instructed 
to respond by mouse-clicking one of two squares displayed at the top corners of the screen. 
All other methodological aspects of Experiment 2, chiefly the set of materials, the design, and 
the two types of task, were the same of Experiment 1. As MouseTracker tracks continuous 
manual reaching movements, the technique allows the study of the online dynamics of the 
decision process, which is realized over multiple competing possibilities. Thus, it can reveal 
the uncertainty during response unfolding and its time course. At a theoretical level, deciding 
between the two response choices (past vs. future, and word vs. nonword) could be described 
as a continuous and dynamic competition between attractors (Spivey, 2007). These 
possibilities can push or pull the movement of the hand (so affecting the recorded mouse 
trajectory) in different directions inside a workspace defined by the locations of the response 
squares, exactly like how real magnetic attractors would do to the needle of a compass. 
MouseTracker allows the collection of several measures of continuous performance. There 
are two temporal indexes. First, there is Initiation Time, which measures the time from the 
click on the start button and the beginning of mouse movement. Second, there is the 
Trajectory time, which is analogous to a standard reaction time, as it measures the total time 
elapsed from the click on the start button and the click on the response box. Third, there is 
Maximum Deviation Time, which indexes the time between the beginning of mouse 
movement and the moment of greatest divergence between the mouse trajectory and an ideal 
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straight line between the start and response locations. There are also a variety of spatial 
measures of decisional conflict. The most sensitive, and the only one we focused on in this 
study, is the Area Under the Curve (AUC). It is calculated as the geometric area between 
mouse trajectory and the ideal straight line from the start button to the correct response box 
(Freeman & Ambady, 2010). Any attraction toward the alternative response box will induce a 
deviation of the mouse trajectory from this ideal straight line, generating an area between the 
actual and the ideal trajectory. The greater the attraction, the greater the area. A second, 
related spatial measure is Maximum Deviation, which is the point of the actual trajectory that 
is maximally distant from the ideal straight trajectory. Finally, there are the measures of x-
flips and y-flips numbers, which refer to the number of direction switches along the horizontal 
and the vertical axis, respectively. They describe the complexity of the trajectory, offering a 
further index of indecision in the process of responding. 
 
8.3.1. Method 
8.3.1.1. Participants  
Forty-eight Psychology students from the University of Granada (6 male; age range 20-29 y.; 
4 left-handed by self-report) participated for course credit. All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and were naive as to the purposes of the experiment. As in 
Experiment 1, participants were assigned to two groups: 24 of them performed the temporal 
judgment task, the other 24 the lexical decision task. 
 
8.3.1.2. Materials and procedure 
Everything was kept as identical as possible to Experiment 1 MouseTracker Software 
Package (Freeman & Ambady, 2010) was used to collect the stream of x-y coordinates of the 
mouse trajectories of participants’ manual responses. Thus, precise characterizations of both 
257 
 
temporal and spatial dynamics of the mouse trajectories were available for analysis. 
Individual trajectories were first rescaled to a standard coordinate space, then normalized into 
101 time steps (Freeman & Ambady, 2010). Data were exported to Microsoft Office Excel 
using the utilities included in the MouseTracker package, where they were trimmed (see 
details below).  
Participants sat 60 cm from the computer screen, with their right hand placed over the 
mouse they found in front of them, centrally positioned with respect to the screen. Two grey 
squares were always displayed at the top corners of the screen as response alternatives. Each 
trial began with the appearance of the start button (a grey rectangle at the bottom center of the 
screen) that remained on the screen until clicked. Then the target stimulus appeared at the 
center of the screen. As in Experiment 1, stimuli were presented in Courier New font, 38 
points, lower case, black printed on white background, remaining on the screen until a 
response was made by mouse-clicking one of the response alternatives. As in Experiment 1, 
incorrect trials were followed by a 500 ms red uppercase “X” at the same location of the 
stimulus. Each incorrect trial was then followed by a 1000 ms blank screen. Correct trials 
were followed only by a 1500 ms blank screen. Participants were instructed to decide whether 
the presented verb or nonverb referred to either the past or the future in the temporal judgment 
task or whether the stimuli were real Spanish verbs or not in the lexical decision task. Also as 
in Experiment 1, each task comprised two experimental blocks of 148 trials (separated by a 
two minutes break) in which the same list of stimuli were responded to using the two possible 
different mappings of responses (past/future or word/nonword) to response boxes (left/right). 
The order of presentation of the two mappings was counterbalanced over participants.  
 
8.3.1.3. Design and Analysis 
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The data were analyzed using a mixed factorial ANOVA with the same factors as in 
Experiment 1: Task (temporal judgment vs. lexical decision) x Lexical status (word vs. 
nonword) x Temporal reference (past vs. future) x Key (left vs. right) x Counterbalance (to 
reduce noise, but not reported further). Notice that the factor Key actually refers to the 
location of the response box in either the left or right upper corners of the screen, but we keep 
the same name as in Experiment 1 for the sake of easing comparisons.  
 
8.3.2. Results 
Accuracy, Initiation Time and Trajectory Time 
Errors occurred in 4.73% of trials of the temporal judgement task, and in 1.82% of trials in the 
lexical decision task. Errors were analyzed independently. Any trial in which Trajectory time, 
Initiation time or Maximum deviation exceeded 2.5 standard deviations from each 
participant’s mean were excluded from the analysis. This process led to the removal of an 
additional 3.84% of data in the temporal judgment task and 3.17% in the lexical decision task.  
The ANOVA on Initiation times showed a significant interaction between Task and 
Lexical status (F(2, 92) = 5.28, MSe = 361.86, p <.05): starting a movement of the mouse to a 
word vs. nonword stimulus took the same amount of time in the temporal judgment task 
(word M = 135 ms vs. nonword M = 136 ms), whereas it took longer for words than nonwords 
in the lexical decision task (word M = 163 ms vs. nonword M = 155 ms). 
The ANOVA on total Trajectory times, which are to be considered as the RTs of the 
mouse responses, revealed a significant main effect of the factor Lexical status, (F(1, 46) = 
65.34, MSe = 12630.59, p <.001), with longer latencies for nonwords (M = 1416 ms) than 
words (M = 1323 ms), again in line with the lexicality effect literature. Two interactions were 
significant as well. First, the Task x Temporal reference (F(2, 92) = 20.59, MSe = 6751.90, p 
<.001), due to past tense items being faster than future tense items in lexical decision (past M 
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= 1298 ms vs. future M = 1329 ms; Newman-Keuls p <.05), while the reverse was true in 
temporal judgment (past M = 1470 ms, future M = 1424 ms; Newman-Keuls p <.05). Second, 
the interaction of the factors Task, Lexical status and Temporal reference (F(3, 184) = 5.91, 
MSe = 3168.76, p <.05; Temporal judgment: Word - past M = 1407 ms, future M = 1372 ms; 
Nonword - past M = 1531 ms, future M = 1477 ms. Lexical decision: Word - past M = 1264 
ms, future M = 1277 ms; Nonword - past M = 1331 ms, future M = 1381 ms).  
The analysis of accuracy revealed two main effects: Task (F(1, 46) = 13.07, MSe = 
7.97, p <.001), due to less error in lexical decision than temporal judgment (98.08% vs. 
95.27% of correct responses, respectively), as in Experiment 1; and Lexical status (F(1, 46) = 
15.12, MSe = 2.65, p <.001), which showed a greater accuracy for words than nonwords 
(97.55% vs. 95.81% of correct responses, respectively).  
 
Trajectory spatial analysis 
The ANOVA on Area Under the Curve (AUC) mean values revealed that, as in Experiment 1, 
the interaction of Temporal reference and Key was significant (F(2, 92) = 7.86, MSe = 0.09, p 
<.01): future verbs showed smaller AUC values when responded at the right corner (M = 
0.71) than at the left corner (M = 1.02) (Newman-Keuls p <.001), and the opposite was true 
for past verbs (left M = 0.98, right M = 0.85; Newman-Keuls p <.01). As in Experiment 1, this 
interaction was modulated by the Task factor (F(3, 184) = 12.87, MSe = 0.09, p <.001; 
Temporal judgment: Past verbs - left key M = 1.16, right key M = 1.14; Future verbs - left key 
M = 1.30, right key M = 0.88; Newman-Keuls p <.001; . Lexical decision: Past verbs - left 
key M = 0.79, right key M = 0.56, Newman-Keuls p <.001; Future verbs - left key M = 0.73, 
right key M = 0.54, Newman-Keuls p <.001) (see Fig. 3).  
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Figure 3. Experiment 2 - AUC mean values for the interaction Task x Temporal  
reference x Key. 
 
Thus, the congruency effect was found again only in the temporal judgment task. As in 
Experiment 1, to better clarify this crucial result, we report also the interaction considering the 
factors Task and Compatibility (F(2, 92) = 12.87, MSe = 0.04, p <.001; Temporal judgment: 
congruent M = 1.02, incongruent M = 1.22 - Newman-Keuls p <.001. Lexical decision: 
congruent M = 0.67, incongruent M = 0.64) (see Fig. 4). 
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Figure 4. Experiment 2 - AUC mean values for the interaction Task x Compatibility. 
 
As the same interaction was observed also on Trajectory Time, the results of 
Experiment 2 are perfectly consistent with those in Experiment 1 as well as with the findings 
of Ulrich & Maienborn (2010). This supports the conclusion that the space-time congruency 
effect does not arise automatically, but only when the temporal dimension is task relevant. A 
plot of the mean trajectories of each task are reported in Figure 5 and 6. 
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Figure 5. Mean trajectories for Congruent vs. Incongruent trials in Temporal judgment task. 
 
 
Figure 6. Mean trajectories for Congruent vs. Incongruent trials in Lexical decision task. 
 
There were other significant findings of less relevance to current purposes. First, the 
factor Task was significant (F(1, 46) = 11.23, MSe = 1.86, p <.01), due to lower AUC mean 
263 
 
values in lexical decision (M = 0.66) than in temporal judgment (M = 1.12). Second, the factor 
Key (F(1, 46) = 10.42, MSe = 0.44, p <.01) indicated higher trajectory curvatures when 
participants responded going to the left (M = 1.00) than to the right side of the screen (M = 
0.78). Third, the factor Lexical status approached significance (F(1, 46) = 3.06, MSe = 0.12, p 
=.087), due to a bigger curvature - greater indecision - when participants responded to 
nonwords (M = 0.92) than to words (M = 0.86).  Finally, there was an interaction between 
Task and Lexical status (F(2, 92) = 9.86, MSe = 0.12, p <.01), due to smaller areas in the 
lexical decision for words (M = 0.57) than nonwords (M = 0.74; Newman-Keuls p <.01), 
while in temporal judgment no difference was observed (words 1.15 vs. nonwords 1.10).  
No other main effects or interactions were significant. 
 
8.3.3. Discussion 
Experiment 2 found a significant interaction between left-right responses and temporal 
reference in the temporal judgment task. Therefore, it confirmed and extended prior findings 
in the literature (e.g., Torralbo el al., 2006; Santiago el al., 2007; Ulrich & Maienborn, 2010), 
showing that the space-time congruency effect can also be observed on mouse trajectories. 
Experiment 2 also confirmed the absence of a congruency effect in the time-irrelevant lexical 
decision. This null interaction in the time-irrelevant task occurred in the context of a very 
clear interaction in the time-relevant task, using the same stimuli, procedures and participant 
population. This replicated the findings of Experiment 1 using a different and probably more 
sensitive measure. Therefore, , it seems that even when specially designed stimuli are used to 
make sure that temporal reference is processed, the emergence of a congruency effect 
between left-right space and temporal content of the stimuli is strongly mediated by the task 
context, specifically by the explicit goal of the task. The present pattern of results strongly 
suggests that the space-time congruency effect is not automatic. 
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8.4. General Discussion 
The present study was aimed at addressing the issue of automaticity in the activation of the 
left-right mental time-line. In line with prior findings, we observed flexibility, not 
automaticity, in the activation of the mental time-line (e.g., Torralbo et al., 2006; Ulrich et al., 
2012). The results we observed perfectly reproduced the already reported findings in a 
situation in which the potential methodological confounds present in the previous studies 
about the issue of automaticity were avoided (e.g., Ulrich & Maienborn 2010). Indeed, firstly 
short single words and nonwords especially designed to secure a deep processing generated a 
strong space-time congruency effect when participants judged their temporal reference, but 
failed to do it in a lexical decision task. Secondly, this happened not only when response 
latencies were used for measuring the effect (Experiment 1) as in the previous studies, but 
also when we recorded the mouse trajectories of the hand movements performed by 
participants to decide over concurrent response possibility (Experiment 2).  Finally, we 
performed both the tasks following an identical procedure and using the very same pool of 
stimuli, thus allowing a real comparison of the results of the two tasks. But at the end, our 
findings on Spanish tensed verbs agree well with the conclusions obtained by Ulrich et al. 
(2012) regarding the front-back mental time line, and corroborates those by Ulrich and 
Maienborn (2010) regarding the left-right time line with full sentences in German. 
Present results are consistent with the view that, all other factors being equal, only the 
conceptual mappings that are required to carry out the task are set up in working memory. 
This is predicted by the coherent working models theory proposed by Santiago and colleagues 
(2011), which fundamentally rests on the assumption that mental models of any situation are 
constrained to be the most internally coherent and simple as possible. So, given the 
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requirements of the task, it would be very likely that only the necessary information is 
retrieved from the long-term memory system and recalled in the mental working space. The 
authors explicitly indicated this characteristic of mental models as the central factor for 
accounting the flexibility of conceptual congruency effects which has been observed in the 
literature in a wide variety of tasks, and not only in linguistic ones (i.e., the flexibility and 
context-relatedness of affordance-based compatibility effects, see for example Borghi et al., 
2012; Kalénine et al., 2013; Natraj et al., 2013; see chapter 4 and 5). Thus, at a theoretical 
level, such a model seems to be able to explain the fitness of human behaviour: our life would 
not be so adapted to the environment, if stimuli would be so preponderant and invasive in 
respect to subjective intentions to determine cognitive processes with their mere presence. 
However, it is obvious that present results leave open many future lines of inquiry, and 
even if they stand in favor of a flexible view of the effect, the issue of the automaticity (or 
lack thereof) in the activation of the mental time line is still not closed. Indeed, an important 
open question is whether it could be possible to observe the activation of the mental time line 
in time-irrelevant tasks when using different conditions. There are several directions that 
future research might attempt. A first, interesting possibility has to do with the use of 
temporal stimuli which have a more direct link to temporal reference, such as dates, months 
or weekdays (e.g., Gevers et al. 2004). A second possibility is that more sensitive and subtle 
measures (e.g., eye tracking) in respect of the ones already used might be able to find the 
effects with the same experimental paradigm (i.e., lexical decision). Finally, it is possible that 
lexical decision requires a too superficial processing of the stimuli: it is clearly showed by 
response latencies that this is true in respect of time judgments. Thus, future researches may 
be able to design tasks that would able to activate the spatial dimension even if requiring in-
depth cognitive processes different from space-time mapping. Anyway, we do not propend for 
this possibility, as in the literature lexical decision has demonstrated to be a good setting for 
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observing implicit conceptual effects (e.g., in the study on positive-negative valence items 
and forward-backward manual movements of Wentura et al., 2000). 
On the other side, if the activation of the mental time line needs the participants 
attention to be directly drawn on temporal aspects of the stimuli and really remains goal-
dependent, idea that as said above makes much sense to us, at least this raises the question of 
why. Indeed, in the literature other conceptual mappings which project onto the spatial 
dimension have been shown to be activated automatically, at least under certain conditions 
(e.g., number magnitude, Fischer et al., 2003; evaluation with approach-avoidance responses, 
Chen & Barg, 1999). Space and time seem to be intrinsically linked from the initial stages in 
development (Piaget, 1969), whereas the influence of space on temporal judgments in 
psychophysics tasks remains until the adult age (e.g., Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008; 
Casasanto et al., 2010). Future research needs to definitively address the question of why 
participants do not activate the spatial dimension when processing linguistic stimuli even if 
they exhibit an evident temporal reference. 
In conclusion, the present results corroborate the Flexible foundations view of abstract 
concepts (e.g., Santiago et al., 2011): the left-right space-time congruency effect was observed 
only in the case in which participants were explicitly required to judge temporal reference of 
the stimuli. Thus, this conceptual effect seems to be strongly mediated by the context that was 
determined by the goals of the experimental task. 
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9. Evidence of sound-symbolism with every-day objects figures 
 
In par. 3.6, a discussion about the possible evolution of human language highlighted that a 
basic idea shared by many embodied accounts is the supposed gestural origin of 
contemporary verbal languages. Following the assumption that speech evolved from gestures 
it was proposed that, during the gradual phylogenetic shift to verbal language, it is very likely 
that the vocal system initially reproduced the characteristics of the gestural medium it 
emerged from. Thus, referring to the literature on actually observable gestural languages, that 
are contemporary signed languages, it was suggested that the principal property they exhibit is 
iconicity, intended as the resemblance relation between the sign meaning and its gestural 
expression. This led to the identification of a possible counterpart of this phenomenon in 
vocal language: if visual iconicity sustained the grounding of meaning in gestural languages, 
sound-symbolism - intended as the natural, non-arbitrary link between the sound and the 
meaning of a word – did it for speech. Several scholars have already suggested that sound-
symbolism played an important role in the evolution of contemporary vocal languages, 
underlying the existence in modern lexicon of sound-symbolic words referring to sound-to-
meaning correspondences about information from various modality. In line with this view, 
recent research has started to emphasize the role and importance of iconicity in language, as a 
possible mean to connect and ground the linguistic-communicative form with the sensory-
motor characteristics of words referents. A compelling part of the evidence produced by prior 
experimental research on sound-symbolic correspondences has focused on sound-shape 
mappings (i.e. sonorant words associated to rounded shapes, strident words associated to 
jagged shapes). This literature, however, exhibits some evident methodological limitations. 
Indeed, the setting was usually a double forced-choice paradigm with simultaneous 
presentation of both words and shapes pairs. In addition, the totality of the studies used not 
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only invented words, but also ad-hoc figures, created especially for such experiments. This 
led sound-symbolic skeptics to affirm that the reported effects may be due to the properties of 
the figures, or to the structure of the task. It is obvious that assuming sound-symbolism as 
playing a role in natural language evolution implies the necessity of observing it in more 
ecological experimental settings. In order to demonstrate the reality of sound-symbolism, the 
present study was guided by the hypothesis that sound-shape correspondences would be 
observed when participants had to choose, between two invented words, the name which 
better suited an image representing a common object/entity. Considering that stimuli 
reproduced every-day entities, a following hypothesis was that this effect would be modulated 
by the entity category too (e.g., natural objects would be represented with smoother shapes 
compared to artifacts). The results confirmed the “classic” sound-shape correspondences with 
this more ecological stimuli, showing the effect both in Experiment 1, when participants 
chose a name for figures of natural objects (e.g., leaf) and artifacts (e.g., fork), and in 
Experiment 2, when participants chose a name for figures of natural (e.g., animals) and 
artificial agents (e.g., robots). Furthermore, a modulation of the category emerged when 
participants had to name agents: sound-shape correspondences were not observed with robots, 
which were associated more often to strident words despite of their actual shape. On the 
whole, these results confirm the validity of sound-symbolism in more ecological situations, 
bolstering the hypothesis of a natural line of evolution from gestures to iconically grounded 
forms of speech. 
 
 
9.1. Introduction 
In his Institutiones (VI cent. C.E.) Justinian affirmed that Nomina sunt consequentia rerum to 
indicate that verbal language has its origin from the things it denotes. The very beginning of 
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the philosophical debate on the origin of language precedes at least of some centuries this 
Latin laconism, as in Plato’s Cratylus (IV cent. B.C.E) there is a talk about the possibility of 
the existence of a resemblance relation between the structure of words and of what they 
denote. Even if this is not Plato’s position, this dialog suggests the emergence of a naturalistic 
vision of language as opposed to the alternative sophists’ view, according to which the word-
referent relation is totally arbitrary.  
The principle of arbitrariness of human language, however, remains nowadays widely 
accepted among linguists, philosophers and psychologists (Kovic et al., 2009; Nielsen & 
Rendall, 2011; Nygaard et al., 2009a, b; for a different position, see Reilly et al., 2012). Since 
the Course in General Linguistic (De Saussure, 1916), contemporary sciences of language 
have followed the perspective which affirms that a label is always arbitrarily assigned to a 
referent (e.g. object, event, relation etc.), being each assignation grounded only on socio-
cultural conventions (Nielsen & Rendall, 2011; Pietrandrea, 2002). This view considered as 
accidentally assigned even those names which entertain with their referents (e.g., sounds) a 
transparent iconic relation. With iconicity we refer to the similarity between certain properties 
of the words and the sensory-motor characteristics of their referents, as it happens in 
onomatopoeias, in which words evoke acoustic experiences (e.g. buzz, hiss; see chapter 3).  
In spite of the wide acceptance of the principle of arbitrariness of language, some 
dissonant voices are starting to emerge. Research on language evolution has suggested that 
the emergence of lexicon conventionality could be a belated stage in the evolution of human 
language. Indeed, from a phylogenetic point of view, linguistic conventions might be settled 
on originally iconic linguistic forms (Merleau-Ponty, 1945; Steels, 2011), and so considered 
as the outcome of a process which has recursively and efficiently maximized communication 
(Burling, 1999; Corballis, 2009; Fay et al., 2010; Garrod et al., 2007; Zipf, 1949; for 
modeling work in this direction see Baronchelli et al., 2011).  
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A further important source of inspiration for the research aimed at stressing the fact 
that language is not always arbitrary, in particular when we consider face-to-face interactions, 
comes from the embodied and grounded approach to cognition (reviews in Barsalou, 2008; 
Borghi & Pecher, 2011). This approach solves the so-called symbol-grounding problem 
(Harnad, 1990) by proposing that symbols are grounded in the same systems used by 
perception, action and emotion (see chapter 1 and 3). According to this perspective, during 
the processing of words we would re-activate previous experiences with their referent. For 
example, the word “cat” would re-enact the experience of seeing a cat, caressing it, feeding it, 
and so on. In line with this view, recent research has started to emphasize the role and 
importance of iconicity in language, as a possible mean to connect and ground the linguistic-
communicative form with the sensory-motor characteristics of words referents. This research 
has underlined the fact that arbitrariness might not be the rule during face-to-face 
communication, where gestures and iconic words might be consistently used. For example, 
Perniss & Vigliocco (in press) have highlighted the importance of iconicity in both spoken 
and signed language. In their perspective, the role of iconicity is crucial in three important 
aspects of language processing: phylogenesis, ontogenesis and processing. In phylogenesis 
iconicity facilitates displacement, i.e. the ability to refer about things distant in time and 
space, and in ontogenesis it provides a mechanism for establishing referentiality, linking 
linguistic form and meaning and hence facilitating word learning. Finally, in language 
processing iconicity facilitates grounding of words in sensory-motor and emotional systems, 
thereby determining embodiment.  
In this paper we investigate the word-referent relationship focusing on the direct bindings 
between the word sound and certain aspects of the referent appearance (e.g., shape). With 
word sound we refer to a multimodal experience, including both the acoustic experience 
during language comprehension and the phono-articulatory experience during word 
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production. The idea underlying this investigation is that words can entertain a non-arbitrary 
relation with their referents. This process has been identified in speech as sound-symbolism or 
phonosemantics (Hinton et al., 1994; Parise & Pavani, 2011), and it is something that works 
in a way similar to iconicity in sign languages (e.g. Corballis, 2002, 2009; Gentilucci et al., 
2004; Gentilucci & Corballis, 2006; Pietrandrea, 2002; Perniss et al., 2010; Pizzuto & 
Volterra, 2000; Thompson et al., 2009, 2010).  
The psychological literature on sound-symbolism is longstanding, dating at least the 
first half of the last century. Indeed, Edward Sapir already suggested in his most known essay 
on language that verbal labels are able to catch aspects of what they refer to. As evidence of 
this, Sapir (1929) reported results of an experiment where almost the totality of the 
participants - English mother tongues - assigned the invented names mil or mal to a small or a 
big table respectively, thus intuitively coupling the sound of the words with the size of the 
objects. Similarly, Wolfgang Köhler (1929; 1947) revealed the existence of correspondences 
between word sounds and visual shapes: Spanish participants intuitively assigned an invented 
word with rounded vowels (baluma, or by 1947 maluma) to rounded invented figures and an 
invented word with unrounded vowels (takete) to jagged invented figures. Finally, the cross-
linguistic ability to guess foreign words meaning, registered with samples of different mother 
tongues (e.g. Brown et al., 1955; Gebels, 1969; Hinton et al., 1994; Koriat & Levy, 1979; 
Kunihira, 1971), drove some authors to explicitly affirm that speech may have emerged from 
universal imitative connections between sounds and meanings (Kovic et al., 2009).  
In the last ten years, research conducted on speakers of different languages has 
gathered results which support the idea of sound-shape correspondences (e.g. Akita et al., 
2008; Arata et al., 2010; Asano et al., 2011; Kovic et al., 2009; Iwasaki et al., 2007; Nielsen 
& Rendall, 2011; Nygaard et al., 2009a, b; Parault, 2006; Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001; 
Spector & Maurer, 2008; Westbury, 2005). In particular, Maurer et al. (2006) investigated the 
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takete-maluma phenomenon in 2.5-years-old children and adults to assess whether children 
reliably map words with rounded vowels to rounded shapes, and words with unrounded 
vowels to jagged shapes (for a different interpretation, see Nielsen & Rendall, 2011). 
Participants were shown simultaneously two shapes, a rounded and a jagged one, and had to 
name each shape choosing the name within two alternatives, one with rounded vowels and the 
other with unrounded ones. Results showed that children, as adults, matched names with 
rounded vowels to rounded shapes and names with unrounded vowels to the jagged ones, 
indicating that sound-shape correspondences are at work at the earliest stages of language 
acquisition. 
As Maurer et al. (2006), several studies on sound-shape correspondences have adopted 
naming tasks with a two alternative forced-choice design. Although results of studies 
adopting such a kind of paradigm support the hypothesis of a non-arbitrary relation between 
words and their referents, there are some methodological issues which might bring a sound-
symbolism skeptic to say that results can be due to some sort of confounds. For example, as 
far as our knowledge is concerned, the most part of experiments adopting the naming 
paradigm has proposed forced-choice tasks where two words, one sonorant and one strident, 
were simultaneously presented together with the stimuli figures pairs. The risk with such a 
design is twofold, as it was clearly highlighted by Nielsen and Rendall (2011). First, the 
purpose of the experiment can become very transparent to subjects, which are required to 
compare both figures and names in each trial. Second, the simultaneous presentation doesn’t 
allow disentangling when the results are due to two matches, one for strident sounds/jagged 
shapes and another for sonorant sounds/rounded shapes, and when there is only one match in 
one of the two directions. Indeed, in each trial the subjects second-choice is automatically 
defined by the image and the name they have coupled first. Another problem is that these 
experiments might be poorly ecological and might not reflect what happens in real life, since 
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both the words and the stimulus figures are created ad-hoc for the experiment. Moreover, 
these ad-hoc figures emphasize the features under investigation (e.g., roundness, jaggedness), 
thus possibly inducing an enhancement of the reported behavioral effects (see Nielsen & 
Rendall, 2011 for a similar critique). 
For these reasons, in the present study we tested the correspondences between sounds 
and shapes avoiding a double forced-choice paradigm, and using visual stimuli representing 
every-day objects and entities. Participants were required to choose between two words the 
suitable name for an image which represented a well known object/entity, common in every-
day life.  
Using every-day stimuli allowed us to overcome one further limitation of current 
studies on sound-symbolic correspondences. To our knowledge, no study so far has taken into 
account the possible effects of categorical differences on sound-symbolic correspondences. In 
contrast, the literature on concepts and categorization has highlighted profound differences in 
the representation of artifacts and natural objects and of living and not living entities, as 
indicated by neural studies on brain activation (for a review, see Martin, 2007), by 
neuropsychological studies on categorical deficits (e.g. Humphreys & Forde, 2001; Gainotti, 
2000) and by behavioral studies on categorization in children (e.g. Mandler, 1992; Rakison & 
Oakes, 2003) and adults (e.g. Borghi et al., 2007; Laurence & Margolis, 2007; Roversi et al., 
2013). Some authors have underlined that categorical distinctions in infants might be based on 
perceptual cues as well as on motion cues (e.g. Mandler, 1992, 2004). Motion cues differ for 
animals and artifacts: animals are characterized by self-propelled movements and by 
nonlinear and smooth motion paths, while artifacts are characterized by induced motion and 
by linear motion path (Mandler, 1992; Rakison & Paulin-Dubois, 2001, 2002). In a similar 
vein, recent research has shown that some features of words, such as their grammatical 
gender, are not arbitrarily related to the characteristics of the referents belonging to different 
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categories. Sera et al. (2002) asked English, Spanish, French and German children and adults 
speakers to attribute male or female voices to inanimate objects. Result showed that for 
gendered languages the relation between grammatical gender and the perception of items as 
being male- or female-like was not arbitrary: speakers of Spanish and French, unlike speakers 
of German, relied on grammatical gender in their assignment of male and female voices to 
inanimate objects.  The different results obtained with French and Spanish compared to 
German speakers suggest that the effect is present with grammatical systems characterized by 
two gender categories (German has 3), where grammatical and natural gender are highly 
correlated. More crucially for us, the gender assignment interacted with the category of the 
objects, showing that artificial objects were more often perceived as male-like than natural 
ones, which were instead considered more female-like. Thus, the authors pointed out that the 
natural–artificial distinction may be correlated to several factors, such as item shape 
(rounded/jagged), density (light/heavy), or common use (typically used by females/males), 
which map onto the grammatical gender assignments in a phonesemantic-like manner. 
On the basis of the reviewed evidence, we reasoned that manipulating the category 
would allow us to get some hints on how categories are represented with a paradigm never 
used in this context. As suggested by Sera et al. (2002) it is possible, indeed, that one further 
feature distinguishing natural objects and artifacts pertains their shape: the shape of natural 
objects could be mentally represented as smoother compared to artifacts’ shape. In light of 
these considerations, we designed a paradigm that allowed us to study the development of the 
sound-symbolic correspondence with every-day objects/entities, which belonged to different 
categories. We will expose below our hypotheses, based on the main manipulations we 
decided to introduce. 
First, we hypothesize that the sound-shape correspondence effect would be conserved 
if the figures represent every-day entities and, second, if they are one-by-one presented. If the 
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hypothesis is confirmed, this will show that the effect is due neither to the structure of the task 
nor to the properties of the shown figures. 
Third, we hypothesize that the sound-shape effect is modulated by objects/entities 
category. To this aim in Experiment 1 the stimuli figures represented every-day objects, 
which could be natural objects or artifacts, and in Experiment 2 the stimuli were figures 
representing natural (i.e., animals) or artificial agents (i.e., robots), to explore whether natural 
entities are represented with smoother shapes as compared to artificial entities.  
 
 
9.2. Experiment 1 
 
9.2.1. Method 
9.2.1.1. Participants 
Twenty-four undergraduate students from the University of Bologna participated in the 
experiment for course credits (9 males; mean age = 20.79 (2.23); 2 left-handed by self-report). 
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were naive as to the purposes of 
the experiment. 
 
9.2.1.2. Materials 
The task consisted in choosing one word within a pair as the preferred name for the picture 
stimulus. Words pair was simultaneously displayed on the screen. Stimuli consisted of 24 
black-and-white line figures chosen from the graphic database by Lotto, Dell’Acqua and Job 
(2001). Twelve figures referred to natural objects and twelve figures referred to artifacts, and 
each set was composed by 6 rounded-shaped and 6 angular-shaped figures. Each participant 
rated each picture after the experimental session on a 7-point Likert scale for 
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sharpness/roundness (1: “very sharp” – 7: “very rounded”). Ratings were analyzed in a 2 x 2 
ANOVA with the within factors Figure Type (Natural vs. Artificial) and Figure Shape 
(Rounded vs. Jagged). The ANOVA with items as random factor revealed a main effect of 
Figure Type, F(1, 5) = 24.98, MSe = 0.17, p < .01 (Natural M = 4.21, Artificial M = 3.37), and 
of Figure Shape, F(1, 5) = 134.23, MSe = 0.41, p < .001 (Rounded M = 5.31, Jagged M = 
2.26). The interaction between Figure Type and Figure Shape was not significant. 
The ANOVA with subjects as random factor showed the main effects of Figure Type, 
F(1, 23) = 68.11, MSe = 0.25, p < .001 (Natural M = 4.21, Artificial M = 3.37), and of Figure 
Shape, F(1, 23) = 718.69, MSe = 0.31, p < .001 (Rounded M = 5.31, Jagged M = 2.26). The 
interaction between Figure Type and Figure Shape was significant as well, F(2, 46) = 11.26, 
MSe = 0.24, p < .01 (Natural: Rounded shape M = 5.89, Jagged shape M = 2.51,; Artificial: 
Rounded shape M = 4.72, Jagged shape M = 2.01) (LSD, all ps < .001). 
To control if participating in the experiment exerted an influence on participants’ 
attitudes about object shapes, an additional independent group was asked to make an identical 
evaluation of the pictures. The independent group was composed by twenty-four students 
from the University of Bologna, participating for course credits (7 males; mean age = 23.42 
(3.51); 5 left-handed by self-report). They had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were 
naive as to the purposes of the questionnaire. The independent ratings were again analyzed 
with the 2 x 2 ANOVA, with the within factors Figure Type (Natural vs. Artificial) and 
Figure Shape (Rounded vs. Jagged). The ANOVA by-item revealed a main effect of Figure 
Type, F(1, 5) = 11.26, MSe = 0.30, p < .05 (Natural M = 4.37, Artificial M = 3.62), and of 
Figure Shape, F(1, 5) = 258.17, MSe= 0.27, p < .001 (Rounded M = 5.69, Jagged M = 2.30). 
The interaction between Figure Type and Figure Shape was not significant.  
The ANOVA by-participants showed the main effects of Figure Type, F(1, 23) = 
68.54, MSe = 0.20, p < .001 (Natural M = 4.37, Artificial M = 3.62), and Figure Shape, F(1, 
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23) = 718.69, MSe = 0.31, p < .001 Rounded M = 5.69, Jagged M = 2.30). The interaction 
between Figure Type and Figure Shape was significant as well, F(2, 46) = 11.37, MSe = 0.14, 
p < .01 (Natural: Rounded shape M = 6.19, Jagged shape M = 2.55; Artificial: Rounded shape 
M = 5.18, Jagged shape M = 2.06) (LSD, all ps < .001). Thus, the ratings of the independent 
group showed a pattern identical to the ratings of the experimental group. Indeed, ratings 
predict both the sound-symbolic correspondence of names and shapes, and an effect of the 
category, which should emerge in the experimental results in a form similar to the standard 
sound-symbolic effect. 
The 8 words, used as names for the 24 pictures, were taken from the study by Maurer 
et al. (2006) and manipulated in the way they were written to obtain in Italian the same sound 
they have in English (e.g., the English bouba was transformed in the Italian boba, see the 
Appendix for the complete list of stimuli). The 8 names were coupled in the same four pairs 
of the experiment by Maurer et al. (2006), always composed by one sonorant, round-sounding 
word (e.g. maluma) and one strident, sharp-sounding word (e.g. takete). Each pair of words 
was visually presented on a computer screen under the picture to name (see Figure 1). Thus, 
depending on the object appearance in the figure (Figure Shape: Rounded vs. Jagged) and on 
the phonological characteristics of the name (Response Type: Rounded vs. Jagged), in each 
trial it was possible to obtain as response a sound-symbolic combination (e.g. choosing 
maluma as the name of a rounded-shaped figure) or a non-sound-symbolic combination (e.g. 
choosing maluma as the name of a jagged-shaped figure). For sake of simplicity we defined 
the two levels of both Figure Shape and Response Type factors as Rounded vs. Jagged. 
279 
 
 
Figure 1. Experimental stimuli and procedure 
 
9.2.1.3. Design and procedure  
Participants sat 50 cm from the computer screen. Each trial began with a fixation point (+) 
lasting for 500 ms. Then the stimulus picture was displayed centrally, remaining on the screen 
for 5 seconds or until a response was made. The two names were simultaneously presented 
under the picture, one on the left and the other on the right (the names order was 
counterbalanced between subjects). Participants were required to decide which of the two 
names was more suitable for the picture displayed above them by pressing two keys on an 
Italian QWERTY keyboard. The keyboard was positioned close to the screen so that each of 
the two keys was located perfectly below the name to which it corresponded: participants 
pressed the 5 key to choose the name on the left and the 9 key for the name on the right (see 
Figure 1). At the beginning of the experiment they were instructed to respond as quickly as 
they could. They did not receive any feedback about the accuracy of their responses, as they 
were told no correct/incorrect values were settled for the trials. Considering that each of the 
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total 24 pictures was presented once with each of the 4 word pairs, the experiment consisted 
overall in 96 experimental trials, preceded by 8 training trials to familiarize with the 
procedure.  
 
9.2.2. Results 
Missing responses (i.e. responses that required more than 5 seconds to be given) were 
removed. Their very low rate (0.17%) testified the task was easy to perform. All the 
remaining responses were transformed in percentage of choosing a rounded response (the 
percentage of rounded and jagged responses sum up to 100%, thus they cannot be considered 
as independent from each other) and entered in a 2 x 2 ANOVA with the within factors Figure 
Type (Natural vs. Artificial) and Figure Shape (Rounded vs. Jagged). Fisher’s LSD post hoc 
tests were conducted on significant interactions. The ANOVA on the percentage of rounded 
responses showed only the expected main effect of Figure Shape, F(1, 23) = 20.43, MSe = 
341.23, p <. 001, due to rounded sounding names being more frequently assigned as label to 
Rounded shapes (M = 61.86%) than to Jagged shapes (M = 44.82%), as reported in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Experiment 1 - Main effect of Figure Shape 
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In this task, each picture was repeated 4 times. To control if picture repetition could 
have affected the results, we repeated the analysis on the data collected in Experiment 1 
considering only the trials of first presentation of each picture. The percentage of rounded 
responses to the first presentation were entered in a 2 x 2 ANOVA with the within factors 
Figure Type (Natural vs. Artificial) and Figure Shape (Rounded vs. Jagged). Fisher’s LSD 
post hoc tests were conducted on significant interactions. 
The ANOVA on the percentage of rounded responses showed a marginally significant 
main effect of Figure Shape, F(1, 23) = 3.95, MSe = 525.59, p <. 06, due to rounded sounding 
names being more frequently associated to Rounded shapes (M = 55.90%) than to Jagged 
shapes (M = 46.60%). 
Finally, to control if the experimental results were related to the pictures ratings, we 
correlated subjects’ mean rating to each picture and the mean percentage of rounded response 
then assigned to that picture. The correlation was positive and highly significant (r = .24, p < 
.001), indicating that the more the picture was subjectively perceived as round, the more the 
participant tended to label it with a rounded word. 
Importantly, we confirmed the results of the ANOVA and of correlations by mixed 
effects models, through which we simultaneously took into account the fine-grained effect of 
perceiving roundness (i.e., ratings values) and the variance due to random factors such as 
Item, or Names Pair. We defined the first model as the most complete one, i.e., with Figure 
Type and Ratings as fixed effects, and Item (i.e., each picture), Names Pair (i.e., the two 
names within to choose) and Participant in interaction with Figure Type and Rating as random 
effects. Then, at each consecutive step we tried another model by firstly eliminating random 
effects one by one, then interaction between fixed effects, and finally fixed effects one by one. 
Each time we performed a log-likelihood test to determine if one model was worse than the 
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previous in fitting the data: if no significant difference was observed, or if the last model was 
significantly better than the previous one (i.e., log-likelihood value closer to 0) then the less 
complete model was chosen. The final model resulting from this procedure consisted of all 
random effects, and only Rating as fixed effect (AIC = 2888, BIC = 2945, Log-likelihood =-
1434). 
 
9.2.3. Discussion 
As predicted, participants more frequently chose rounded words (e.g. maluma) as names for 
rounded shaped objects figures (e.g. orange) and jagged words (e.g. takete) as names for 
jagged shaped objects figures (e.g. fork), showing a high sensitivity to the correspondence 
between words sounds and visual shapes even if the figures to name represented familiar 
objects. This was true also when we considered only the first presentation of the visual 
stimuli. Importantly, the results of the correlational analysis between ratings and performance 
and of mixed effects models confirmed this finding, and indicated that sound-shape 
correspondence is a continuous, fine-grained effect. This result confirms evidence on the 
sound-shape correspondence effect. Furthermore, it suggests that attaching labels to external 
entities, and specifically to every-day objects which already have a common and 
conventionalized label, is not necessarily an arbitrary activity. Finally, we were able to obtain 
the sound-shape correspondence effect by presenting the stimuli one-by-one, thus avoiding 
potential limits of previous studies, such as the transparency of the experimental aim and the 
enhancement of the observed effects (see Nielsen &Rendall, 2011). 
However, despite the fact that results from all the ratings performed on Experiment 1’s 
pictures showed that artifacts were perceived as sharper than natural objects, the predicted  
effect of the object category (natural vs. artificial) was not found in the choice of the name. 
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9.3. Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1 we asked participants to choose a name for pictures of already known 
objects. We found the predicted sound-symbolic correspondence between names and shapes, 
but no effect of the object category. One possible cause of the absence of a category effect is 
that very different items were compared – for example, the category of artifacts included both 
very simple tools (e.g. spoon) and more complex ones (e.g. compass). In Experiment 2 we 
investigated whether the effect would be found using a more compact sub-category within the 
artificial and natural entities, i.e. the category of agents. We define an agent as an entity 
perceivable as having the ability to autonomously act or move, and endowed with features 
typically linked to animacy (Landau et al., 1988; Backscheider et al., 1999), i.e., eyes. In this 
sense we consider as agents both animals (i.e. natural agents) and robots (i.e. artificial agents). 
In contemporary cultures robots have become a quite credible kind of agent, in part for 
common sense beliefs about Turing machines and Artificial Intelligence, and mostly for the 
part they play in popular culture (e.g. science fiction books, comics, movies). 
Stimuli of Experiment 2 were animals and anthropomorphous robots figures. This 
choice allowed us to compare two categories the members of which are more similar than the 
members of the previously used artifacts and natural objects categories. Lastly, considering 
that an ontogenetic continuity of sound-symbolism has been already shown in literature with 
ad-hoc stimuli (e.g. Maurer et al., 2006), here we tested a sample composed by adults and 
children, to investigate the sound-symbolic phenomenon related to every-day categories in 
function of age. The reasons why we decided to test participants of different ages are 
multifold. First, typically studies on sound-symbolism are realized with children too, and 
considering that Experiment 1 confirms that sound-symbolic correspondences are able to 
affect the labeling of every-day objects, we think it is important to verify whether different 
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processes characterize sound-symbolism with common objects in adults and children. Second, 
and more crucially, we are interested in whether the relationship between shapes and sounds 
emerges earlier in development than the relationship between categories and sounds. We start 
namely from the assumption that language influences categorization (e.g. Lupyan, 2012), and 
that a prolonged use of a given label may render the categories less malleable and more stable 
than they initially are. On this basis, it is very likely that children are more flexible than adults 
in forming categories as those of natural and artificial agents, as the features that result to be 
more salient depend from developmental processes where language plays a fundamental role 
(Sera et al., 2002). While the formation of categories of natural and artificial agents should be 
profoundly influenced by language, this should be less the case for shape categories. The 
interest for the different developmental pattern of the relation between sound and shape 
compared to that between sound and category derives from these considerations.  
Thus, we predicted that, using the more specific subcategory of agents, we would find 
a modulation of the sound-symbolic effect in function of both category and age. In particular, 
we expected a more marked effect of category on the choice of name in adults, as they may 
have a more clear distinction between natural and artificial agents due to experience and 
prolonged use of verbal labels (Sera et al., 2002), as well as because in children the category 
of animated entities might be broader and the representations of natural and artificial agents 
might overlap. In addition, if language influences categorization (e.g., Lupyan, 2012) we 
expect that children's categories are more flexible and malleable compared to the categories of 
adults (see also Sera et al., 2002, for a similar conclusion pertaining gender). Furthermore, we 
expect that adults’ categories will be less permeable to learning effects occurring during the 
experiment (e.g., effects due to figure repetitions).  
 
9.3.1. Method 
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9.3.1.1. Participants 
Twenty-four children (15 males; mean age = 8.79 (1.06); all right-handed) participated to the 
experiment as volunteers, and twenty-four students from the University of Bologna (10 males; 
mean age = 21.04 (2.91); 3 left-handed by self-report) participated for course credits. All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were naive as to the purposes of the 
experiment. 
 
9.3.1.2. Materials  
The materials consisted of twenty-four black-and-white pictures of manmade drawings, of 
which 12 represented animals (6 rounded and 6 jagged-shaped) and 12 robots (6 rounded and 
6 jagged-shaped), and of the same eight words used in Experiment 1 (see the Appendix for 
the complete list of stimuli).  
As in Experiment 1, after the experimental session, each subject rated pictures on a 7-
point Likert scale for roundness/sharpness. A mixed 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA with the between 
factor Group (Children vs. Adults), and the within factors Figure Type (Animal vs. Robot) 
and Figure Shape (Rounded vs. Jagged) was performed. The ANOVA by-item revealed a 
main effect of Figure Type, F(1, 10) = 31.14, MSe = 0.40, p < .01 (Animal M = 4.23, Robot M 
= 3.21), and of Figure Shape, F(1, 10) = 331.59, MSe = 0.24, p < .001 (Rounded M = 5.01, 
Jagged M = 2.42).  The main effect of Group almost reached significance, F(1, 10) = 3.72, 
MSe = 0.25, p < .09 (Children M = 3.86, Adults M = 3.58), as well as the interaction of Group 
and Figure Type, F(2, 20) = 3.61, MSe = 0.40, p < .09 (Children: Animal M = 4.19, Robot M 
= 3.52; Adults: Animal M = 4.26, Robot M = 2.90). No other interactions reached 
significance.  
A by-participants ANOVA with the same factors was performed as well. All the main 
effects were significant: the factor Group, F(1, 10) = 5.46, MSe = 0.67, p < .05 (Children M = 
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3.86, Adults M = 3.58), the factor Figure Type, F(1, 10) = 98.33, MSe = 0.50, p < .001 
(Animal M = 4.23, Robot M = 3.21), and the factor Figure Shape, F(1, 10) = 316.51, MSe = 
1.02, p < .001 (Rounded M = 5.01, Jagged M = 2.42). An interaction was reliable too, the 
Group x Figure Type, F(2, 20) = 11.39, MSe = 0.50, p < .01 (Children: Animal M = 4.19, 
Robot M = 3.52 - LSD p < .05; Adults: Animal M = 4.26, Robot M = 2.90 - LSD p < .001). 
No other interaction reached significance.  
As in Experiment 1, we wanted to control the eventual influence of the repeated 
exposure to the labeling task on the attitudes about visual stimuli shapes, so an additional 
independent group performed the ratings on the pictures of Experiment 2. The independent 
group was composed of twenty-four children (11 males; mean age = 9.13 (0.45); 2 left-
handed by self-report) who participated as volunteers, and twenty-four students from the 
University of Bologna (12 males; mean age = 23.54 (3.37); 3 left-handed by self-report) who 
participated for course credits. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and 
were naive as to the purposes of the questionnaire. The independent ratings were analyzed 
using a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA with the between factor Group (Children vs. Adults) and the within 
factors Figure Type (Animal vs. Robot), Figure Shape (Rounded vs. Jagged). The ANOVA 
by-item revealed the main effect of Figure Type, F(1, 10) = 7.43, MSe = 0.99, p < .05 
(Animal M = 4.08, Robot M = 3.30), and Figure Shape, F(1, 10) = 404.36, MSe = 0.20, p < 
.001 (Rounded M = 4.99, Jagged M = 2.39).  No other main effect or interactions reached 
significance.  
An ANOVA by-subject with the same factors were performed as well, showing as 
significant the three main effects: the factor Group, F(1, 46) = 6.74, MSe = 1.06, p < .05 
(Children M = 3.88, Adults M = 3.49), the factor Figure Type, F(1, 46) = 67.99, MSe = 0.44, p 
< .001 (Animal M = 4.08, Robot M = 3.30), and the factor Figure Shape, F(1, 46) = 589.67, 
MSe = 0.55, p < .001 (Rounded M = 4.99, Jagged M = 2.39). Three interactions almost 
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reached significance, starting from the Group x Figure Shape, F(2, 92) = 3.42, MSe= 0.55, p < 
.08 (Children: Rounded shape M = 5.08, Jagged shape M = 2.68; Adults: Rounded shape M = 
4.89, Jagged shape M = 2.10). Then, the Figure Type x Figure Shape, F(2, 92) = 3.45, MSe= 
0.37, p < .07 (Animal: Rounded shape M = 5.46, Jagged shape M = 2.71; Robot: Rounded 
shape M = 4.51, Jagged shape M = 2.08). Finally, the three-way interaction of the factors 
Group, Figure Type and Figure Shape was almost significant, F(3, 184) = 4.01, MSe= 0.37, p 
< .06 (Children - Animal: Rounded shape M = 5.47, Jagged shape M = 3.08; Robot: Rounded 
shape M = 4.69, Jagged shape M = 2.29. Adults - Animal: Rounded shape M = 5.45, Jagged 
shape M = 2.33; Robot: Rounded shape M = 4.33, Jagged shape M = 1.88). No other effects 
were observed.  
Overall, the independent group ratings partially confirmed the pattern of the 
experimental group, as both ratings predict the “classic” sound-symbolic correspondence of 
sounds and shapes, and also an effect of the category (by itself, or in interaction with the 
stimuli shape) for both experimental groups. 
 
9.3.1.3. Design and procedure  
The design and the procedure were exactly the same of Experiment 1, except for the fact that 
the stimuli used, instead of pictures of natural objects and artifacts, were pictures of animals 
and robots. 
 
9.3.2. Results 
Missing responses were removed (1.28%), and the remaining responses were entered as 
percentages in a mixed 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA with the between factor Group (Children vs. 
Adults) and the within factors Figure Type (Animal vs. Robot), Figure Shape (Rounded vs. 
Jagged). Fisher’s LSD post hoc tests were conducted on significant interactions. 
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The analysis showed, as expected, the significant main effect of the factor Figure 
Shape, F(1, 46) = 11.54, MSe = 132.49, p < .01, due to Rounded shapes (M = 52.45%) being 
more often labeled with a rounded sounding name than Jagged shapes (M = 46.81%) (see Fig. 
3).  
 
Figure 3. Experiment 2 - Main effect of Figure Shape 
 
The main effect of Figure Type, F(1, 46) = 3.72, MSe = 1079.55, p < .06, almost 
reached significance, due to Animals (M = 54.21) being more often labeled with rounded 
names than Robots (M = 45.06), as reported in Fig. 4.  
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Figure 4. Experiment 2 - Main effect of  Figure Type 
 
The interaction Group x Figure Type was significant, F(2, 92) = 5.85, MSe = 1079.55, 
p < .05. If an undifferentiated pattern in respect of Figure Type was observed in Children 
responses (Animal M = 47.92%, Robot M = 50.24%), the category of the stimuli exerted a 
clear effect on the responses of Adults (Animal M = 60.49%, Robot M = 39.88%; LSD p < 
.01) (see Fig. 5). 
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Figure 5. Experiment 2 - Interaction Group x Figure Type 
 
The interaction Figure Type x Figure Shape was significant as well, F(2, 92) = 23.70, 
MSe = 90.55, p < .001, showing that Animal Rounded shape (M = 60.37%) received 
significantly more rounded responses than all other conditions (Animal Jagged shape M = 
48.04%; Robot Rounded shape M = 44.54%, Robot Jagged shape M = 45.58%) (LSD, all ps < 
.001), with the category effect suppressing the sound-shape correspondence for natural jagged 
shape and especially for artificial rounded shape (see Fig. 6).  
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Figure 6. Experiment 2 - Interaction Figure Type x Figure Shape 
 
No other effects or interactions were significant. 
As in Experiment 1, a further analysis considering only the first presentation of each 
picture was performed to control for the effect of figure repetition. The rounded responses to 
the first presentation were entered as percentages in the mixed 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA with the 
between factor Group (Children vs. Adults) and the within factors Figure Type (Animal vs. 
Robot), Figure Shape (Rounded vs. Jagged). Fisher’s LSD post hoc tests were conducted on 
significant interactions. The analysis showed as significant the interaction Figure Type x 
Figure Shape, F(2, 92) = 23.70, MSe = 90.55, p < .001, indicating a modulation of Animal 
Rounded shape (M = 59.55%), which received significantly more rounded responses than all 
other conditions (Animal Jagged shape M = 50.42%; Robot Rounded shape M = 48.30%, 
Robot Jagged shape M = 49.86%) (LSD p < .001). No other effects or interactions were 
significant.  
Given the different results of the analysis on the first presentation of each picture and 
the overall results of Experiment 2, it might be useful to look at the two groups individually, 
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so we performed two separated 2 x 2 ANOVA, with the within factors Figure Type (Animal 
vs. Robot) and Figure Shape (Rounded vs. Jagged), on the data collected at the first 
appearance of each picture. Fisher’s LSD post hoc tests were conducted on significant 
interactions.  The analysis of the Children responses to the first appearance of each picture did 
not show main effects or interactions. The analysis of the Adults, instead, showed that a main 
effect almost reached significance, while the interaction was reliable.  First, the expected main 
effect of Figure Shape was marginally significant, F(1, 23) = 3.33, MSe = 354.57, p < .09, due 
to Rounded shapes (M = 54.65%) being more often assigned to a rounded sounding name than 
Jagged shapes (M = 47.64%). The interaction between Figure Type and Figure Shape was 
reliable, F(2, 46) = 6.03, MSe = 339.62, p < .05, showing a modulation of the category 
especially for Animal Rounded shape (M = 65.56%), which received significantly more 
rounded responses than all other conditions (Animal Jagged shape M = 49.31%; Robot 
Rounded shape M = 43.75%, Robot Jagged shape M = 45.97%) (LSD, all ps < .001). No other 
main effects or interactions were significant.  
To control if the results were related to the pictures ratings, we correlated subjects’ 
mean rating to each picture and the mean percentage of rounded responses then assigned to 
that picture. While the correlation was not significant for children (r = -.03, p > .4), a positive 
significant correlation was observed for adults (r = .20, p < .001), indicating a fine-grained 
effect of the subjective perception of roundness on the choice of the name. 
Mixed effects models were conducted to confirm and clarify results from ANOVA and 
correlations. Models started from the most complete one, with Figure Type, Rating and Group 
as fixed effects, and as random effects Item (i.e., each picture), Names Pair (i.e., the two 
names within to choose), and Participant in interaction with Figure Type, Ratings and Group. 
The procedure was the same as described in Experiment 1.  The final model resulting from 
this procedure consisted of all fixed effects in interaction, and Item, Names Pair and 
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Participant in interaction with Figure Type and Group as random effects (AIC = 5840, BIC = 
5943, Log-likelihood =-2904).  
 
9.3.3. Discussion 
The sound-symbolic correspondence between shapes and sounds was confirmed with figures 
of natural and artificial agents in Experiment 2. It was also observed in the adult group when 
considering only the first presentation of each visual stimulus. Thus, results found in 
Experiment 1 with natural objects and artifacts were replicated with natural and artificial 
agents. 
 Besides this “classic” sound-symbolic effect, in the overall analysis we found that 
label assignment was modulated by the category, thus confirming our hypothesis (see Fig. 4 
and 6). As to the developmental pattern, in the adults group we found a clear interaction 
between sound and category, which was not present in children (see Fig. 5). Indeed, a 
sonorant, rounded-sounding word (e.g. maluma) was more frequently assigned to an animal, 
and a strident, sharp-sounding word (e.g. takete) was more frequently assigned to a robot. 
This result shows with a paradigm never used in studies on categorization that natural and 
artificial agents differ also for some general characteristics related to sounds: natural items are 
associated to smoother sounds in comparison to artificial ones. Results of Experiment 2 show 
also that the category effect interacted with the sound-shape correspondence. If the classic 
effect was present for animals, jagged responses were always preferred for robots, 
independently of their shape (as reported in Fig. 6). Thus, with artificial agents a sound-
category correspondence suppressed the classic sound-shape correspondence. This interaction 
clearly indicated that the modulation of the takete-maluma effect due to the category appeared 
both in adults and children, as confirmed also by the marginally significant main effect of 
Figure Type (see Fig. 4) . However, it could be argued that the effect of category is due to a 
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confound of the figures stimuli, which might be more rounded for animals than for robots. We 
do not believe that this is the case, for two main reasons. Firstly, neither an interaction 
between Figure Type and Figure Shape nor a triple interaction between Group, Figure Type 
and Figure Shape were observed in the experimental group's ratings. Thus, results of the 
ratings by the experimental groups are not predicting the interaction between Figure Type and 
Figure Shape, that we observed in the labeling task. Moreover, the difference between jagged 
and rounded robots in participants’ ratings was significant (Robot: Rounded shape M = 4.45, 
Jagged shape M = 1.97; LSD p < .001), while the effect on the task performance with robots 
was not. This pattern of responses was not predicted by the corresponding independent 
groups’ ratings (Robot: Rounded shape M = 4.51, Jagged shape M = 2.08; LSD p < .001). 
Secondly, and most important, mixed effects models results clearly showed that both Figure 
Type and Rating values (i.e., subjective perception of jaggedness), as well as Group, are 
crucial factors required to explain our data. While we cannot exclude that perceptual 
differences between the two kinds of figures we have chosen might have a contribution in 
performance, we believe that this cannot be the main factor underlying the resulting effects 
related to the Figure Type factor.  
As to the developmental pattern, our results suggest that the effect emerges with age, 
confirming the hypothesis that categories of young children are more malleable, since the 
effects of language on them is not yet marked as in adults categories (Sera et al., 2002). This 
higher malleability of children's categories is confirmed by the fact that in children the sound-
symbolic correspondence was not present during the first presentation of the stimuli, while for 
adults it was. This suggests that children were extracting the sound-symbolic relations and 
learning how to use them during the labeling task. Furthermore, the results of the correlational 
analysis between children’s ratings and performance indicated that also the link between the 
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perception of external entities’ features related to shape and the ability to implicitly use them 
in cognitive tasks is still developing.  
 
 
9.4. General Discussion 
In Experiment 1 we asked a group of adults to choose a name between two alternatives for 
figures of every-day objects, i.e., natural objects (e.g., fruit) and artifacts (e.g., kitchen tools). 
The results showed the “classic” takete-maluma effect: we found a reliable perceptual 
correspondence between names sound and shapes appearance. This result reveals that the 
effect can be found also with every-day objects. However no effect of the objects category 
(natural vs. artificial) was found, even if it was predicted by the ratings of both experimental 
and independent groups.  
In Experiment 2 we selected a subcategory among the natural and artificial categories, 
the category of agents, with the aim to render the two contrasting categories of natural and 
artificial agents more compact and better comparable. Stimuli were figures depicting animals 
(natural agents) or robots (artificial agents). In order to investigate the development of the 
effect, both adults and children were tested. This second experiment confirmed the “classic” 
takete-maluma effect. In addition, an effect of the category (natural vs. artificial) was 
observed too. First, adults only more frequently assigned rounded sounding names to animals 
than to robots, while for sharp sounding names the opposite was true (Figure 5). Second, the 
category also interacted with the takete-maluma effect, as this effect was present only with 
animals, while with robots a jagged response was always preferred independently on shape 
(Figure 6). Importantly, this interaction indicated that this modulation of the takete-maluma 
effect due to the category appeared both in adults and children.  
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Our results allow us to address the predictions made. First, we demonstrated that the 
sound-shape correspondence effect emerges with figures representing every-day objects or 
agents, that is with more ecological stimuli compared to those typically used in the literature. 
Second, the pairs of names used (Maurer et al., 2006) showed the predicted sound-to-shape 
symbolic mapping even when the figures were one-by-one presented (Nielsen & Rendall, 
2011). Thus, the effect was found with a paradigm which minimized both the risk of an 
enhancement of the results as the risk that participants could understand the aim of the study. 
These two considerations confirm and strengthen the effect observed in previous studies (e.g. 
Maurer et al., 2006). 
Third, modulations of the effect by the stimulus category were found in Experiment 2. 
Specifically, sound-shape correspondences were not observed with robots, which were 
associated more often to jagged responses despite of their actual shape. Importantly, this 
effect was not predicted by ratings, where adults and children both judged jagged robots as 
sharp, and rounded ones as round. One possible reason why we found the effect in 
Experiment 2, with the more compact and apparently less differentiated category of “agents”, 
and not in Experiment 1, can depend on the special “naming habit” used by children and 
adults in their interactions with biological agents (e.g. animals), and with any entity 
presenting animacy cues (e.g. eyes, mouth) and perceived as able to autonomously act (e.g. 
robots). Indeed, entities perceived as agents are usually renamed during the interactions with 
them: children and adults typically use a special name for their pets (e.g. their cat is not called 
just “cat”) and for their favorite teddy-bear, or robot toy. In contrast, it might seem more 
difficult to associate novel names to entities endowed only with generic names and not with 
proper names, as the objects of Experiment 1. In support of this explanation, research on the 
mutual exclusivity or lexical contrast constraint (Clark, 1987; Markman, 1989, 1992) has 
shown that during language acquisition we experience difficulties in using more names, for 
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example a basic and a superordinate one (e.g. “dog” and “animal”), to indicate the same 
referent. 
Fourth, while the takete-maluma effect and its modulation due to the category were 
stable across ages, the interaction between the produced sound and the category changed with 
development. Indeed, only adults showed the tendency to associate a jagged name to a robot 
and a rounded name to an animal independently from the shape. Children, differently from 
adults, did not show a sound-symbolic correspondence between word and category 
independently from shape. One could speculate that the emergence of sound-symbolic 
correspondences at the semantic level requires the acquisition of linguistic and cultural 
aspects related to categories. We explain the result referring to the linguistic experience of 
adults: it is possible that adults have more experience in listening to or actively associating 
more nouns to agents such as pets and toys. This experience might have led to associations 
between sound features (i.e. strident, sonorant) and categories properties (i.e. animal more 
rounded, robot more jagged) which go beyond the “classic” sound-symbolic correspondence 
between shapes and names based only on perceptual aspects of the stimulus. This result 
confirms that children categories are more perceptually grounded than adults ones (for the 
importance of shape and perceptual grounding in children categorization, see the literature on 
the “shape bias”, showing that names are extended on the basis of shape similarity, e.g., 
Landau et al., 1988, 1992; Smith, 2005). This interpretation is in line with the idea that, once 
the mapping between perceptual aspects and linguistic aspects is established, no grounding is 
necessary, but that participants can use a shortcut relying on associative knowledge (Barsalou 
et al., 2008; Connell & Lynott, 2013; for a discussion see Borghi et al., 2011). Importantly, 
the effects of category we observed cannot be merely attributed to perceptual aspects of the 
selected stimuli, as they are not mirroring the subjective judgments on figures roundness 
observed in the ratings. Nonetheless, in the ratings interesting effects of category emerged 
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both for objects and for agents: we suggest that these results might indicate an influence of 
factors such as category and age on the subjective perception of roundness. 
One could argue that the difference between children and adults could be due to the 
fact that the distinction between animate and inanimate entities becomes better differentiated 
with age. We tend to exclude this interpretation for at least two reasons. The first is that we 
found that the sound-shape correspondence was modulated by category in both adults and 
children. Only the interaction between sound and category independently of shape was 
present in adults but not in children. Thus the difference between adults and children does not 
seem to pertain the development of categories, but rather the development of associations 
between categories and linguistic labels. The second is that the literature has shown the ability 
to distinguish between artifacts and natural objects as emerging rather early: some studies 
have demonstrated with habituation, preferential looking or other methods that already 
prelinguistic infants are able to differentiate these two macro-categories (e.g. Behl-Chadha, 
1996; Mandler, 2004; Quinn & Johnson, 2000).  
Taken together, these results extend and strengthen evidence on the takete-maluma 
effect indicating that sound-symbolic correspondences may arise at either perceptual or 
semantic levels. In general, our results bolster the hypothesis of a natural relation between the 
structure of words and the meanings they convey, extending previous findings of the sound-
symbolic literature to entities taken from every-day life (see chapter 3). Moreover, they 
clearly suggest a mutual influence between the naturally biased sound-shape correspondences 
and the cultural and linguistic learning by which categorization is socially determined.  
Indeed it has been confirmed as possible not only an iconic relation between the name 
and its referent, but also a sound-symbolic correspondence with semantic aspects of the 
referents categories too, in interaction with the previous knowledge about them. As our results 
have been collected presenting real stimuli and invented words, a future direction for our 
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research could be conducting experiments in which presentation is reverse, that is invented 
rounded/jagged figures are presented with real words (strident/sonorant, and referring to 
natural objects/artifact). In such a setting it is very likely to observe sound-shape 
correspondences as facilitated or interfered according to word meaning.  
Finally, our results might have implications for the classical question about the 
arbitrariness of verbal language discussed in the introduction. Indeed, they can offer 
suggestions to speculate about a possible origin of contemporary conventionalized lexicons 
from more iconic ones, in keeping with the perspectives on cognition which hypothesize a 
direct, natural line of evolution from gestures to speech (e.g. Corballis, 2002, 2009; Gallese, 
2008; Gentilucci et al., 2004; Gentilucci & Corballis, 2006;  Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). 
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
The research project of my thesis, performed in the theoretical framework of embodiment, 
was aimed at demonstrating the high dynamicity and flexibility of situated simulation 
processes, as introduced in chapter 1. Among the issues relevant for this aim in the literature 
of embodied and grounded cognition, my experimental research has been focused on 
affordances and verbal language. These two topics were separately introduced in chapter 2 
and 3 of the thesis, where they were treated at both the theoretical and empirical level, with an 
extensive review of the related literature. In the second part of the thesis, the two topics were 
investigated in a series of original studies. The common starting point for all the reported 
experiments was that both object/action understanding and language comprehension are tied 
to the context in which they take place. In this direction, the reported studies attempted to 
clarify the factors able to modulate the simulation processes triggered by affordance and 
verbal language processing.  
Chapter 4 opened the experimental section of the thesis. The reported behavioural 
study investigated affordance-based compatibility effects related to tools embedded in 
complex visual contexts, defined by the presence of the tool, another object and a hand in 
interaction with them. The presence of the second object allowed to create different visual 
contexts defined by the tool-object relation, as the two items could be either spatially, 
functionally or not related. The active object and the second object could be presented alone, 
with a hand in potential interaction with the tool, or with a hand in effective interaction with 
the tool, in a manipulative or functional posture. In this setting, the activation of the different 
affordances (i.e., manipulative/functional) evoked by the same active object displayed in 
different contexts (i.e, move/use) were tested in a categorization task (i.e., the objects are 
related?) with hand or foot responses (Experiment 1 and 2, respectively). The results indicated 
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the advantage in response times for the functional over the spatial context in both 
experiments. This finding suggests that in complex scenes action knowledge was available 
earlier and accessed faster than thematic knowledge about objects. The cause of this different 
accessibility was related to the differences between functional and spatial relations. While 
functional relations between two objects are normally clear and, in some cases, socially 
established, spatial relations are more subject to individual differences and less 
conventionalized. This higher variability might explain why participants needed longer and 
produced more errors to verify a potential spatial relation than a functional relation between 
two objects. 
In the results of Experiment 1, manual responses revealed also the predicted action-
context compatibility effect: manipulative postures were favored by move contexts and 
inhibited by use contexts, while the reverse was true for functional postures. This confirmed 
the hypothesis that the emergence of specific object affordances is selectively modulated by 
the visual and social context displayed by the pictures. Additionally, the results of Experiment 
2 on foot responses did not show the compatibility of hand actions and contexts, suggesting 
that the findings of Experiment 1 were due to an effector-specific motor simulation, rather 
than to simple associations between contexts and hand-postures.  
The finding of a flexible activation modulated by the context have important 
theoretical implications for the debate on the supposed automaticity of the affordance effect. 
This automaticity was often inferred from the fact that, even if the task requires processing a 
given aspect of an object (for example assigning it to a given a category), affordances related 
to other aspects (e.g., grip, orientation) were activated. However, some evidence had already 
suggested factors that can flexibly modulate the activation of affordances. For example, 
Pellicano et al. (2010) and Tipper et al. (2006) have shown that affordance effects are not 
present with tasks implying simple perceptual processing of the stimuli, such as color 
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discrimination tasks, whereas they emerge when the task implies deeper processing, as in 
categorizations or decisions on objects shape. In line with this evidence, recent neuroimaging 
findings suggested that ventral stream areas for awareness of correct/incorrect contexts for 
man-made artifacts were not active when subjects were not seeking functional relationships 
between objects (Mizelle & Wheaton, 2010a). This suggests that the activation of affordances 
is dependent on the whole experimental situation, and the results described in chapter 4 
bolsters this conclusion as well, showing that also the (visual and social) context selectively 
modulates the activation of affordances. The present study suggests that our cognitive systems 
responds flexibly to changing contexts, and support the affordance competition hypothesis 
(Cisek, 2007), according to which a competition between different available action 
opportunities is activated. The evidence reported in chapter 4 demonstrates that contextual 
relations between objects, as well as the presence of an hand suggesting a specific action goal, 
are able to solve this competition.  
The study reported in chapter 5 further investigates the influence of different contexts 
on affordance activation focusing on a particular class of tools called conflict objects (i.e., 
tools endowed with different affordances associated to specific actions). In the present 
experiment, participants were asked to categorize (i.e., natural/artifact) conflict object pictures 
presented in different complex visual scenes that evoked either move- or use-related actions 
(i.e., move/use context). Categorization judgments were performed on a manipulandum ad-
hoc by executing a move- or use-related action (i.e., clench/pinch). The results confirmed the 
action-context compatibility effect found in chapter 4 with conflict objects as well, showing 
shorter latencies when the manual response movement and the visual context were 
compatible. The present data extends the findings reported in the previous chapters, 
demonstrating that the complex visual environment in which objects were embedded were 
able to guide affordance activation, modulating the move- and use-related gestures performed 
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during semantic object processing. As the reported action-context compatibility effects were 
related to the meaning conveyed by the action intention evoked by the whole visual scene, 
these findings  reinforce the conclusion advanced in chapter 4 that affordances are flexibly 
activated in dependence of the context. Additionally, the fact that the observed compatibility 
effects raised from exposition to very naturalistic visual contexts also provided a further 
ecological validation to action evocation phenomena during object processing. On the whole, 
the present study confirmed the predicted influence of visual scene on stimulus-response 
compatibility effects during semantic object processing. This finding brings additional 
support to action models that consider both action sub-types and contexts as key determinants 
for understanding interactions between visual objects and action processing (e.g., Buxbaum & 
Kalénine, 2010). Finally, the evidence reported in chapter 5 confirmed that the notion of 
automaticity often applied to affordance-based compatibility effects should at least be 
redefined. Indeed, the present results were observed in respect of properties of the motor 
responses that were totally irrelevant to successfully carry on the task. However, it is evident 
that they don’t stand in favor of an idea of automatic emergence or constant activation of 
affordances. In this direction, further research should try to integrate the different findings in 
the literature investigating the time scale at which the observed context effects emerge across 
different experimental situations. Indeed, it is still unclear if context-relevant action 
modulation arose before conceptual object processing is completed, thus affecting semantic 
processing from earlier stages of perceptual processing, or if object-related actions were 
automatically evoked during early processing stages, with the modulation of the context being 
a late filter that enhanced relevant action features during conceptual processing, discarding 
irrelevant ones.  
On the whole, the effects described in these two chapters clearly indicate a high degree 
of flexibility in the emergence of affordance effects. The results reported suggest overall that 
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all action features are not systematically integrated in the simulation of object concepts, and 
that the context play a crucial, selective role for this integration. Indeed, the studies presented 
in chapter 4 and 5, along with some findings reviewed in chapter 2 of this thesis, indicate that 
the situated simulation of object affordances can be modulated by several factors, including 
the visual scene and the social situation in which objects are embedded, the specific goals of 
the tasks, the mappings evaluated and the motor responses performed. This evidence about 
the understanding of action-related cognition confirms the general hypothesis of this thesis 
that flexibility and contextuality are crucial properties in the occurrence of simulation 
processes. 
The study in chapter 6 linked the two experimental topics of this thesis, affordances 
and verbal language, to take a further step in the investigation of simulation processes. The 
principal aim of the two experiments it reports was the direct comparison between the 
simulation triggered by visual objects processing and the simulation triggered by words 
referring to objects. Indeed, much research in the literature has been aimed at showing 
similarities in this processes, while more recent proposals have began to focus on their 
differences (e.g., Borghi & Riggio, 2009). In line with this, the present study tested the 
emergence of affordance-based compatibility effects in  a categorization task on pictures of 
big and small manipulable objects and on the names of the same objects. Participants listened 
to a category-word (i.e., artificial/natural) and had to decide among two stimuli 
simultaneously presented on the screen which corresponded to it, reporting their choice using 
either a big mouse, requiring a power grip, or a small mouse, requiring a precision grip. The 
results of Experiment 1 showed a compatibility effect between the hand posture on the mouse 
and the grip elicited by pictures of objects in function of their size: mouse trajectories were 
more direct, revealing less uncertainty in the decisional process, when the dimension of the 
mouse and the object size were congruent. In addition, a clear influence of the distractor size 
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on the response was observed, as in the case in which the dimension of the mouse matched 
that of the distractor, responses were more uncertain. Furthermore, the degree of uncertainty 
was higher when the object and the distractor size matched than when they did not. Finally, 
the finding that natural objects were processed faster than artifacts not only confirmed 
previous research (e.g., Borghi et al., 2007), but related also to what observed in chapter 4 and 
5. Indeed, since artifacts are designed to be used, not only manipulation but functional 
information was activated as well, with the possibility that the two kinds of information 
competed slowing down responses. Overall, these results revealed that participants were 
sensitive to the static hand postures required to use the response devices. The results obtained 
in Experiment 2 with words (i.e., the names of the objects presented in Experiment 1) were 
quite different, as they did not show the predicted compatibility between the hand posture and 
the implied dimension of the target stimulus. However, an  interaction of the object and the 
distractor size in dependence of the mouse dimension showed higher response uncertainty 
when big targets were matched with big than small distractors. This finding revealed that 
participants were in a certain measure sensitive to the size of object words referred to. Finally, 
the results showed an higher uncertainty for artifacts compared to natural objects, matching 
what observed in Experiment 1.  
At first sight, the absence of the predicted compatibility effect might seem problematic 
for an embodied account of language processing. However, evidence of the activation of 
motor information with words was found as well, as the presence of modulations of size 
suggests that words elicited modal information part of an embodied re-enactment of the 
associated sensory-motor experience. The overall results can be read in terms of recent 
proposals emerging in the embodied cognition literature. Indeed, theories of reuse (or neural 
exploitation, see Gallese, 2008) suggest that if language recruits structures and mechanisms 
characterizing the motor system, it also modifies and builds on them (e.g., Anderson, 2010; 
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Borghi, 2012; Pezzulo & Castelfranchi, 2009). The present results suggest that, while the 
compatibility between the executed grip and the observed visual object occurs online, motor 
information on object size is processed offline as well, influencing language comprehension 
too. On the whole, the reported study further confirms with static hand postures the flexibility 
of affordance-based compatibility effects, extending the previous evidence on the simulation 
triggered by visual objects to linguistic stimuli referring to objects.  
The three experimental studies reported in chapter 7, 8, and 9 are focused on the 
second topic of the thesis, verbal language. In particular, abstract language grounding was 
investigated in the experiments described in chapter 7 and 8, while chapter 9 reported an 
original research on sound-symbolism. 
The study described in chapter 7 was aimed at testing the predictions advanced about 
language grounding by the Words As social Tools theory (WAT), according to which the 
differences between abstract and concrete words are related to their different modalities of 
acquisition (MoA). The hypothesis tested in the present study was that abstract words 
meaning would be more strongly grounded in socio-linguistic experiences, while concrete 
words meaning would rely more on sensory-motor experiences. In order to mimic the 
acquisition of novel concrete and abstract words/concepts, firstly participants were submitted 
to a training in which they manipulated invented objects (i.e., concrete entities) and observed 
groups of invented objects interacting in novel ways (i.e., abstract relations) on a screen. 
Thus, novel abstract categories did not refer to single objects, but to complex relationships 
between different objects, and they were not manipulable. Then, in a further training phase, 
this set of stimuli was then labeled with invented category-names, and in four experiments a 
variety of tasks were performed to study the acquisition of the novel concrete and abstract 
concepts/words. Experiment 1 controlled with a production task that the pattern of properties 
produced for the novel categories was similar to the one typically observed for existing 
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concrete and abstract words. In Experiment 2 and 3, abstract words were also learned by half 
of the participants by associating an explanations of their meaning, while in Experiment 4 the 
explanation was provided along with the label for concrete categories as well. This situation 
should resemble the learning process of children, as showed in studies on MoA (e.g., Wauters 
et al., 2003). The results of Experiment 2, 3 and 4 showed that this learning process 
influenced a later color verification task: participants responded faster to concrete words with 
manual responses, while response latencies for abstract words were shorter with vocal 
responses. This finding confirmed previous evidence on action words that showed faster 
responses with the microphone than with the keyboard to sentences describing mouth-related 
actions (Scorolli & Borghi, 2007). In addition, in line with WAT prediction, the performance 
with abstract words improved when participants were provided with a verbal explanation 
along with the label (Experiment 2 and 3), while this effect was not observed in concrete 
words (Experiment 4). The fact that the advantage of the explanation was confined to abstract 
words revealed that their difference was not simply due to phono-articulatory aspects, but that 
for accessing the meaning of abstract words linguistic information played a crucial role. This 
was confirmed by the finding that when in Experiment 4 the verbal explanations were 
designed to contradict the perceptually-based category features, the advantage of the 
microphone over the keyboard for abstract words was strongly reduced compared to the other 
experiments. Finally, the results of categorical recognition tasks in Experiment 3 and 4 clearly 
revealed that language was relevant for both concrete and abstract categories, probably 
because the linguistic label is a further cue that allows a better differentiation between 
categories (e.g., Mirolli & Parisi, 2011). These findings open an interesting scenario. 
Language was relevant for both concrete and abstract words, but in tasks for which 
categorization was not relevant, such as the final color verification task, it was more 
accessible in representing abstract than concrete concepts. This might occur as more linguistic 
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information was needed in order to define the boundaries of abstract concepts, being the 
members of abstract categories were not manipulable.  
On the whole, the results of the present study confirmed WAT predictions. They 
confirmed that linguistic information was more crucial than sensory-motor information in the 
representation of abstract concepts. However, it was also demonstrated that all the novel 
concepts acquired were not only grounded in perception and action systems, because in 
developing their representation language was important too. This finding suggests that real 
abstract words would activate linguistic as well as sensory-motor areas in the brain, in line 
with embodied and grounded theories of language comprehension. Finally, these results - 
revealing that a different learning process flexibly led to differences in performance on a 
variety of tasks (e.g., property production, property verification) -  showed that the novel 
conceptual representations were developed and positioned in the concrete-abstract continuum 
in direct function of the different contexts (e.g., sensory-motor, linguistic) in which each 
category was acquired.  
Chapter 8 reported a study that further inquire into the grounding of abstract concepts. 
In this case, the metaphoric mapping of an abstract dimension on a more concrete one is 
investigated, in particular the TIME IS SPACE metaphor, with the aim of highlighting the 
flexible activation of such conceptual mappings. The TIME IS SPACE metaphor consists in 
the use of a mental timeline to organize and spatially represent the abstract contents of 
temporal expressions. As in the literature previous research on the issue of space-time 
compatibility effect in time-irrelevant task have produced unclear evidence, the present study 
tested the activation of the left-right mental timeline in both an explicit temporal reference 
judgment and a lexical decision task. The set of stimuli was composed by verbs and pseudo-
verbs endowed with past and future tense markers, especially selected to secure a deep 
processing of each item. Both tasks, apart from the dimension evaluated, followed an identical 
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procedure and used an identical pool of stimuli, in order to allow a trustworthy statistical 
comparison of their results. The results showed a strong space-time congruency effect when 
participants judged temporal reference, while no compatibility was observed for the time-
irrelevant lexical decisions. This happened not only in Experiment 1, when response latencies 
were used to measure the effect as in previous studies, but also in Experiment 2, when the 
mouse trajectories performed by participants to decide over concurrent response possibilities 
were recorded. The findings of both experiments are consistent with the view that, all other 
factors being equal, only the conceptual mappings that are required to carry out the task are 
set up in working memory. This is predicted by the coherent working models theory proposed 
by Santiago and collegues (2011), which fundamentally rests on the assumption that mental 
models of any situation are constrained to be the most internally coherent and simple as 
possible. The authors explicitly indicated this characteristic of mental models as the central 
factor for accounting the flexibility of conceptual congruency effects which has been 
observed in the literature in a wide variety of tasks, and that this thesis highlighted for 
affordance-based compatibility effects too (e.g., Borghi et al., 2012; Kalénine et al., 2013; 
Natraj et al., 2013). Thus, only the strictly necessary information was retrieved from the long-
term memory system to be included in participants’ mental model of the current situation. 
However, even if this evidence clearly favors a flexible view of compatibility effects, the 
issue of the automaticity (or lack thereof) in the activation of the mental timeline could not be 
considered definitively closed. Indeed, there are several directions for modifying time-
irrelevant tasks that future research still needs to explore, starting from the use of temporal 
stimuli which have a more direct link to temporal reference (e.g., weekdays, months). A 
second possibility is that more sensitive and subtle measures (e.g., eye tracking) might be able 
to find the effects in the same experimental setting. Finally, it is also possible that future 
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research may design tasks that in respect to lexical decisions are able to activate the spatial 
dimension even if requiring cognitive processes different from space-time mapping. 
On the whole, the present results support flexible accounts of the activation of 
conceptual mapping such as the TIME IS SPACE metaphor, confirming that space-time 
congruency effects emerge only in the case in which participants are explicitly required to 
judge temporal reference of the stimuli. This evidence suggests that conceptual effects are 
strongly mediated by the experimental context, as it was determined by the different goals of 
the tasks performed. 
Chapter 9 reported the last experimental study of the thesis, which focused on sound-
symbolism. Following the assumption that speech evolved from gestures (e.g., Corballis, 
2002), several scholars suggested that sound-symbolism played an important role in the 
evolution of contemporary vocal languages, sustaining grounding and embodiment of verbal 
languages (see par. 3.6). In line with this view, recent research emphasized the role and 
importance of iconicity in language as the possible mean for connecting and grounding the 
linguistic-communicative form in the sensory-motor characteristics of words referents. These 
hypotheses are  thought to be supported by a variety of findings, among others the evidence of 
iconic correspondences between the sound of invented words (i.e., strident, sonorant) and 
information from the visual modality (e.g., roundness, jaggedness). However, the literature on 
sound-to-meaning mappings was confined in the realm of invented entities, being limited to 
figures created ad-hoc for the experiments. If sound-symbolism is assumed as playing a role 
in both natural language evolution and ontogenetic grounding, this implies the necessity of 
observing it in more ecological experimental settings. In order to extend the literature to 
existing categories, the hypothesis guiding the present study was that sound-shape 
correspondences would be observed when participants had to choose, between two invented 
words, the name which better suited an image representing an every-day entity. The results 
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confirmed the “classic” sound-shape correspondence in this more ecological settings, showing 
the effect both in Experiment 1, when participants chose a name for figures of natural objects 
(e.g., leaf) and artifacts (e.g., fork), and in Experiment 2, when participants chose a name for 
figures of natural (i.e., animals) and artificial agents (i.e., robots). Furthermore, a modulation 
of the category emerged when participants had to name agents. Specifically, sound-shape 
correspondences were not observed with robots, which were associated more often to strident 
words despite of their actual shape. One possible reason for observing this effect with the 
category of agents can depend on the special “naming habit” characterizing the interactions of 
humans with biological agents (e.g., animals), and with any entity presenting animacy cues 
(e.g., eyes), or perceived as able to autonomously act (e.g., robot). Indeed, entities identified 
as agents are usually renamed during the interactions with them: adults typically use a special 
name for their pets, and children do it also for their favorite teddy-bear or robot toy. In 
contrast, it might seem more difficult to associate novel names to entities endowed only with 
generic names and not with proper names as the objects of Experiment 1. In support of this 
explanation, research on the mutual exclusivity or lexical contrast constraint (e.g., Markman, 
1992) showed that during language acquisition we experience difficulties in using more 
names, for example a basic (e.g., dog) and a superordinate one (e.g., animal) to denote the 
same referent. In general, the results bolster the hypothesis of a natural relation between the 
structure of words and the meanings they convey, extending previous findings in the sound-
symbolic literature to entities taken from every-day life. Moreover, they clearly suggest a 
mutual influence between the naturally biased sound-shape correspondences and the cultural 
and linguistic learning by which categorization is socially determined. Indeed, it has been 
confirmed as possible not only an iconic relation between the name and its referent, but also a 
sound-symbolic correspondence with semantic aspects of the referents categories too, in 
interaction with the previous knowledge about them. Finally, the present results have 
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implications for the classical question about the arbitrariness of verbal language. Indeed, they 
may offer a base to speculate about a possible origin of contemporary conventionalized 
lexicons from more iconic ones, in keeping with the perspectives on cognition which 
hypothesize a direct, natural line of evolution from gestures to speech (e.g., Arbib, 2005; 
Corballis, 2002; Gallese, 2008; Gentilucci & Corballis, 2006; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004).  
On the whole, this thesis describes evidence on affordances and verbal language that 
clearly stay in favor of embodied and grounded views of cognition. Crucially, the results 
collected on the investigated conceptual effects support the original hypothesis that guided 
this research: the high flexibility of situated simulation processes. Indeed, the evidence 
reported confirms that the context is able to play a crucial role in affordances emergence, 
metaphoric mappings activation and language grounding. The perception of the whole 
situation itself is flexibly shaped and determined by a number of factors, which in an 
experimental setting can include the goals of the task, the kind of stimuli used, the physical 
and social scene in which stimuli might be embedded, the mappings evaluated, the training 
performed, the responses executed. In other words, the identification of the experimental 
situation as being that specific situation, which calls for certain appropriate behaviours, is 
itself a matter of contextuality. 
In conclusion, this thesis highlights that in an embodied perspective cognition is 
necessarily situated and anchored to a specific context, as it is sustained by the existence of a 
specific body immersed in a specific environment. This suggests that in future the 
experimental research on embodied cognition should be aimed at investigating simulation 
processes – and, in general, the human mind and behaviour - in the most ecological settings, if 
not in natural, every-day situations. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 
  
  TARGET OBJECT 2nd OBJECT RELATION 
1 Spoon Plate Functional 
2 Fork Strawberries Functional 
3 Tennis racquet Ball Functional 
4 Tea-strainer Mug Functional 
5 Knife Butter Functional 
6 Screw-driver Screw Functional 
7 Bottle opener Bottle Functional 
8 Paint-brush Can of paint Functional 
9 Scissors Paper Functional 
10 USB Laptop Functional 
11 Wrench Nut/Bolt Functional 
12 Syringe Needle medicine Functional 
13 Iron Crumpled Shirt Functional 
14 Coffee Pot Mug Functional 
15 Hammer Nail Functional 
16 Coffee measurer/scoop Coffee Functional 
17 Shaving razor Foam Functional 
18 Skillet Vegetable Functional 
19 Ice cream scooper Ice cream Functional 
20 Spatula Skillet Functional 
21 Marker Paper Functional 
22 Can opener Can of vegetables Functional 
23 Wine bottle opener Wine bottle Functional 
24 Spoon Screw No Relation 
25 Fork Tennis ball No Relation 
26 Tennis racquet Book bag No Relation 
27 Tea-strainer Laptop No Relation 
28 Knife Nail No Relation 
29 Screw-driver Paper No Relation 
30 Bottle opener Mouse No Relation 
31 Paint-brush Lamp No Relation 
32 Scissors Bottle No Relation 
33 USB Tennis ball No Relation 
34 Wrench Paper No Relation 
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35 Syringe Spoon No Relation 
36 Iron Tea cup No Relation 
37 Coffee Pot Marker No Relation 
38 Hammer Crumpled Shirt No Relation 
39 Coffee measurer/scoop Paper No Relation 
40 Shaving razor Paper No Relation 
41 Skillet Pen No Relation 
42 Ice cream scooper Paper No Relation 
43 Spatula Mouse No Relation 
44 Marker USB No Relation 
45 Can opener USB No Relation 
46 Wine bottle opener Mouse No Relation 
47 Spoon Pot Spatial 
48 Fork Glass Spatial 
49 Tennis racquet Shoe Spatial 
50 Tea-strainer Sugar Spatial 
51 Knife Pot Spatial 
52 Screw-driver Flash-light Spatial 
53 Bottle opener Coffee cup Spatial 
54 Paint-brush Marker Spatial 
55 Scissors Stapler Spatial 
56 USB Mouse Spatial 
57 Wrench Catalogue Spatial 
58 Syringe Cotton swab Spatial 
59 Iron Detergent Spatial 
60 Coffee Pot Milk Spatial 
61 Hammer Wood Spatial 
62 Coffee measurer/scoop Coffee cup Spatial 
63 Shaving razor Soap Spatial 
64 Skillet Plate Spatial 
65 Ice cream scooper Plate Spatial 
66 Spatula Fork Spatial 
67 Marker Scissors Spatial 
68 Can opener Plate Spatial 
69 Wine bottle opener Glass Spatial 
Table a. Target-objects list with the corresponding paired objects
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CHAPTER 5 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 
 
Normative study 
The 40 critical scene pictures were assessed for their ability to evoke a particular 
gesture, either pinch or clench, when the subject was explicitly asked to pantomime a gesture 
appropriate for the conflict object as depicted in the scene. 16 additional healthy subjects (5 
males) volunteered for participation in the norming experiment. On each trial, the scene 
picture appeared on the screen. After 1000 ms, a red box appeared around the conflict item in 
each photograph lasting 750 ms, and then disappearing from the photograph. Participants task 
was to pantomime with their left hand how they would interact with the highlighted object in 
that particular context. Participants were always asked to respond with their left hand while 
their right hand in order to allow future comparisons with left hemisphere stroke patients. 
Thus, as left hemisphere stroke patients frequently have reduced right arm mobility, the 
mobility of the right limb was limited with an arm sling. Participants were given explicit 
instructions to take note of the context as it would inform them about how they might interact 
with that object in real life. They were also instructed to respond as quickly as possible so as 
to reflect the most natural and immediate gesture evoked by the object in that environment.  A 
response was coded as a clench if pantomimed contact with an imaginary object included the 
palm of the hand, had a rounded aperture, and used more than 3 active fingers. A response 
was coded as a pinch if the subject pantomimed contact with the object with only the thumb 
and the index finger or only the thumb, index, and middle finger. It was also coded as a pinch 
if the subject gestured with more than 3 fingers but pantomimed contacting the object with the 
tips of the fingers and/or formed a hand posture with a flat aperture. Responses were recorded 
by video camera and coded offline by one of 2 experimenters, who demonstrated 90% inter-
rater reliability. To prevent coding biases experimenters did not have knowledge of the scene 
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or object to which the subject was pantomiming. The norming experiment contained 40 trials, 
presented randomly. There were two scenes for each of 20 conflict objects: one scene 
depicted the conflict object in a USE context and the other scene depicted the conflict object 
in a MOVE context. Norming data confirmed that each conflict object received more pinch 
gestures in the USE compared to the MOVE context while it received more clench gestures in 
the MOVE compared to the USE context. Overall, in the MOVE context there were 175 
clench and 142 pinch gestures, whereas in the USE context there were 103 clench and 210 
pinch gestures.  
CONFLICT ITEM MOVE SCENE USE SCENE 
Book On bookshelf Open on desk 
Playing cards Stacked in drawer Stacked on card table 
Binder clip In supply drawer Affixed to paper stack on desk 
Cookie jar On pantry shelf On counter, lid slightly ajar 
Corkscrew In kitchen drawer In corked wine bottle 
Cheese grater In kitchen drawer In bowl on kitchen counter 
Jewelry box On bathroom shelf On bathroom counter, slightly ajar 
Keys In desk drawer Inserted to desk lock 
Lamp On supply shelf On desk, angled toward magazine 
Pencil sharpener On bathroom shelf On desk, pencil inserted 
Pin cushion On bathroom shelf On bathroom counter 
Post-it On bathroom shelf On desk, top note written on 
Pot lid On dish rack On pot on stove 
Soda can On pantry shelf On counter next to glass 
Measuring spoons In kitchen drawer On kitchen counter, inserted in baking soda 
Tape dispenser In desk drawer On desk, with gift wrapping supplies 
Kitchen timer In kitchen drawer On kitchen counter 
Tissue On bathroom shelf On bathroom counter, slightly ajar 
Toilet paper On bathroom shelf On roll next to toilet 
Tupperware On dish rack On kitchen counter with food inside, slightly ajar 
Table a. Conflict item list with their corresponding MOVE and USE scenes
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CHAPTER 9 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 
 
WORDS PAIRS 
Jagged Names Rounded Names 
KIKI BOBA 
KUTI BAMA 
TITI GOGA 
TUKITI MABUMA 
Table 1. Word pairs 
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Figure a. Experiment 1 - Stimuli figures 
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Experiment 2 - STIMULI FIGURES 
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Figure b. Experiment 2 - Stimuli figures 
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